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Autonomous weapon systems (AWS) can select and engage targets without human 
intervention. They, therefore, act as both weapons and fighters in combat. The current legal rules 
governing these areas are written for humans to apply and abide by, with a subsequent responsibility 
regime for violations. Thus, as machines, AWS pose a challenge to these legal rules. This thesis asks if 
international law as it currently stands is sufficient to regulate AWS, or if new law is required?  
This thesis presents a novel way of understanding the relationship between AWS and those 
who control them that is rooted in the lex lata. It demonstrates that AWS exist at the centre of ‘layers 
of control’ where the influence of political decision-makers, weapons reviewers, AWS developers, and 
AWS users can clearly be seen. Doing so views AWS as their legal agents, meaning that the legal 
regimes regulating weapons, targeting, and responsibility can be applied to the actions of AWS 
through these controlling entities. 
Ultimately, this thesis concludes that, in most cases, current international law rules are 
sufficient to regulate the development, use, and responsibility for AWS. In coming to this conclusion 
through the ‘layers of control’ approach, it is argued that: the weapons law regime needs to be 
interpreted flexibly in order that the autonomous nature of AWS can be sufficiently considered; 
human beings must, for the foreseeable future, play a significant rule in the use of AWS; the entities 
controlling AWS must be seen as acting through these systems in order for responsibility to be 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. The argument and contribution 
The main argument of this thesis is that international law, even as it currently stands, can be 
interpreted and applied to sufficiently regulate autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in armed conflict. 
This is significant because of the remote chances of international agreement upon new law in this 
area.  The argument is rooted in the notion that, despite having ‘machine autonomy’, these systems 
are limited by their programming and the instructions they receive and so are subject to the ‘control’ 
of multiple entities.   
This thesis provides an original contribution by employing a novel approach to ‘control’. In this 
understanding, the AWS is at the centre of four ‘layers of control’ that are each associated with a 
controlling entity.  These layers are: political control, concerning decisions about engaging in armed 
conflict using AWS; procurement control, entailing decisions about reviewing AWS and approving 
them for use in particular situations; technical control, involving decisions about how AWS should 
recognise targets and civilians; tactical control, covering decisions about how AWS can be used during 
attacks.  
Where these entities correctly implement legal rules as part of their exercise of control, the 
resulting freedom for the AWS is that which is legally permissible; meaning that their use should be 
fully compliant with the applicable bodies of law. Owing to the qualitative deliberations required to 
comply with several of the applicable legal rules, and the inability of machines to ever make such 
decisions, this means that human beings who exert control in each layer are legally required to take 
key decisions about the use of AWS, particularly in relation to targeting. Consequently, human 
decision-making can be seen at the very centre of AWS operations, despite performance of the actual 
attacks being delegated to these machines. 
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In determining whether international law, as it currently stands, is sufficient to regulate AWS, 
this thesis is focussed upon the lex lata and how it can be best brought to bear on the novel challenges 
of regulating AWS without stretching its interpretation too. This thesis explains how a realistic 
interpretation of current law provides a framework that enables sufficient regulation to ensure lawful 
use of these systems and, crucially, provides an adequate responsibility regime in the event that these 
rules are violated. In order to provide a responsibility regime tailored to AWS, a modest lex ferenda 
suggestion is made in relation to weapons reviewers. In assessing the legal issues of AWS, several large 
debates in international law are touched upon, including issues of civilians directly participating in 
hostilities, and the difficulties of investigating and prosecuting crimes conducted during the conduct 
of hostilities. The central issues in these debates apply equally to AWS. Literature on these debates, 
and international law more widely, is drawn upon not only to take a position on these issues, but also 
to advance the field through placing the distinctive challenges of AWS within them.  
 
2. Machine autonomy in AWS 
In order to build this contribution, Chapter 2 outlines how AWS function with ‘machine 
autonomy’ whilst still being subject to human control, and how this can be perceived through different 
definitions and paradigms for understanding AWS. The way in which machines use algorithms to sense 
and process data is explained using computer science literature from Boden,1 Fry,2 and Domingos3 in 
order to create a foundational understanding of how all systems with ‘artificial intelligence’ function. 
The work of Sharkey,4 Arkin,5 Boulanin and Verbruggen,6 and the International Panel on the Regulation 
 
1 Margaret A Boden, AI (OUP, 2016). 
2 Hannah Fry, Hello World (Doubleday, 2018). 
3 Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm (Perseus Books, 2015). 
4 Noel Sharkey, 'Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned From The Drones' (2011) 21 Journal of Law, Information 
& Science, 140. 
5 Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour In Autonomous Robots (CRC Press, 2009). 




of Autonomous Weapons7 is then used to build upon this foundation and explain the specific nature 
of AWS. This Chapter explains that, fundamentally, AWS can be understood as encompassing sensors, 
processors, and actuators, and that they function according to their algorithms.  
Next, philosophical,8 physiological,9 and critical computer science literature10 is explored to 
demonstrate that the concept of ‘artificial intelligence’ is a misnomer and that no machine could ever 
really be seen as equating to a living being. The consequence of this observation is that AWS are 
subject to programming written by their developers and instructions provided by their users; this is 
fundamental to the functioning of ‘autonomous’ systems, it is impossible for any machine to operate 
beyond these boundaries or the control of their developers and users. The work of Weizenbaum is 
crucial in coming to this view. He explains that even if machines are developed to their absolute 
technological limit and their programmer, or user, could ask them why they acted in a particular way, 
their ultimate answer would be, ‘Because you told me to.’11 Winter comes to a similar conclusion with 
AWS, and explains that autonomous systems do not make decisions, but they apply the decisions of 
their programmers and users.12 Whilst AWS and fighters in combat play the same role, i.e. conducting 
hostilities, the crucial difference is that human beings can make decisions for themselves, whereas a 
machine can only apply decisions within the limits of its programming and instructions.13 
 
7 International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 'Technology And Application Of Autonomous 
Weapons' (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017). 
8 Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum, 'The Grounds Of Moral Status’ Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy Archive (Stanford University, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190318070216/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entrie
s/grounds-moral-status/>. 
9 Mark Bishop, 'Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain' (2009) 19 Minds and Machines, 507; Philippe Rochat, 'Five 
Levels Of Self-Awareness As They Unfold Early In Life' (2003) 12 Consciousness and Cognition, 717. 
10 Roger Penrose, Shadows Of The Mind (OUP, 1996), 127-208; Peter Stone et al., ‘Artificial Intelligence and 
Life in 2030’ (Stanford University, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919211256/https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861
/f/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf> 6. 
11 Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power And Human Reason (WH Freeman, 1976), 260. 
12 Elliot Winter, 'Autonomous Weapons In Humanitarian Law: Understanding The Technology, Its Compliance 
With The Principle Of Proportionality And The Role Of Utilitarianism' (2018) 6 Groningen Journal of 
International Law, 183, 193. 
13 ‘contrary to what is suggested by science-fiction scenarios, the danger is not that robots begin to disobey. 
Quite the reverse: it is that they never disobey.’, See Gregoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (Penguin Books, 2015). 
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Having explained how AWS, as a matter of fact, could be said to be subject to human control, 
Chapter 2 then explores different definitions of AWS from the US,14 the UK,15 Russia,16 the 
Netherlands,17 France,18 China,19 Switzerland,20 Cuba,21 Belgium,22 and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross.23 It determines that (1) AWS should be seen as weapon systems that select and engage 
targets without human intervention, (2) their overall activities would be predictable even if their 
individual actions are not, and (3) the potential for a human being to intervene in an attack is irrelevant 
unless they actually do so. 
Next, the Chapter critically explores the two main, competing, paradigms for understanding 
key aspects of AWS, namely: the ‘loop’ paradigm offered by Human Rights Watch24 that enhances 
comprehension of the human-machine relationship; the ‘levels’ paradigm developed by Crootof that 
 
14 United States Department of Defense, 'Directive 3000.09' (2012) 13-14. 
15 Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 'The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems' (UK 
Ministry of Defence, 2011) para.205. 
16 Russian UNOG Delegation, ‘Russia's Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic 
Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the 
Convention’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 4 April 
2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6, para.2. 
17 The Netherlands UNOG Delegation,’ Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area 
of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention’ 2017 
Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 9 October 2017) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.2, para.5. 
18 French UNOG Delegation, ‘Characterization of a LAWS’ 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 




19 Chinese UNOG Delegation, 'Position Paper’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (Geneva, 11 April 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para.3. 
20 Swiss UNOG Delegation, 'A “Compliance-Based” Approach To Autonomous Weapon Systems’ 2017 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 10 November 2017) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.9, para.29. 
21 Cuban UNOG Delegation, ‘Implementation and enforcement of International Law, particularly international 
humanitarian law, in the context of autonomous weapons’ 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 14 April 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912161055/https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAs
sets)/2EC2FA3DC75A50FFC12580820056F458/$file/Cuba+WP.pdf> 4. 
22 Belgian UNOG Delegation, ‘Towards a definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems’ 2017 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 7 November 2017) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.3, para.8(c). 
23 International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications Of Increasing 
Autonomy In The Critical Functions Of Weapons' (ICRC, 2016) 7. 
24 Human Rights Watch, 'Losing Humanity' (Human Rights Watch, 2012) 2. 
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provides insight into how AWS can be seen in terms of their technical sophistication from inert 
weapons, through automatic and semi-autonomous, to autonomous weapon systems.25 These two 
paradigms are then placed within the wider ethical,26 political,27 and security studies literature28 to 
show the major issues that AWS pose. The Chapter agrees with Leveringhaus that the use of 
autonomous attack could be morally and ethically permissible in situations where it is necessary in 
order to avoid defeat or the use of other systems present greater risks of undesirable consequences.29 
 
3. The applicable law and layers of control 
Having shown that AWS are, despite their apparent autonomy, mere machines subject to 
human control, Chapter 3 builds on this to explain how international law is relevant to these systems 
and how it can be applied to them. To do this it first explains the sources of international law and 
notes that there are no specific legal rules governing their use: no treaties regarding AWS have been 
agreed; there has not been a clear expression of customary rules relating to AWS; there have been no 
legal judgements where AWS could be evaluated or could have general principles applied to them; 
none of the ‘classic’ highly qualified publicists wrote about AWS, and nor are there generally agreed 
positions amongst modern writers that could be applied directly to AWS.  
Given that there are no existing provisions that specifically regulate AWS, this Chapter goes 
on to explain how current international law can be applied to such systems. It does this through 
 
25 Rebecca Crootof, 'The Killer Robots Are Here: Legality And Policy Implications' (2015) 36 Cardozo Law 
Review, 1837, 1870-1872. 
26 For example, Alex Leveringhaus, Ethics And Autonomous Weapons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 3; Robert 
Sparrow, 'Killer Robots' (2007) 24 Journal of Applied Philosophy, 62; Michael Robillard, 'No Such Thing As Killer 
Robots' (2017) 35 Journal of Applied Philosophy, 705. 
27 For example, Lucy Suchman, Karolina Follis and Jutta Weber, 'Tracking And Targeting' (2017) 42 Science, 
Technology, & Human Values, 983. 
28 For example, Paul Scharre, Army Of None (WW Norton & Company, 2018); Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, 
'Pros And Cons Of Autonomous Weapons Systems' (2017) May-June Military Review, 72; Matthew Press, 'Of 
Robots And Rules: Autonomous Weapon Systems In The Law Of Armed Conflict' (2017) 48 Georgetown Journal 
of International Law, 1337; Michael W. Meier, ‘The strategic implications of lethal autonomous weapons’, in 
Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Research Handbook On Remote Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2017). 
29 Alex Leveringhaus, Ethics And Autonomous Weapons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 3. 
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explaining the relevance of several different bodies of law and legal regimes that apply to these 
systems: the Jus ad Bellum as it is applicable to the use of force by states using AWS; the law of armed 
conflict and international human rights law as they are applicable through the ‘weapons law’ and 
‘targeting law’30 regimes; the law on state responsibility and international criminal law as they are 
applicable through responsibility regimes for states, non-state actors, individuals and, potentially, 
corporations. 
Next, the Chapter makes an initial assessment of the legality of AWS per se in order to show 
that they are not prohibited outright by international law, and that it is worth considering the legality 
of AWS in depth. Having done this, the Chapter then explains the regulatory challenge of applying 
legal rules normally applied to, and by, fighters to AWS. The Chapter considers three possible options 
for dealing with this challenge: prohibit AWS by an international legal instrument as suggested in 
works by Chengeta31 and Human Rights Watch;32 create a comprehensive international legal 
regulation for the development, manufacture, use, proliferation, and responsibility for AWS as 
preferred by Crootof,33 Anderson, Waxman and Reisner;34 or, apply existing legal rules to those 
controlling AWS. It is shown that the latter is the only viable option because no agreement on a 
prohibitive or regulatory treaty is likely to be achieved, and there are no existing legal provisions 
specifically regulating AWS. In evaluating options for applying current legal rules, this thesis rejects 
conceptualising AWS as having legal personhood as this ‘would shield human actors from 
 
30 It is important to note that this term is disputed. Many authors would say ‘the law on the conduct of 
hostilities’, however owing to the focus on targeting in Chapter 5, the term ‘targeting law’ is preferred in this 
thesis. See William H. Boothby, The Law Of Targeting (OUP, 2012). 
31 Thompson Chengeta, 'Measuring Autonomous Weapon Systems Against International Humanitarian Law 
Rules' (2016) 5 Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare. 
32 Human Rights Watch, 'Losing Humanity' (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
33 Rebecca Crootof, 'The Killer Robots Are Here: Legality And Policy Implications' (2015) 36 Cardozo Law 
Review, 1837. 
34Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Mathew Waxman, 'Adapting The Law Of Armed Conflict To 
Autonomous Weapon Systems' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 335. 
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accountability’.35 However, following the work of Pagallo,36 the thesis accepts that AWS can be 
conceptualised as the legal agents of those controlling them, who hold responsibility for the acts of 
these systems.  
Different conceptions of control offered in existing literature on AWS are then explored. The 
most common notion of control regarding AWS is ‘meaningful human control’. This is an approach 
that, if followed, would require human beings to make all key decisions about attacks at the time an 
attack takes place;37 in effect, this would prohibit the use of autonomous targeting. This approach is 
rejected because, in addition to requiring compliance with legal rules, it provides additional 
requirements about how this should be done, and so goes beyond extant international law.38 
Implementation of these requirements would also prohibit attacks using artillery shells and some 
missiles that have been taking place for many years due to the inability to control such ordnance once 
it is launched.39 As such, it is neither a reflection of the lex lata nor practical to implement and so is 
rejected by this thesis.  
Another approach to controlling relationships over AWS is offered by Kruipy, who describes a 
matrix of individuals exerting control over these systems as a socio-technical system that could be 
 
35 International Tin Council Case, JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry [1989] 3 
WLR 969, 986-987; Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis and Thomas D. Grant, 'Of, For, And By The People: 
The Legal Lacuna Of Synthetic Persons' (2017) 25 Artificial Intelligence and Law, 273, 287. 
36 Ugo Pagallo, The Laws Of Robots (Springer Netherlands, 2013) 152-170; Ugo Pagallo, 'Vital, Sophia, And 
Co.—The Quest For The Legal Personhood Of Robots' (2018) 9 Information, 230, 10. 
37 See, for example, Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre, 'Meaningful Human Control In Weapon Systems: A 
Primer' (Center for a New American Security, 2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104630/https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documen
ts/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf?mtime=20160906082316>; Article 36, 'Key Elements Of 
Meaningful Human Control' (2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190720004947/http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-FINAL.pdf>; Elke Schwarz, 'ICRAC Statement On The Human Control Of 
Weapons Systems At The August 2018 CCW GGE' 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (Geneva, 28 August 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104758/https://www.icrac.net/icrac-statement-on-the-
human-control-of-weapons-systems-at-the-august-2018-ccw-gge/>. 
38 Rebecca Crootof, 'A Meaningful Floor For "Meaningful Human Control"' (2016) 30 Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal, 53, 61-62. 





seen to have quasi-legal personhood for the purposes of attributing responsibility.40 This thesis does 
not dispute that the relationships could be seen as a socio-technical system. But, having rejected 
ascribing legal personhood to AWS, due to the potential to shield individual wrongdoers, this approach 
is rejected for the same reason. 
Chapter 3 goes on to expand upon the concept of layers of control in order to elaborate 
further on the original contribution to knowledge made by this thesis. It explains the nature and extent 
of control in this context and outlines how legal rules are applied in each layer. In order to do so, it 
brings together several competing concepts of control over autonomous systems into a coherent 
framework: political control draws upon UK policy documents;41 procurement control develops from 
Corn’s concept of procurement responsibility;42 technical control is based upon McFarland’s idea of 
‘autonomous control’;43tactical control is inspired by the way in which weapons with autonomy are 
controlled today, as described by Scharre.44 Each of these concepts are developed by their authors to 
understand control over autonomous systems in their entirety; however, this thesis shows that they 
are most relevant to distinct entities within a layer of control. The subsequent chapters show how 




40 Tetyana Kruipy, ‘Regulating a Game Changer: Using a Distributed Approach to Develop an Accountability 
Framework for Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2018) 50 Georgetown Journal of International Law, 45, 
111. 
41 UK UNOG Delegation, 'Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s Perspective On Human Control 
Over Weapon Development And Targeting Cycles’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 8 August 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, 5-6. 
42 Geoffrey Corn, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing The Inevitability Of 'Taking The Man Out Of The 
Loop', in Nehal Bhuta, et al.(eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016), 230-238. 
43 Tim McFarland, 'Autonomous Weapons And Human Control' (Humanitarian Law & Policy, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190719081210/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2018/07/18/autonomous-weapons-and-human-control/>. 
44 Scharre (n.28), 162-169. 
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4. Applying the ‘weapons law’ regime 
In Chapter 4, the so-called ‘weapons law’ regime is applied to AWS in the context of weapons 
review criteria. This builds upon the previous chapters and explores in detail the nature and 
implications of procurement control, and how it influences both technical and tactical control. At the 
outset, a brief historical case study of autonomy being used during the Vietnam War is made to explain 
the importance of tailoring a legal review to weapons with autonomy to fully comprehend their impact 
and novelty. The importance of weapons reviews is underscored by following the work of Bolt45 and 
particularly Corn,46 who notes that weapons reviewers only provides guidance and authorise a system 
for use in a particular situation or in a specific manner where the unlawful use of the system is 
unforeseeable to them.47 As such, this means that reviewers are gatekeepers for using AWS: they will 
only approve an AWS, or any weapon system, for use where they can see a lawful way of using it.  
This Chapter outlines the legal basis of weapons reviews, and the applicable law, using the 
work of Jevglevskaja48 and the military manuals of the UK,49 the US,50 Canada,51 Australia,52 New 
Zealand,53 Denmark, 54 Germany,55 and information from Sweden.56 It then uses the work of Boothby,57 
 
45 Alexander Bolt, ‘The Use of Autonomous Weapons and the Role of the Legal Adviser’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), 
International Humanitarian Law And The Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013). 
46 Corn (n.42), 209. 
47 Corn (n.42), 233. 
48 Natalia Jevglevskaja, 'Weapons Review Obligation Under Customary International Law' (2018) 94 
International Law Studies, 1887. 
49 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual Of The Law Of Armed Conflict (OUP, 2004) para.6.20.1; UK Ministry of 
Defence, 'Legal Review Of Newly Acquired Or Developed Weapons Or Associated Equipment (2009DIN04-217)' 
(Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2009); UK Ministry of Defence, UK Weapons Reviews 
(Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2016) (hereafter: UK Weapons Reviews). 
50 US Department of Defense, Law Of War Manual 2015, Updated May 2016 (Office of the General Counsel, 
2016)(hereafter: US Manual). 
51 Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law Of Armed Conflict At The Operational And Tactical 
Levels (National Defence, 2001). 
52 Australian Defence Headquarters, Law Of Armed Conflict, ADDP 06.4 (Defence Publishing Service, 2006). 
53 New Zealand Defence Force, DM 69 (2 Ed) Manual Of Armed Forces Law, Volume 4 Law Of Armed Conflict 
(Directorate of Legal Services, 2017). 
54 Jes Rynkeby Knudsen, Military Manual On International Law Relevant To Danish Armed Forces In 
International Operations (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016). 
55 Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, Law Of Armed Conflict Manual (2013). 
56 Marie Jacobsson, 'Modern Weaponry And Warfare: The Application Of Article 36 Of Additional Protocol I By 
Governments' (2006) 82 International Law Studies, 183. 
57 William H Boothby, Weapons And The Law Of Armed Conflict (2nd edn, OUP, 2016). 
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McClelland,58 and others, along with the weapons review policies of the UK,59 the US,60 and Australia61 
to describe the process of a weapons review. This involves examining the meaning of each applicable 
legal rule and how they apply to AWS: whether a weapon is specifically prohibited; whether a weapon 
is likely to be prohibited in the future; whether a weapon causes superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering; whether a weapon causes an unlawful level of environmental harm; whether a weapon is 
inherently indiscriminate; whether a weapon can be used in accordance with the Martens Clause. The 
Chapter outlines how procurement control has a direct influence on technical control by determining 
how the requirements for each legal rule can be generally met by AWS.  
In doing so, the Chapter re-confirms that AWS are not fundamentally unlawful, and that they 
could pass a weapons review, but also that the flexibility of how weapons reviews can be performed 
is key to properly evaluating AWS. The legal obligation to conduct weapons reviews comes from Article 
36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,62 which does not provide any 
instruction on how they should be carried out. As the Chapter explains, although states generally agree 
on what rules should be applied in reviews, there are no clear limitations on this; therefore, it is 
unclear how AWS should be assessed in a way that is tailored to them. This Chapter fills a gap in 
knowledge by explaining that, as the legal obligation is not prescriptive, weapons reviews can, and 
should, be used flexibly in order to comprehend the novelty of emerging systems. The best example 
of this is in relation to examining whether they are inherently indiscriminate. With conventional 
weapons a review would consider accuracy in terms of whether the weapon can hit the point it is 
aimed at. Whereas with AWS, the most important factor is how accurate it is in recognising targets. 
Taking this approach allows for the key issues of new weapons to be evaluated effectively.  
 
58 Justin McClelland, 'The Review Of Weapons In Accordance With Article 36 Of Additional Protocol I' (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross, 397. 
59 UK Weapons Reviews. 
60 US Manual, para.6.2. 
61 Australian UNOG Delegation, 'The Australian Article 36 Review Process’ 2018 Group of Governmental 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 30 August 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.6. 




5. Applying the ‘targeting law’ regime 
Chapter 5 builds upon the previous Chapter to demonstrate how AWS could be used lawfully 
within the so-called ‘targeting law’ regime. Taking into account the previous chapters, and the 
limitations on what machines can do by their very nature, this Chapter argues that many decisions 
about targeting require human beings to perform them lawfully and this will be the case for the 
foreseeable future. Authors such as Asaro63 and Human Rights Watch64 suggest that all targeting 
decisions need to be made contemporaneously by human beings. This thesis does not agree that all 
targeting choices must be made at the moment of attack. By following the works of Schmitt65 and 
Thurnher,66 Boothby,67 Sassòli,68 and Ford,69 the Chapter explains that the nature of the legal rules 
relevant to targeting does not explicitly require human beings to fulfil them, meaning that what is 
most important is the completion of legal requirements and not how this is done. As such, there is no 
prohibition on these rules being satisfied by AWS. The Chapter fills a gap in knowledge between these 
two camps: That human traits are lawfully required for fulfilling targeting decisions, but that 
operationalising these choices can be done by AWS where they have the necessary technical 
capabilities.  
The reason for taking this position is that many legally required decisions about targeting 
involve qualitative analysis. It is currently unforeseeable that any AWS would ever be able to perform 
 
63 Peter Asaro, 'On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, And The 
Dehumanization Of Lethal Decision-Making' (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross, 687. 
64 Human Rights Watch, 'Losing Humanity' (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
65 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems And International Humanitarian Law: A Reply To The 
Critics' (2013) Harvard National Security Journal Features 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190917164404/https://harvardnsj.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf>. 
66 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, '"Out Of The Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems And The Law Of 
Armed Conflict' (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal, 231. 
67 William Boothby, ‘How Far Will the Law Allow Unmanned Targeting to Go?’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law And The Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013). 
68 Marco Sassóli, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions And Legal Issues To Be Clarified' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 308. 




qualitative decision-making,70 and so these decisions must be taken by a human being in order to 
determine how an AWS should carry out an attack. Consequently, the commander is legally and 
morally required to always remain ‘cognitively close’ to the attack, even when they have delegated 
the execution of the attack to the AWS and it will act ‘autonomously’. 
The AWS acts as a proxy for the human being and can never lawfully, nor practically, replace 
this human decision-making. So, for example, the method by which an AWS is to recognise targets and 
civilians, what factors should be considered for a comparison between military advantage and 
incidental harm, and how this should be done by an AWS (if it is at all possible) are all decisions that 
must be taken by the commander in order to be lawful.  
This does not mean that a commander must determine everything about an attack, but that 
the commander must determine a specific mission for the AWS, within particular boundaries, prior to 
launching it; for example, a commander would not need to choose tank X to be attacked, but would 
need to determine that tanks (A) should be destroyed within B time-frame at C location and using D 
weapons (or causing E effects).  
Another implication of legally requiring commanders to carry out qualitative assessments and 
be ‘cognitively close’ to the attack is that, unless a commander can guarantee lawfully compliant use 
of AWS in a fully-autonomous mode on the mission they have determined, then using the system in a 
semi-autonomous or remote-controlled mode becomes a legal requirement. The legal rules for an 
attack must be complied with: if an AWS cannot do this without additional human assistance, then 
that human assistance becomes lawfully required. 
In relation to the previous chapters, this exercise of tactical control is most crucial in terms of 
how the system will actually act. It is only once the decisions about targeting take place that an AWS 
can be deployed according to the decisions of each controlling entity. Following on from Chapter 4, it 
 
70 Boothby (n.67), 56-57. 
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is also made clear that the instructions a commander can give, and the level of control they can exert, 
is subject to the limit provided by procurement control (i.e. the use of an AWS must be in compliance 
with a reviewer’s guidance), and technical control (i.e. the use of an AWS is limited by its technological 
reality). Of course, this is also limited by political control (i.e. an AWS cannot be used in an armed 
conflict that political decision-makers do not choose to engage in). This, therefore, is the clearest 
example of how these different layers of control are exercised and impact upon AWS; when such a 
system is deployed it is always subject to these four layers of control. Other than a rogue operator 
deploying an AWS beyond their orders (and therefore beyond control), use of AWS does not exist 
beyond these layers of control. Even if non-state actors (NSAs) use AWS, they might not have a formal 
weapons review process, for example, but someone in their organisation chooses to purchase them, 
and tells their fighters how to use them; thus even the use of AWS by NSAs is still subject to multiple 
levels of control, even if it is not exercised in the same way. 
 
6. Applying responsibility regimes 
Having explained throughout the thesis that AWS are, by their nature, subject to the control 
of human beings, Chapter 6 demonstrates how the ‘layers of control’ approach facilitates determining 
the responsibility of states, non-state actors, and individuals for the use of AWS (it also includes an 
exploration of the international responsibility of corporations). The Chapter first outlines how people 
who are against the development of AWS have argued that there is a ‘responsibility gap’ meaning 
that, in their view, it is difficult to ascribe responsibility for the use of AWS to individuals and so their 
use would not be morally compliant; the works of Human Rights Watch,71 Chengeta,72 and Sparrow73 
are explored on this position. Overall, the Chapter shows how this position is wrong. It argues for, and 
 
71 Human Rights Watch, 'Mind The Gap' (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
72 Thompson Chengeta, 'Accountability Gap, Autonomous Weapon Systems And Modes Of Responsibility In 
International Law' (2016) 45 Denver Journal of International Law, 1. 
73 Sparrow (n.26) 62. 
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evidences that, international law as is currently stands does, on the whole, have the tools to deal with 
responsibility for AWS by applying multiple responsibility regimes together in a new paradigm.  
Some authors have considered individual legal regimes for dealing with some of the 
responsibility issues created by AWS,74 and others have suggested use of multiple regimes 
simultaneously.75 This Chapter fills a gap in knowledge firstly by presenting which legal responsibility 
regimes should be assessed, and then outlining how they can each be applied in the case of different 
entities controlling AWS. Thus, by presenting a new paradigm of responsibility for AWS, the Chapter 
demonstrates that there does not need to be a responsibility gap and that this can be closed through 
adopting a view that the various entities controlling AWS also have responsibilities that come from 
this control; the Chapter does, however, accept that there are some very specific areas where 
responsibility gaps could exist in international law, and that these could be closed by domestic legal 
systems.  
The right to a remedy and concepts of moral accountability are explored in order to 
demonstrate the importance of determining the legal responsibility paradigm for the use of these 
systems, and that this paradigm needs to, and indeed can, govern each entity exercising control over 
AWS. In explaining the responsibility of state agents who control AWS, the state responsibility regime 
is outlined and it is shown that where such persons use an AWS to violate international legal 
obligations, the state can be held responsible for this; state responsibility for human rights violations 
are considered in particular owing to their application to weapons reviews discussed in Chapter 3 and 
to targeting in Chapter 4. The potential for violent non-state actors to use AWS is mentioned several 
times throughout this work and so the emerging framework regarding their responsibility as holders 
 
74 See, for example, Jeffrey Thurnher, 'No One At The Controls: The Legal Implications Of Fully Autonomous 
Targeting' (2012) 67 Joint Force Quarterly, 77;   See, for example, Tim McFarland and Tim McCormack, 'Mind 
The Gap: Can Developers Of Autonomous Weapons Systems Be Liable For War Crimes?' (2014) 90 
International Law Studies, 36; Charles James Dunlap, 'Accountability And Autonomous Weapons: Much Ado 
About Nothing?' (2016) 30 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 63. 




of international legal obligations in the same vein as states is also explored alongside the potential 
responsibility of corporations under the emergent business and human rights regime. Next, the 
international criminal law regime is examined and the core crimes of aggression, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes are outlined to display that AWS could perform the actus reus 
elements of these crimes. This section takes particular note of the work of McFarland and 
McCormack,76 who have identified an area of potential impunity regarding war crimes for AWS 
developers who build systems in peace time but programme them in such a way as to perform 
international crimes during a later armed conflict.77 
In order to show how control of AWS relates to responsibility for their actions on the individual 
level, the notion of ‘acting through’ other entities in the ‘control of crime’ approach is explained using 
the work of Roxin,78 Ohlin,79 Jain,80 and jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court.81 This 
concept shows that actions of AWS should be viewed as the manifestation of technical and tactical 
control and so those exerting that control with mens rea can be seen as using these machines as 
instruments to carry out their criminality and thus be held responsible for what they programme or 
instruct the AWS to do. The Chapter explains the lack of de jure responsibilities of AWS manufacturers 
through a brief consideration of corporate liability in international law, and the potential legal 
responsibility for the senior managers of these companies using precedents from post-World War II 
trials of ‘Nazi Industrialists’.82 
 
76 McFarland and McCormack (n.74) 361. 
77 See the penultimate criteria for each crime under Art.8, International Criminal Court, Elements Of Crimes 
(International Criminal Court, 2011). 
78 Claus Roxin, 'Crimes As Part Of Organized Power Structures' (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 193; Claus Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (Walter de Gruyter, 2007) 127. 
79 Jens David Ohlin, 'The Combatant's Stance: Autonomous Weapons On The Battlefield' (2016) 92 
International Law Studies, 1, 11-14. 
80 Neha Jain, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: new frameworks for individual responsibility’ in Nehal Bhuta, et 
al.(eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016) 308-310. 
81 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Pre-Trial Chamber) Case No: ICC-01/04-01/07 [2008] ICC. 
82 United States v. Friedrich Flick (Vol. VI), United States V. Carl Krauch (Vols. VII-VIII, and United States v. 
Alfried Kripp (Vol. IX) in Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials Of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military 




Next, the Chapter explores the role of commanders through considering firstly superior orders 
and how the complexity of AWS might mean that seemingly innocuous orders might result in unlawful 
actions due to difficulties in comprehending how AWS work. Further, the applicability of command 
responsibility is explored both over AWS operators and the systems themselves. Again, the complexity 
of these systems is considered due to commanders being required to understand their subordinates 
in order to effectively control them.  
A final mode of liability is explored in relation to procurement control; the work of Corn is 
used to explain the notion of ‘procurement responsibility’83 and how weapons reviewers could be held 
responsible for approving AWS for use where they either knew or should have known about issues 
with these machines that could affect their lawful use. 
The responsibility paradigm that this Chapter sketches out is not, however, without issue. 
There are some small responsibility gaps that remain. First is that, as mentioned, not all weapons 
manufacturing activities are in the context of an armed conflict and so AWS developers might be 
immune from prosecution on the international level if they produce an unlawful system prior to the 
conflict starting. Further, AWS manufacturers are, for the foreseeable future, not holders of 
international legal personality in a way that would allow for them to be held responsible. Therefore, 
the international level struggles to hold these entities responsible for their control over AWS. Thus, 
the Chapter argues that in these situations, domestic legal regimes should be used to fill the vacuum 
and remove the responsibility gap. It is, however, noted that this also creates an additional issue as 
many modern technologies are developed and built by consortia of many different manufacturers84 
 
Office, 1950); Matthew Lippman, 'War Crimes Trials Of German Industrialists: The "Other Schindlers."' (1995) 9 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 173. 
83 Corn (n.42), 209. 
84 See, for example, the large number of contributing companies from different countries: BAE Systems, 
'Taranis' (BAE Systems, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190812060713/https://www.baesystems.com/en-





and so it could be exceedingly difficult to attribute responsibility to those who actually cause 
wrongdoing. Another issue with holding individuals responsible is whether they could have, or should 
have, been able to understand the complexity of these machines and the implications for their usage; 
some technological solutions are sketched out. Despite these remaining responsibility gaps, this 
Chapter argues that, in opposition to the position of the anti-AWS lobby, the real responsibility gap 
with regard to AWS is in fact far smaller than they suggest and should not be seen as a barrier to their 
development or deployment. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 7 provides a summing up of the major issues: different 
entities can be seen as controlling AWS; these entities can be held responsible for the actions of AWS 
that they have control over; human beings should make decisions about, and remain close to, the use 
of AWS in attacks. However, it is also noted that the issues caused by the complexity of these systems 
cannot yet be solved through technological solutions, and that even if the technologies developed to 
the point where human beings would not need to be ‘cognitively close’ to an AWS attack in legal terms, 
the same requirement in moral terms, as established in Chapter 2, would remain.  
Overall, the thesis demonstrates that international law, as it currently stands, is sufficient to 
regulate AWS. It is also shown that the best way for international legal rules to be applied to AWS is 
through the human beings and entities that control them, and that, in order to understand these 
control relationships, they should be seen as existing in layers which reduce the freedom of action 
that an AWS has to the point where the space that they can operate autonomously is acceptable to 
each controller. Where controllers correctly apply legal rules as part of their control, the autonomous 




Chapter 2: The nature of machine autonomy and how it manifests in AWS. 
 
1. Introduction 
Autonomy in weapon systems has been a concern of international lawyers since at least the 
1980s, with Pictet suggesting that the use of remote-control technologies, sensors, and automation 
could lead to human beings playing an ever-smaller role on battlefields.1 He ultimately warns that ‘if 
man does not master technology, but allows it to master him, he will be destroyed by technology.’2 We 
are currently in a period of great advancement for military technologies.3 Thus, it is very important 
that we fully understand the nature of, and issues created by, autonomous weapon systems (AWS). A 
key issue is the meaning of ‘autonomous’ as it relates to AWS. This is important because, we need to 
understand their nature in order to determine how they should be treated by legal systems. 
AWS are defined later in this Chapter as systems that target and attack adversaries without 
human involvement. Thus, they are a weapon that plays the role of a fighter in combat. How the legal 
rules apply to these machines is crucial because they are engaged in a role that no weapon has ever 
played before. The legal rules governing warfare have been fundamentally unchanged since 1977,4 
and were written for humans to apply, abide by, and be subject to a responsibility regime when they 
violate those rules. Thus, whether AWS can simply be treated as if they were human for the purposes 
of these legal rules deeply affects how they should be regulated and how responsibility for their 
actions should be ascribed. 
 
1 Jean Pictet, ‘Article 36’, in Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary On 
The Additional Protocols Of 8 June 1977 To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1987) para.1476. 
2 The gendered language in this quote is not ideal but has been reproduced verbatim to maintain the accuracy 
of Pictet’s meaning, Pictet (n.1) para.1476. 
3 On the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ cause by artificial intelligence and robotics, see P.W. Singer, Wired For 
War (Penguin Press, 2009). 
4 The last major treaty changes to the law of armed conflict were: Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (API); Protocol Additional To The 
Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, And Relating To The Protection Of Victims Of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (APII). 
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In order to answers these questions in later chapters, the nature of AWS must first be 
understood. This Chapter outlines ‘autonomy’ as it relates to machines and how these systems work. 
It is determined that these machines are not ‘autonomous’ in the same sense as human beings but 
have ‘machine autonomy’ subject to their programming and instructions, and so are controlled by 
persons who decide upon their programming and instructions. An assessment of different definitions 
of AWS is then undertaken. This outlines how the selection and engagement of targets are key 
attributes, that the actions of AWS are generally foreseeable even if specific actions are not 
predictable, and that the potential for human intervention is not relevant unless an intervention 
actually takes place. Then, the major issues generated by these systems are discussed alongside the 
major paradigms for understanding AWS. Finally, the Chapter notes the capabilities of weapons with 
autonomy that are available or in development today. 
 
2. Machine autonomy 
The word autonomous comes from 17th century Greece. It began as αὐτός (autós, “self”) and 
νόμος (nómos, “law”). In the modern world, we think of autonomous entities as having ‘the freedom 
to determine one’s own actions, and behaviours.’5 Such an entity is, therefore, independent, and not 
subject to extrinsic control. However, this thesis is concerned with machines that possess autonomy. 
Machine autonomy is a narrower concept than that regarding other autonomous entities. It 
comes from the field of robotics and relates more to a machine functioning automatically rather than 
to its individual freedom.6 A machine that functions automatically follows a ‘pre-programmed 
sequence of operations or moves in a structured environment.’7 For example, traffic lights generally 
 
5 Collins English Dictionary Online, 'Definition of autonomy' (2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20161012230804/http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/englis
h/autonomy>. 
6 Noel Sharkey, 'Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned From The Drones' (2011) 21 Journal of Law, Information 
& Science, 140, 141. 
7 Sharkey 2011 (n.6) 141 
20 
 
follow a fixed sequence for allowing vehicles at different junctions to travel. An autonomous machine, 
however, is more complicated, not only can they operate in open and unstructured environments, 
they also have some freedom in how these operations happen.8 Consider that a self-driving vehicle 
might be instructed with a destination, but must use its conception of the world to plan a route and 
use its sensors to avoid pedestrians on crossings. 
 
3. How autonomous machines work 
All robotic systems whether autonomous, automatic, or somewhere in between, function in 
similar ways. They are all made up of sensors, processors, and actuators.9 The sensors detect relevant 
changes to the environment and may deal with any data type which can be quantified. Various sensors 
could detect the shape, size, and depth of objects, along with their velocity and acoustic, 
electromagnetic, or engine emissions.10 As such, machine sensors can go beyond human senses11 and 
may be able to detect these data either individually or collectively (multi-phenomenon assessment 
can greatly increase sensing accuracy).12  
Once data has been sensed, it must be processed. This is done using algorithms that compare 
sensor data to a pre-set condition.13 The condition is constituted from an entry in the memory of the 
system (in the case of this thesis, a database of potential targets).14 After this comparison, the 
algorithm will then produce an output, the result of which depends upon whether the condition is 
 
8 Sharkey 2011 (n.6) 141 
9 International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 'Technology And Application Of Autonomous 
Weapons' (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017) 11. 
10 Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, ‘Mapping The Development Of Autonomy In Weapon Systems’ 
(SIPRI, 2017) 24-25. 
11 Ian S Henderson, Patrick Keane and Josh Liddy, ‘Remote and autonomous warfare systems: precautions in 
attack and individual accountability’ in Jens David Ohlin (ed.) Research Handbook On Remote Warfare (Edward 
Elgar, 2017) 341-342. 
12Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, 'New Capabilities In Warfare: An Overview Of Contemporary 
Technological Developments And The Associated Legal And Engineering Issues In Article 36 Weapons Reviews' 
(2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross, 483, 489. 
13 Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm (Perseus Books, 2015) 1. 
14 Boulanin and Verbruggen (n.10) 24-25; Brian Handy (ed.), 'Royal Air Force: Aircraft And Weapons' (Royal Air 
Force, 2007) 87. 
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met or not (whether the sensor data matches a database entry). Some algorithms can provide multiple 
outputs.15 
For example, a simplified algorithm in an AWS deployed to attack enemy tanks could be: IF 
object = tank, AND no civilians present, THEN attack, ELSE continue mission.16 So, the data collected 
using sensors would either represent a tank, or it would not (IF/ELSE). Where a tank is detected, there 
is an additional condition that no civilians are present (AND). Only where these two conditions are 
met can an attack proceed. In computer science, the so-called ‘closed world assumption’ presumes 
that anything not known to be true is false.17 Unless a system can recognise an entity as a target with 
sufficient confidence that it is actually a target, it will be recognised as a non-target.18 
Where targets are recognised, an attack would be performed by the actuators of the system. 
With an AWS, these would be the munitions that it is equipped with to fire at entities which it has 
recognised as a target. 
 
4. Sensing and processing of data: artificial intelligence 
In order for data to be sensed and processed, it must be quantifiable. Research into using 
algorithms for qualitative analysis is ongoing,19 but has not yet produced any algorithms to do this (if 
this is even possible).20 As such, autonomous systems will only be able to comprehend their 
 
15 Domingos (n.13) 2. 
16 Arkin has developed some prototype algorithmic decision systems which an AWS could use. See Ronald 
Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour In Autonomous Robots (CRC Press, 2009), 132, fig.10.4. 
17 Arkin (n.16) 63. 
18 Backstrom and Henderson (n.12) 490. 
19 Tom Abate, 'Stanford Algorithm Analyzes Sentence Sentiment, Advances Machine Learning' (Stanford School 
of Engineering, 2013) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190612123046/https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/
stanford-algorithm-analyzes-sentence-sentiment-advances-machine-learning>. 





environment through quantitative analysis for the foreseeable future.21 Where qualitative decisions 
need to be taken,22 this requires humans to work closely with the system to take those decisions and 
complete the mission objectives.  
Still, in terms of quantitative analysis, systems with autonomy already display a significant 
amount of sophistication. This is only expected to increase, with more tasks being delegated to 
machines as they display greater capabilities in the future.23 
The technical sophistication of systems with autonomy that are available today, and in the 
near future, means that the onboard computers, which coordinate the actions of autonomous 
systems, could be seen as an artificial intelligence (AI). AI is simply a characterisation of a system using 
computational methods that are advanced enough to perform a task normally performed by 
humans.24 Although Hollywood presents us with exciting, and worrying, visions25 of AI systems 
 
21 William Boothby, ‘How Far Will the Law Allow Unmanned Targeting to Go?’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law And The Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 56-57. 
22 For example, the proportionality decision, Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), API; Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules (CUP, 2005) (Hereafter: 
ICRC Study) Rule 14. 
23 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Mathew Waxman, 'Adapting The Law Of Armed Conflict To 
Autonomous Weapon Systems' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 335, 388-395. 
24 Some suggest that the ‘artificial intelligence’ is too broad to be accurate. Consider the range in complexity in 
AI systems in chess computers and self-driving cars. Thus, ‘computational methods’ is favours by some 
authors, see International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 'Computational Methods In The 
Context Of LAWS' (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017)(iPRAW) 9-10. Also note that others suggest that 
machines using AI should be referred to as ‘cyber-physical systems’, see Kobi Lenis, 'New Technologies 
Symposium: How Can Lawyers Ensure Compliance With Existing Law (During Peacetime And During War) In 
The New Era Of Cyber-Physical Systems?' (Opinio Juris, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190508125143/https://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/06/new-
technologies-symposium-how-can-lawyers-ensure-compliance-with-existing-law-during-peacetime-and-
during-war-in-the-new-era-of-cyber-physical-systems/>. Still, ‘AI’ is the term of art that shall be used in this 
thesis.  
25 On the wider cultural conception of AI, see Judith A Markowitz, Robots That Kill: Deadly Machines And Their 
Precursors In Myth, Folklore, Literature, Popular Culture And Reality (McFarland & Company, 2019). 
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attempting to help,26 or wipe out, humanity,27 and some authors present utopian28 or dystopian29 
visions of an AI-enabled future, these systems are often mundane systems such as chess computers.30  
Some authors have suggested that AI systems could one day become alive.31 This is impossible 
as key aspects of living such as sentience,32 consciousness,33 or self-awareness,34 cannot be reduced 
to algorithms.35 Thus, systems that use AI could never really be seen as living,36 or have any attendant 
moral status.37 Any perception that an AI system is ‘smart’ or ‘intelligent’ in a human-like way is 
illusory.38 As the processing of these systems is just an application of mathematical models to sensor 
data, these systems do not make decisions, but they apply decisions already embedded in the 
algorithms within the processors of the system.39 Still, by applying (probabilistic or statistical) 
 
26 See, for example, Andrew Stanton, Wall-E (Pixar, 2008); Brad Bird, The Iron Giant (Warner Bros, 1999). 
27 See, for example James Cameron, The Terminator (Orion Pictures, 1984) and its sequels, or Joss Whedon, 
Avengers: Age Of Ultron (Marvel Studios, 2015) 
28 Ray Kurzweil, The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology (Gerald Duckworth & Co, 2006). 
29 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies (OUP, 2016). 
30 See Garry Kasparov, Deep Thinking (John Murray Publishers, 2017). 
31 Max Tegmark, Life 3.0 (Penguin Books, 2018) 281-314. 
32 Sentience refers to the capacity to feel pleasure of pain, see, Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum, 
'The Grounds Of Moral Status’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive (Stanford University, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190318070216/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entrie
s/grounds-moral-status/>, paras.5.3 and 6; on the inability of machines to feel pleasure or pain, see Mark 
Bishop, 'Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain' (2009) 19 Minds and Machines, 507. 
33 Consciousness being defined as ‘subjective experience’ (Tegmark, (n.31) 283); machines cannot experience 
this because they are an object, not a subject, see Roger Penrose, Shadows Of The Mind (OUP, 1996) 127-208. 
34 This requires an entity to recognise a ‘self’ in themselves, and also in others, see Philippe Rochat, 'Five Levels 
Of Self-Awareness As They Unfold Early In Life' (2003) 12 Consciousness and Cognition, 717, 719-722. As 
machines process quantitative algorithms, they cannot translate qualitative concepts such as a self, or a third 
person view of one’s self, into quantitative programming. 
35 It is questionable whether anyone even knows where to begin with this. See, Steven Pinker, Enlightenment 
Now (Penguin Random House, 2018) 296-300, 425-428. 
36 ‘Unlike in the movies, there is no race of superhuman robots on the horizon or probably even possible.’ See 
Peter Stone et al., ‘Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030’ (Stanford University, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919211256/https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861
/f/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf> 6. 
37 See Jaworska and Tannenbaum, (n.32); see also Rebecca Crootof, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems And The 
Limits Of Analogy' (2018) 9 Harvard National Security Journal, 1. 
38 EPSRC, 'Principles Of Robotics' (EPSRC, 2010) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190825042317/https://epsrc.ukri.org/research/ourportfolio/theme
s/engineering/activities/principlesofrobotics/>. 
39 Elliot Winter, 'Autonomous Weapons In Humanitarian Law: Understanding The Technology, Its Compliance 
With The Principle Of Proportionality And The Role Of Utilitarianism' (2018) 6 Groningen Journal of 
International Law, 183, 193. 
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mathematical models to data, it can be argued that AI systems are capable of ‘reasoning’.40 The 
consequence of this is that systems with machine autonomy are fundamentally limited by their 
programming and, when in use, how they are instructed. Weizenbaum points out that, if it were 
possible for the user of an AI system to ask the machine why it acted in a certain way, the only possible 
answer it could give would be ‘Because you told me to.’41 
Many believe that using AI systems for ‘big data’ processing means they could be highly 
advantageous when used to assist in strategic decision-making.42 Yet, this thesis is focussed only upon 
the use of AI in weaponry. As has already been mentioned, these systems would automate 
quantitative data analysis about targeting. This makes them a ‘narrow AI’, meaning they can perform 
some tasks at a human level, rather than ‘general AI’ or ‘super AI’ which would, theoretically, be able 
to perform all tasks at a human, or above-human, level respectively.43 As narrow AI systems cannot 
do everything, this raises a question of whether they can perform their tasks at legally required 
standards. Indeed, a general or super-AI system which was capable of all human tasks, or more, would 
pose fewer legal challenges as they would, by definition, already be at, or above, human standards 
sufficient for legal compliance. 
 
 
40Dustin A. Lewis, 'Legal Reviews Of Weapons, Means And Methods Of Warfare Involving Artificial Intelligence: 
16 Elements To Consider' (Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912154010/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/03/21/legal-reviews-weapons-means-methods-warfare-artificial-intelligence-16-elements-
consider/>; see also Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning And Inference (CUP, 2009); Barbara J. Grosz and 
Peter Stone, 'A Century-Long Commitment To Assessing Artificial Intelligence And Its Impact On Society' (2018) 
61 Communications of the ACM, 68. 
41 Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power And Human Reason (WH Freeman, 1976), 260. 
42 See, for example Kristin Houser, 'U.S. Department Of Defense Established A Center To Better Integrate AI' 
(Futurism, 2018) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20181223070254/https://futurism.com/the-
byte/jaic-militarys-ai-center>; James Vincent, 'Putin Says The Nation That Leads In AI ‘Will Be The Ruler Of The 
World’' (The Verge, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190816212655/https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/ru
ssia-ai-putin-rule-the-world>; also see Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell and Darragh Murray, 'Machine Learning, 
Artificial Intelligence, And The Use Of Force By States' 10 Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 1. 





4.1. Machine learning 
At this point, it is also important to note that some AI systems include machine learning. Whilst 
humans can write algorithms that can be classed as AI, (known as symbolic AI)44 they are all rule-
based.45 Writing individual rules to perform difficult tasks, such as image recognition, becomes highly-
complex as there are so many variables.46 It is, therefore, impractical for humans to write image 
recognition algorithms.47 Machine learning, however, can deal with such complex tasks by performing 
many rounds of trial and error and being corrected with feedback.48  
The advantage of machine learning in autonomous systems is that it should continually update 
its comprehension of the environment, what entities it should focus on, and what characteristics those 
entities have as they change. This can lead to the assumption that machine learning will allow the 
software to ‘deduce’ information that it was not programmed to comprehend. For example, an image 
recognition algorithm trained to recognise cats could, potentially, learn that cats in real life have a 
greater variance than the photos it was trained on. This might lead to the algorithm recognising a lion 
as a type of cat due to the commonalities of paws, whiskers, and pointed ears. This is an expansion of 
what the algorithms focus on, rather than true deduction. This algorithm could not develop a notion 
of a dog without specific learning, for instance. Consequently, the use of machine learning in AWS 
might enable the categories of what constitutes a target to broaden slightly but would not allow a 
system to develop its own conception of targets.  
If a system is capable of learning about its environment and the boundaries of that learning 
are not sufficiently restricted, the sensor data it learns from might not be known to the programmers. 
The consequence of this is that programmers would not be able to know what these changes are, and 
how they affect the system overall. As algorithms are simply mathematical models representing the 
 
44 Margaret A Boden, AI (OUP, 2016) 6-7. 
45 Hannah Fry, Hello World (Doubleday, 2018) 10-11. 
46 Fry (n.45) 10-11. 
47 Fry (n.45) 10-11. 
48 Fry (n.45) 10-11. 
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environment, they cannot incorporate context and so cannot ‘know’ what they are analysing or what 
they should (not) learn. Both of these problems are associated with so-called ‘deep learning’ 
technologies, which are programmed using neural networks.49 As such, those machine learning 
methods used for programming autonomous systems must be chosen very carefully. This thesis is 
focussed upon the broader issues of targeting by these systems, rather than the specific issues of 
different computational methods and so these issues are only mentioned where relevant. However, 
even if machine learning is used, the resultant algorithms are fundamentally the same as those 
outlined in the previous Section. 
Still, machine learning poses significant problems if systems continue to learn during service, 
referred to as ‘on-line’ or continuous learning.50 Farrant and Ford have noted that this can cause issues 
where learning algorithms modify their programming: when does a programming modification mean 
that a system is ‘new’? Does a modified AI system need to be reviewed, as with other weapon 
systems? How should frameworks of review deal with this issue?51 
 
5. Defining autonomous weapon systems 
Having understood how autonomous systems work, and that they automate human tasks, it 
is important to differentiate between autonomous weapon systems and weapons with autonomy. The 
later are systems which may have some automated functions, such as navigation, temperature 
control, de-icing,52 take-off, and landing,53 but not targeting functions.  
 
49 See Joshua G. Hughes, 'The Law Of Armed Conflict Issues Created By Programming Automatic Target 
Recognition System Using Deep Learning Methods' (2018) 21 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 99. 
50 iPRAW (n.24) 11. 
51James Farrant and Christopher Ford, 'Autonomous Weapons And Weapon Reviews: The UK Second 
International Weapon Review Forum' (2017) 93 International Law Studies, 389, 403-407; states party to API 
are obligated to review new weapons under Article 36. These issues are discussed more in Chapter 4. 
52 Philip Alston, 'Lethal Robotic Technologies: The Implications For Human Rights And International 
Humanitarian Law' (2012) 21 Journal of Law, Information and Science, 35, 43. 





The next logical step would be to define AWS as systems which automate targeting: An 
autonomous weapon system is that where the functions of selecting and engaging targets are 
performed by the machine without human intervention.54 This is the most popular definition, having 
first been used by the US and then Human Rights Watch in 2012,55 and later by then UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions Christof Heyns in 2013.56 This 
definition seems most appropriate as it encapsulates the most novel and crucial aspects of these 
systems which differentiate them from others. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
also follow this definition and suggests that selecting and engaging targets are the ‘critical functions’ 
of an AWS.57 Due to its focus on the particular novelty which AWS present in comparison to other 
systems, this is the definition used in this thesis. 
Consequently, where a human being is directly involved in decision-making, and either selects 
or engages a target, the system used would be semi-autonomous.58 It is important to remember that 
where an operator needs to take control of a system, the machine might switch modes from fully-
autonomous, to semi-autonomous.59 Where both selection and engagement of targets are performed 
by a human, these systems are under direct human control.60  
Whilst conceptualising AWS through their automated selection and engagement of targets is 
most commonly used, it is not ubiquitous. Discussions at the United Nations on the topic of AWS have 
been ongoing for six years and have not yet been able to come up with a shared definition.61 
 
54 United States Department of Defense, 'Directive 3000.09' (2012) 13-14; Human Rights Watch, 'Losing 
Humanity' (Human Rights Watch, 2012) 2; Milena Costas Trascasas and Nathalie Weizmann, Academy Briefing 
No.8: Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Law (Geneva Academy, 2014) 6. 
55 US DoD (n.54); HRW (n.54). 
56 Report Of The Special Rapporteur On Extrajudicial, Summary Or Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns (Human 
Rights Council, 23rd session) 2013 UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para.38. 
57 International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications Of Increasing 
Autonomy In The Critical Functions Of Weapons' (ICRC, 2016) 7. 
58 US DoD (n.54) 14. 
59 US DoD (n.54) 14. 
60 Singer (n.3) 74. 
61 Michael W. Meier, ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Is It the End of the World as We Know It . . . Or 




Firstly, some states have attempted to define AWS to include systems which can be remote-
controlled or overseen by humans as still being autonomous.62 Obviously, during the times where a 
system is under remote-control, it cannot be acting autonomously as it would not be exhibiting any 
freedom in its actions. Still, if this is only a mode of operation, in addition to semi- and fully-
autonomous modes, then it could still be thought of as an AWS. 
Several states include an impossibility of human intervention or communication with AWS 
during its missions as a definitional criterion.63 This seems overly-restrictive as two systems could 
perform near-identical operations but because one is within range of communication links it would 
not be autonomous. This ignores what the system itself is doing, and whether an operator is making 
an intervention of real consequence. As such, this thesis rejects this as a key characteristic of AWS. 
Some definitions go beyond the selection and engagement of targets to include systems 
designed for other military and support tasks, such as surveillance.64 This is overly-inclusive as it does 
not focus upon the uniqueness of AWS as being those that perform autonomous targeting. 
 
Of Armed Conflict And The Dynamics Of Modern Warfare (OUP, 2019) 290; for more on the UN discussions, 
see The United Nations Office at Geneva, 'Background - Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems' (UNOG, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912160215/https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPa
ges)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument>. 
62 Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 'The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems' (UK 
Ministry of Defence, 2011)(Hereafter: UK Approach) para.205; Russian UNOG Delegation, ‘Russia's Approaches 
to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the 
Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the Convention’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 4 April 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6, para.2. 
63 The Netherlands UNOG Delegation,’ Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area 
of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention’ 2017 
Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 9 October 2017) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.2, para.5; French UNOG Delegation, ‘Characterization of a LAWS’ 2016 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 15 April 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912155857/https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAs
sets)/5FD844883B46FEACC1257F8F00401FF6/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_France+Characterizationofa
LAWS.pdf>; Chinese UNOG Delegation, 'Position Paper’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 11 April 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para.3. 
64 Swiss UNOG Delegation, 'A “Compliance-Based” Approach To Autonomous Weapon Systems’ 2017 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 10 November 2017) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.9, para.29; Cuban UNOG Delegation, ‘Implementation and enforcement of International 
Law, particularly international humanitarian law, in the context of autonomous weapons’ 2016 Group of 





The potential unpredictability of an AWS is suggested as a key characteristic by some.65 
However, this would exclude systems used for tasks where the end result is expected. For example, it 
is foreseeable that enemy battleships will be destroyed when deploying an autonomous system 
against an enemy naval convoy, even if the sequence of targeting, or number of munitions needed, 
are unknown. As such, it would be correct to state that the ‘overall activity of an autonomous [system] 
will be predictable [even if] individual actions may not be.’ 66 Thus, this can be added to the definition 
of AWS used in this thesis. 
Other definitions focus upon the expected highly-sophisticated nature of AWS. These include 
suggestions that an AWS would need to be ‘capable of understanding higher level intent’67 or possess 
an ability to evolve its understanding of its environment.68 Yet, as Sharkey notes, such a high technical 
threshold may be impossible to reach.69 States conceptualising AWS with such lofty requirements are 
‘defining away’70 issues as they can simply claim that AWS do not exist according to their definition 
whenever difficult questions are discussed. 
Another attempt to define away issues related to AWS is to characterise them as inherently 
indiscriminate.71 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, any weapon that is inherently indiscriminate would 
be unlawful due to being inaccurate or uncontrollable.72 Thus, according to this characteristic, any 
issues raised about autonomous systems that are accurate and controllable could be ignored as not 
being relevant to AWS under this conception. 
 
65 Belgian UNOG Delegation, ‘Towards a definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems’ 2017 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 7 November 2017) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.3, para.8(c); China UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.3.  
66 UK Approach (n.62) para.205. 
67 UK Approach (n.62) para.205. 
68 China UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.3. 
69 Sharkey 2011 (n.6) 141. 
70 See Maziar Homayounnejad ‘A Note on the Sense and Scope of ‘Autonomy’ in Emerging Military Weapon 
Systems and Some Remarks on The Terminator Dilemma’ in Joshua Hughes (ed.), Autonomy In Future Military 
And Security Technologies: Implications For Law, Peace, And Conflict (The Richardson Institute, 2018) 71. 
71 China UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.3. 
72 Art.51(4)(b)-(c), API. 
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A common definitional feature is lethality.73 But, this ignores the potential of using an AWS 
with less-than-lethal munitions. One can forgive the inclusion of this characteristic, however, as the 
international discussions at the UN are specifically orientated toward ‘lethal autonomous weapon 
systems.’74  
Despite the varying views,75 we can see that defining AWS as systems that select and engage 
targets without human intervention is the most appropriate. The understanding of AWS in this thesis 
can also incorporate that these systems are, on the whole, predictable in terms of what they will do 
because they simply follow the instructions they are given and the algorithms they are programmed 
with. Additionally, we can note that the potential for intervention by an operator is irrelevant unless 
they actually intervene.  
 
6. The development of AWS 
The development of AWS can be seen through two main analytical lenses. One is for advanced 
militaries to be seemingly evermore distant and remote from the exercise of military violence and the 
other is for technology to ostensibly never stop progressing.  
 
6.1. Increasing remoteness and distance 
In terms of remoteness, or distance, this lens suggests that ever since people threw rocks to 
avoid hand-to-hand combat with adversaries, humans have been attempting to exert force onto 
 
73 China UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.3; Belgium UNOG Delegation (n.65) para 8(c); French UNOG Delegation 
(n.63). 
74 See UNOG (n.61). 
75 For other perspectives on defining AWS, see Amandeep Singh Gill, 'Chart-1 Characterization Of The Systems 
Under Consideration In Order To Promote A Common Understanding On Concepts And Characteristics 





others whilst reducing risks to themselves.76 This concept has gained significant traction in relation to 
the use of UAVs (uninhabited aircraft vehicles, or ‘drones’)77 where pilots remotely-control these 
platforms from the other side of the world78 through socio-technical systems.79 This has led to 
discussions on whether such systems enable ‘riskless’80 and ‘gamified’81 remote warfare,82 for the side 
using these technologies, and if this means that their use is unethical.83 Such criticisms appear pre-
mature, as they belie the experiences of the users of these systems who, although not suffering 
physically, report significant psychological repercussions of this work,84 and an ongoing deep moral 
connection to it.85 Indeed, Williams notes that drone operators have an ‘intimate’ connection to their 
targets, despite the physical distance between them.86 However, with the use of AWS, this connection 
would be lost through technological proxies. A loss of moral engagement would, in terms of Just War 
Theory,87 be a negative development. So, if remote-controlled drones already provide the benefit of 
 
76 Generally, see Jens David Ohlin (ed), Research Handbook On Remote Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2017). 
77 This term is used rather than the more common ‘unmanned aircraft vehicle’ firstly to remove any gendered 
association, and also to prevent any confusion that ‘unmanned’ also means no ‘man’ is involved in the 
decision-making process. This second point is made by Alex Leveringhaus, Ethics And Autonomous Weapons 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 3. 
78Derek Gregory, 'Drone Geographies' (2014) 183 Radical Philosophy 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912162118/https://www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/
drone-geographies>.; Dan Gettinger, 'Drone Geography: Mapping A System Of Intelligence' (Center for the 
Study of the Drone, 2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912162257/https://dronecenter.bard.edu/drone-geography/>. 
79 See, for example, Lucy Suchman, Karolina Follis and Jutta Weber, 'Tracking And Targeting' (2017) 42 Science, 
Technology, & Human Values, 983. 
80 See, for example, Shane M Riza, Killing Without Heart: Limits On Robotic Warfare In An Age Of Persistent 
Conflict (Potomac Books, 2013). 
81 See, for example, Lambèr Royakkers and Rinie van Est, 'The Cubicle Warrior: The Marionette Of Digitalized 
Warfare' (2010) 12 Ethics and Information Technology, 289. 
82 Note that ‘remote warfare’ is sometimes conceptualised to include the use of proxy, surrogate, or deniable 
forces physically removed from those in command. See Oxford Research Group, 'Conceptual Series: Defining 
Remote Warfare' (Oxford Research Group, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/pages/category/conceptua
l-series-defining-remote-warfare>. 
83 See, for example, Gregoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (Penguin Books, 2015). 
84 Eyal Press, 'The Wounds Of The Drone Warrior' (New York Times, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190904114515/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/magazine/v
eterans-ptsd-drone-warrior-wounds.html>. 
85 Peter Lee, 'Drone Crews And Moral Engagement' (The Psychologist, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912162913/https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-
30/june-2017/drone-crews-and-moral-engagement>. 
86 John Williams, 'Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones, And Just War' (2015) 29 Ethics & International Affairs, 93. 




reducing physical risks for the side using them, but maintain a level of moral and psychological 
engagement, why develop AWS? 
 
6.2. The (dis)advantages of AWS 
AWS provide two clear benefits over other combat systems. Firstly, AWS offer the ability to 
go further than the limits of human-controlled systems and to operate beyond the speed of human 
reactions.88 Automation of human actions allows for them to be performed much faster.89 Where, for 
example, an AWS engages an equally matched adversary (human or machine), the entity which can 
act quicker will ultimately triumph because more attacks can take place in a shorter time. On a larger 
scale, the side with the faster ‘operational tempo’ often wins wars.90 Thus, AWS are ideal for situations 
of combat at super-human intensity. 
Second, remote-control technologies, such as UAVs, are reliant upon communication signals 
from their operator. 91 If UAVs lose this link, all they can do is fly around in circles or return to base.92 
When this happens, the UAV is militarily useless. Thus, remote-control UAVs cannot be used where: 
stealth is essential to a successful mission and the communication-link would alert the enemy; 
communication is impossible, or degraded, such as missions underwater, underground, in buildings, 
 
88 Mark Wolverton, 'The General Is A Robot: Artificial Intelligence Goes To War' (Undark, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190403034402/https://undark.org/article/book-review-scharre-
army-of-none/>. 
89 Paul Scharre, Army Of None (WW Norton & Company, 2018) 352-326; Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, 'Pros 
And Cons Of Autonomous Weapons Systems' (2017) May-June Military Review, 72; Matthew Press, 'Of Robots 
And Rules: Autonomous Weapon Systems In The Law Of Armed Conflict' (2017) 48 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 1337, 1361. 
90 Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy And War (Routledge, 2007) 1; also see generally, Paul Virilio, Desert 
Screen: War At The Speed Of Light (Continuum, 2002). 
91 The use of the term ‘operator’ has expanded since 9/11 and has been used to refer to special forces soldiers 
in various services. See, for example Jack Murphy, 'What Is An Operator?' (NEWSREP, 2013) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912163549/https://thenewsrep.com/29133/operator/>; 
Michael Hastings, The Operators (Phoenix, 2013); James Rennie, The Operators: On The Streets With Britain's 
Most Secret Service (Pen & Sword Military, 2007). However, in this thesis it is used to describe those who 
operate weapon systems. 





or caves; an adversary is jamming communication signals; a technical fault impairs communication.93 
Thus, AWS which could operate in the absence of data links offers clear benefits over remote-
controlled systems.  
However, it is important not to oversell AWS. Whilst they offer potential tactical advantages 
over some human-controlled weapons, due to the strict logical rules they must follow, they can only 
bring those advantages to bear in situations they are programmed for. Thus, AWS are likely to be 
favoured over drones, inhabited systems, or ‘boots on the ground’ when the particular situation 
matches up to the intended use of the AWS. As such, they are unlikely to be used in situations they 
are not specifically programmed for, or for tasks requiring human judgement. 
Such fragility offers both advantages and disadvantages. By automating tasks, this should 
remove human errors where people misunderstand the data they are receiving. Such mistakes have 
resulted in many incidents where the wrong targets have been attacked.94 Yet, where incorrect data 
is processed by machines, this can also result in undesired outcomes. For example, during the Cold 
War, a Soviet missile early-warning system indicated a US attack was imminent. Soviet protocol 
suggested that a massive nuclear response should take place. But, the machines were processing 
incorrect data caused by sunlight reflecting off cloud tops.95 If these machines were autonomous, they 
would have followed protocol and the nuclear response would have started World War III. A human 
being recognised the unusual data pattern and chose not to enact protocol, thereby averting conflict.96 
Thus, there is a role for human beings to engage with alongside and in control of AWS. 
Some argue that a human presence in targeting decisions is required to enable moral and 
ethical compliance. As an AWS would simply recognise targets and non-targets, human adversaries 
would be treated as objects rather than individuals. This is seen as an affront to human dignity 
 
93 Scharre (n.89) 327-328; Henderson et al. (n.11) 337; Etzioni and Etzioni (n.89) 72. 
94 Scharre (n.89) 141, 167-168, on ‘friendly fire’ incidents from the 2003 Iraq war see 137-143, on the shooting 
down or Iranian Air Flight 655 see 169-170. 
95 Scharre (n.89) 1-2. 
96 Scharre (n.89) 1-2. 
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according to Kantian ethics.97 Unfortunately, human beings have been treated as mere targets for 
decades, for example, when they are added to both counterterrorism 98 and strategic military target 
lists.99 Further, early definitions of ‘military objective’ include combatants.100 As such, whilst deaths in 
conflicts are already somewhat undignified,101 AWS do not seem to create more indignity than other 
practices of modern warfare. 
Another important moral and ethical aspect of the permissible use of AWS is accountability 
for their actions.102 This moral accountability should, logically, reside with the entity that made 
targeting decisions. If one is of the opinion that AWS make decisions, then this means that it would be 
immoral and unethical to use these systems as no human decision-maker could be sufficiently tied to 
the actions of the AWS.103 However, this view misunderstands how these systems actually work. As 
we have already seen, AWS are only capable of following their programming.104 As such, AWS cannot 
be moral agents because they cannot decide upon their own actions.105 Consequently, moral and 
ethical accountability for AWS rests with ‘the set of humans responsible for its creation, programming, 
and deployment.’106 Legal responsibility is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
 
97 Aaron M. Johnson and Sidney Axinn, 'The Morality Of Autonomous Robots' (2013) 12 Journal of Military 
Ethics, 129, 134; Ozlem Ulgen, 'Human Dignity In An Age Of Autonomous Weapons: Are We In Danger Of 
Losing An ‘Elementary Consideration Of Humanity’?' (2016) 8 ESIL Conference Paper Series 1-19 European 
Society of International Law 2016 Annual Conference. 
98 Aurel Sari, 'Missing The Mark: Reprieve, 'Kill Lists' And Human Rights Advocacy' (EJIL Talk, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20161114070952/http://www.ejiltalk.org/missing-the-mark-reprieve-
kill-lists-and-human-rights-advocacy/>. 
99 See Derek Gregory, 'Bombing Encyclopedia Of The World' (Geographical Imaginations, 2012) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190621173403/https://geographicalimaginations.com/2012/08/03
/bombing-encyclopedia-of-the-world/>. 
100 For multiple definitions, see Horace B. Robertson, Jr., 'The Principal Of The Military Objective In The Law Of 
Armed Conflict' (1998) 72 International Law Studies, 197. 
101 Scharre (n.89) 288. 
102 Robert Sparrow, 'Killer Robots' (2007) 24 Journal of Applied Philosophy, 62, 67. 
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104 Elliot Winter, 'Autonomous Weapons In Humanitarian Law: Understanding The Technology, Its Compliance 
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International Law, 183, 193. 
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6.3. The loop paradigm 
The distance within human-machine relationships is exemplified in AWS discourse in the ‘loop’ 
paradigm. This enables us to formalise an understanding of the distance between the decision-making 
of the person using/controlling a system and the manifestation of that decision: 
‘Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force only with 
a human command;  
Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select targets and deliver force under the 
oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions; and  
Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting targets and 
delivering force without any human input or interaction.‘107 
The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots seeks to have the use of out-of-the-loop targeting 
banned.108 Yet, by focussing upon the distance in a human-machine relationship, this ignores the 
quality of that relationship: would an ‘on-the-loop’ operator be fully focussed on observing the system 
during operations?109 Further, the loop paradigm does not allow us to understand the sophistication 
of the system. The out-of-the-loop category could seemingly include everything from a landmine to 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator character.110 As such, this paradigm does not allow us to really 
understand the uniqueness that AWS present. 
Still, this thesis is primarily concerned with the use of ‘out-of-the-loop’ systems, or those using 
an ‘out-of-the-loop’ mode, during targeting, as this aligns with the definition adopted by this thesis. 
 
107 HRW (n.52) 2. 
108 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, ‘The threat of fully autonomous weapon systems’ (Stopkillerrobots.org, 
2019) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190929102338/https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/learn/>; 
HRW (n.52) 2-5. 
109 For more on meaningful human control of AWS, see Chapter 3, Section 5.7. 
110 Cameron (n.27). 
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Another popular paradigm that can help us understand the advancement of autonomous systems in 
terms of their sophistication is now considered, before both paradigms are brought together. 
 
6.4. Increasing technological progress 
Perhaps the first weapon with autonomy is the Gatling gun. Invented in 1861, it automated 
the process of loading, firing, and ejecting bullets which is regularly seen in modern firearms.111 
However, the first ‘smart’ weapon, meaning that which is capable of directing itself at the target, was 
the German ‘Falcon’ introduced in 1943. This was a torpedo incorporating an acoustic sensor used to 
target allied and merchant ships.112 The Falcon is a type of what are now known as precision guided 
munitions (PGMs). Some of these missiles use onboard sensors such as radar, heat, or electromagnetic 
sensors, to locate and lock onto their targets.113 PGMs with the highest levels of autonomy available 
today are ‘fire-and-forget’ missiles.114 These require a human to designate a type of target to be 
attacked, and a location where the system can autonomously search for the target. However, due to 
a very small search area, the human essentially chooses the target and the system autonomously 
guides itself toward it.115 This is referred to as ‘autonomous end-game engagement’.116  
However, the ‘Harop’, a missile-cum-drone, is a much more advanced form of PGM called a 
loitering munition.117 This system has a range over 500km and can stay in flight for over 2 and a half 
hours.118 Such freedom means that the Harop is no longer a weapon with autonomy, but, according 
 
111 Scharre (n.89) 35. 
112 Scharre (n.89) 39. 
113 Other types of precision guided munition may have their target determine by a human being using GPS 
coordinates, or ‘painting’ a target using a laser, for example. See Scharre (n.89) 40-41. 
114 For example, the UK Brimstone missile or the US LRASM missile. 
115 Handy (n.14) 87. 
116 Scharre (n.89) 97. 
117 Israel Aerospace Industries, 'Harop' (IAI, 2018) Accessed 24 June 2020. Available 
at:<https://www.iai.co.il/p/harop>. Note that the vast majority of internet resources in this thesis have been 
archived so that these resources are available in the same state that they were researched. However, some 
websites prevent archiving and so references for these websites have been provided in the standard way. 
118 Scharre (n.89) 47-48. 
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to the definition used in this thesis, it is actually the first AWS.119 This system has been employed in 
combat during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But, it is unclear whether it was used in an autonomous 
mode.120  
It is important to note that the development of autonomy in weapons has not been linear. 
There are at least 183 weapons with some form of autonomy available today121 (albeit not necessarily 
lawfully)122 which include: obvious examples such as landmines and submarine-mines; defensive 
systems which shoot incoming ordnance out of the sky faster than a human could react at military 
bases123 and on military equipment;124 an automatic machine gun that can recognise invading forces 
along the South Korean border;125 encapsulated torpedo mines which use sensors to recognise 
underwater targets and then fire a homing missile to engage adversarial ships;126 the Sensor Fuzed 
Weapon which, after being air-delivered, follows several complicated steps and releases 40 sub-
munitions that, for a few seconds, can search for and attack tanks.127 
 
119 Rebecca Crootof, 'The Killer Robots Are Here: Legality And Policy Implications' (2015) 36 Cardozo Law 
Review, 1837, 1870-1872; Scharre (n.89) 46-50. 
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There are several moral and ethical issues which AWS raise in relation to their technological 
sophistication (or lack thereof), rather than their distance from human decision-makers.128 
Leveringhaus suggests that the difference between targeting by humans and machines is that the 
human has a choice not to attack, whereas a machine can only follow its programming.129 Indeed, 
Purves et al. contend that as machines would just be applying human inputted instructions, AWS could 
not apply their algorithms ‘for the right reasons.’130 Yet, Leveringhaus argues that the deployment of 
an AWS can be morally and ethically permissible where the use of other remote-controlled or 
inhabited systems present a greater risk of undesirable consequences, or of military defeat.131 Such 
situations are in-line with the missions that this thesis predicts AWS will be used for: those in 
communication-denied environments, or in combat at super-human intensity. These are both 
situations where AWS would be advantageous and required to prevent defeat on a tactical level, and 
therefore could be morally and ethically compliant. 
Another common argument put forward for AWS being immoral is that these systems would 
lack the human qualities of mercy or compassion needed to avoid morally and ethically problematic 
killings, and it is currently unforeseeable that humans will ever be able to programme these traits.132 
For example, if an AWS could recognise the targetability of children acting for the enemy,133 or enemy 
soldiers who are not in a position to defend themselves,134 the machine could not identify the moral 
quandaries of such attacks and exercise restraint. It would simply attack. Conversely, Arkin notes that 
AWS would not have their judgement clouded by anger, hate, or psychiatric issues, could act quicker 
 
128 For an overview, see Anzhelika Solovyeva and Nik Hynek, ‘Going Beyond the “Killer Robots” Debate: Six 
Dilemmas Autonomous Weapon Systems Raise’ 12 Central European Journal of International and Security 
Studies 12, 166. 
129 Leveringhaus (n.77) 89-117. 
130 Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins and Bradley J. Strawser, 'Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, And Acting 
For The Right Reasons' (2015) 18 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 851. 
131 Leveringhaus (n.77) 82-86. 
132 HRW 2012 (n.54) 4. 
133 Scharre (n.89) 290-294. 
134 Leveringhaus (n.77) 92-93; For the example of the ‘sleeping soldier’ see Chamayou (n.83) 199, although this 
example is specific to killings using UAVs, it could also apply to AWS. 
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than humans, and could take greater physical risks to eliminate targets.135 Arkin also suggests that 
AWS could monitor the behaviour of human beings to ensure their ethical compliance.136 
Some follow Arkin’s logic to suggest that an AWS would be incapable of carrying out an 
atrocity.137 However, the actions an AWS will take are ultimately dependent upon its programming 
and instruction. As a feminist analysis of international crimes shows, atrocities in warfare, those of 
sexual violence in particular, are often the result of a specific plan by high-ranking authority figures.138 
They could order AWS to be (re-)programmed to commit atrocities just as easily as they could order 
humans to carry them out. Thus, the moral and ethical permissibility of using an AWS is massively 
influenced by the underlying programming of the system, and the instructions they are given on each 
mission. 
In terms of strategic concerns, some have suggested that if an AWS were to act in an 
unpredictable way, whether through poor programming, or malfunction, this could create significant 
risks of an AWS initiating unintended conflicts,139 or engaging in unlawful conduct.140 But, as Meier 
points out, AWS that present a chance of unpredictable actions are unlikely to be developed or 
deployed.141 As we saw above, the precise actions of an AWS might not be predictable, but what the 
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system is capable of autonomously performing will be foreseeable in accordance with the 
programming and instructions of the system. 
Further, many have noted that AWS could provide immense benefit to the deploying side, 
such that the asymmetry between technologically advanced and less-advanced groups in warfare 
would widen.142 This is a trend that has been ongoing for centuries.143 Yet, the potentially enormous 
disparity between a belligerent party using AWS and one without them asks whether the side using 
AWS are no longer engage in fighting, but are actually ‘manhunting’ the other.144 Added to the reduced 
physiological and psychological harms mentioned earlier, several authors have recognised that this 
would change the calculous for political decision-makers who would have one less reason to avoid 
conflict.145 For technologically advanced forces, these aspects are strategically beneficial as they are 
more likely to be able to achieve their strategic and military aims. However, for their opponents, 
resistance may be near-impossible.146 This, therefore, could lead to worries of technologically enabled 
global imperialism. However, precision-guided munitions,147 high-altitude bombing,148 and UAVs have 
also generated similar concerns that did not lead to such consequences.149 
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On the other side of this argument are worries about proliferation of AWS to terrorist 
groups.150 Yet, the technological capabilities needed for a terrorist-AWS already exist.151 UAVs can be 
bought online, and AI software can be downloaded from the internet.152 To terrorists, it would not 
matter if their versions of AWS are not very sophisticated. A terrorist group only needs one success in 
order to terrorise the public, whereas a military needs their AWS to work reliably all the time. Still, as 
Pinker points out, the number of people with terrorist-desires, and the know-how to produce such a 
machine whilst evading law enforcement is incredibly small and so it would be very unlikely for a 
terrorist group to be capable of building AWS in the near-future.153 
Still, the more AWS proliferate, the more incentive groups will have to acquire them as there 
is no advantage to be had by being the only entity without AWS. This could lead to a multi-polar 
political landscape which can be unstable, potentially leading to greater levels of conflict.154 The mass 
adoption of AWS could subsequently lead to future armed conflicts being primarily machine-on-
machine combat, thus potentially alleviating much of the human suffering associated with war.155 As 
such, AWS as an advanced technology presents a complex ethical, moral, and strategic picture. 
 
6.5. The levels paradigm 
In terms of technological advancement, it is possible to consider autonomy along a continuum 
of increasingly sophisticated machines: inert systems require direct human control to do anything, 
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such as swords; automatic systems are programmed to act in a specific and responsive way, such as 
landmines; semi-autonomous systems may be programmed to perform some critically relevant tasks 
but require human guidance for others, such as heatseeking missiles that are aimed and fired by 
humans but lock onto targets themselves; autonomous systems that can carry out all relevant tasks 
without human involvement.156 This is the so-called ‘levels of autonomy’ paradigm. 
In developing this paradigm, Crootof focusses her discussion on weapon systems.157 However, 
due to the focus of each category on technological capability, rather than the use of the systems, these 
categories could be read to be very wide and include systems which are used for military support 
tasks, such as autonomous surveillance platforms. The inclusion of systems that do not perform 
targeting were rejected from the definition of AWS in this thesis. Whilst this paradigm enables 
understanding of the differences in technology, and how it can progress and manifest in different 
ways, the categories are far too wide such that the essence of targeting by AWS becomes lost. Further, 
multi-stage weapons with autonomy such as torpedo encapsulated mines, and the Sensor Fuzed 
Weapon are difficult to categorise. They are inert when initially emplaced/deployed by humans, but 
the sub-munitions have greater autonomy when finding targets and so each weapon as a whole defies 
categorisation. Whilst this paradigm allows us to understand increasing autonomy, it is difficult to 
characterise actual weapon systems within its taxonomy. 
 
6.6. Bringing both paradigms together 
Both the ‘levels’ and ‘loop’ paradigms are useful lenses for understanding different aspects of 
AWS. But both lack the focus of the other and struggle to deal with real world systems. For example, 
the Brimstone air-launched fire-and-forget missile is fired at a target by a pilot, but the missile itself 
 
156 Crootof (n.119) 1864-1865 (note that Crootof suggests her levels as inert, automated, semi-autonomous, 
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performs the final actions of the attack autonomously (‘endgame engagement’).158 Prior to release, 
the missile is inert and the pilot is ‘in-the-loop’. At the point of release, the missile is semi-autonomous 
with the pilot ‘on-the-loop’. During the attack, it is autonomous and the pilot is ‘out-of-the-loop’. As 
such, classification of actual weapons is difficult for these paradigms. Thus, whilst it can be illuminating 
to consider the technological capability of a system under the ‘levels’ paradigm and the distance 
between the weapon and human under the ‘loop’ paradigm, neither are satisfactory. 
So, as Scharre suggests,159 both paradigms should be considered simultaneously, whilst also 
considering what the weapon is doing. He proposes looking at autonomy in three dimensions: the 
task(s) a machine performs; the relationship between the human and the machine when the task(s) is 
performed; the sophistication of the machine when performing the task(s). These dimensions are 
independent and increasing any of these parameters can make a system ‘more autonomous’.160  
Due to the independence of each dimension, and lack of clear thresholds, this paradigm 
cannot specifically define an AWS. But, it can be used to better understand differences in each 
definition offered by states. 
With an AWS as defined by this thesis and others (a system that selects and engages targets 
without human intervention), the tasks performed by the system can be characterised as critical, in 
keeping with the ICRC understanding,161 the human-machine relationship as distant but potentially 
contactable, and sophistication as high. The potentially contactable nature of this system would mean 
that an operator could be in, on, or out-of-the-loop, with the system being autonomous or semi-
autonomous in accordance with the acts which the human is performing. Consequently, this can be 
used as a baseline to compare other definitions.  
 
158 Handy (n.14) 87. 
159 Scharre (n.89) 27-28. 
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In terms of tasks, very wide definitions could include systems performing highly-complex or 
simple tasks,162 and so the amount of autonomy displayed by such an AWS would vary depending 
upon how it is employed. Those definitions requiring lethality163 would be focussed upon critical 
targeting functions and so be at a similar level of autonomy along this dimension as the AWS definition 
adopted by this thesis. 
Regarding the human-machine relationship, those definitions requiring an absence of human 
supervision164 would always require an operator to be out-of-the-loop. Such systems would always 
present the greatest distance and autonomy possible in the definition of AWS used in this thesis. 
Beyond this are those definitions which require an impossibility of recalling or controlling the 
system.165 Whilst they may be functionally as distant as simply having no operator oversight, the total 
absence of possible communications means that they are conceptually even more distant. As such, 
systems where communication is impossible present the greatest distance, and therefore most 
autonomy in terms of the human-machine relationship. 
Turning finally to sophistication, the definitions which allow for remote-control or human 
oversight can also vary in terms of their sophistication as the level of autonomy present in this 
dimension is dependent upon what humans actually delegate to the AWS. These concepts are, 
therefore, two-sides of the same coin. Consequently, depending upon how it is used, an AWS could 
be inert, automatic, semi-autonomous, or fully-autonomous. However, one would expect AWS defined 
by their highly-technical functioning to display a greater level of sophistication and autonomy along 
this dimension.166 
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By looking across these different characteristics for conceptualising AWS, we can see that 
there are vastly different understandings of what an AWS is. Further, whilst human-machine 
relationships and the sophistication of a machine are, essentially, two-sides of the same coin, it is the 
tasks that the AWS is performing that provide context for the other two dimensions. This not only 
underlines the superiority of Scharre’s approach, but also that it is key to consider how autonomous 
a system is at the time of its usage.  
Thus, in terms of their use, this thesis is focussed on the ‘critical functions’167 of selecting and 
engaging targets by AWS. Indeed, it is the performance of these tasks in the context of distance and 
sophistication that determines their compliance with legal rules and the attendant need for 
regulation. Consequently, the precise definition of an autonomous system is largely immaterial. in the 
following chapters, this thesis focuses on the ability of international law to regulate critical functions 
in particular. 
 
7. The state of AWS technology on the horizon 
We have already mentioned the Harop system, but weapon systems in development today 
and the near future could allow for a much greater search area than with fire-and-forget missiles or 
loitering munitions, merged with the autonomy in targeting that other systems have. Semi-
autonomous systems such as the Taranis UAV built by BAE Systems and the nEUROn UAV built by 
Dassault Aviation can search wide areas for targets and autonomously select them, however the 
decision to engage a target is currently performed by a human.168 Their ability to recognise targets 
would suggest a high level of sophistication. But they have a close relationship with their human 
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operator who is required to be in-the-loop for critical decisions. Both systems are ‘technology 
demonstrators’, meaning that, rather than full production models, they are, fundamentally, an 
experiment to see what innovations can be developed for them, and which of these will be useful for 
future systems.169  
However, there are several research programmes which indicate that humans might be 
pushed out of the targeting loop. The US military is looking at autonomous target selection and 
engagement using multiple systems.170 The UK military has also initiated several exercises and studies 
geared toward greater integration of autonomous systems into its military functions.171 Further, Russia 
is developing weapons with autonomy for targeting.172 It is important to note that these research 
programmes might not be fruitful, nor might the developed technologies end up being used as part of 
a single system. However, they indicate that military research is heading towards greater autonomy 
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online/darpa-seeks-proposals-third-offset-swarm-sprint/>; Patrick Tucker, 'US Military Changing ‘Killing 
Machine’ Robo-Tank Program After Controversy' (Defense One, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190318180141/https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/03
/us-military-changing-killing-machine-robo-tank-program-after-controversy/155256/>. 
171 UK Government, 'Streets Ahead: British AI Eyes Scan Future Frontline In Multinational Urban Experiment' 
(UK Government, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190724050902/https://www.gov.uk/government/news/streets-
ahead-british-ai-eyes-scan-future-frontline-in-multinational-urban-experiment>; British Army, 'Ex Autonomous 
Warrior 2018' (British Army, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20181123051919/https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/awe-
2018/>; Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 'Human-Machine Teaming (JCN 1/18)' (UK Ministry of 
Defence, 2018); Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 'Future Force Concept (JCN1/17)' (UK Ministry of 
Defence, 2017). 




in weapon systems, which suggests that AWS could become more common. Still, this thesis expects 
that as cutting-edge AWS are developing in the same vein as UAVs, there will be similarities between 
their positions in military hierarchies and they will be instructed by operators who will themselves be 
overseen by commanders.173 
At this point, it makes sense to briefly mention that manufacturers of autonomous systems 
are generally following the example of the aerospace industry which is seen as the ‘gold standard’ in 
terms of safety.174 For instance, manufacturers of autonomous vehicles are pursuing a better-than-
human failure rate.175 This goal is also present in the development of weapons with autonomy. For 
example, BAE Systems are working toward 100% accuracy in target identification within a 10m2 space 
at a distance of 10km with their Taranis system.176 Thus, although there are many issues associated 
with AWS, some engineers are working towards reducing the technical problems as much as possible. 




173 Gregory (n.78). 
174 Alan Winfield, 'The Ethical Roboticist' (Centre for Autonomous Systems, Liverpool, UK, 27 June 2016). An 
earlier version of this presentation is available online: Alan Winfield, 'The Ethical Roboticist' (YouTube, 2011) 
Accessed 24 June 2020. Available at:<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmuXhb6pA5s>. 
175Lee Bell, 'Humans Vs Robots: Driverless Cars Are Safer Than Human Driven Vehicles' (The Inquirer, 2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190708112444/https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/feature/242
6988/humans-vs-robots-driverless-cars-are-safer-than-human-driven-vehicles>; however, note that the 
calculation of a crash rate is difficult, see Peter Hancock, 'Are Autonomous Cars Really Safer Than Human 
Drivers?' (The Conversation, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190824172322/https://theconversation.com/are-autonomous-
cars-really-safer-than-human-drivers-90202>. 
176 Keith Rigby, 'Future Design Drivers For Autonomous Systems Technology' (Royal Aeronautical Society, 
London, 19 July 2017). 
177 Future of Life Institute, 'Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge' (Future of Life Institute, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190728063149/https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-
weapons-pledge/>; Future of Life Institute, 'An Open Letter To The United Nations Convention On Certain 
Conventional Weapons' (Future of Life Institute, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190728062950/https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-





8. Summing up major issues 
AWS are clearly a technology that create many moral, ethical, strategic, and legal issues. Some 
are positive, and some are negative. Like all technologies, AWS are not wholly good, nor wholly bad, 
nor wholly neutral178 – they have an effect not only upon warfare,179 but also upon the societies who 
engage in, and are subject to, their use.180 Further, the underlying algorithms reflect both the 
programmers,181 and the approaches to programming that they took.182 Despite AWS being 
instruments, or tools, of human beings, and subject to their instructions, we cannot view them in 
isolation from their effects on society, nor from the effects of society on them.183 As the development 
of new tools enables the creation of new uses for those tools,184 it is difficult to fully appreciate how 
AWS will be used in the future beyond the situations of combat at super-human intensity and in 
communication-denied environments, which this thesis has already outlined. Indeed, as Virilio notably 
said, ‘When you invent the ship, you also invent the shipwreck ... Every technology carries its own 
negativity, which is invented at the same time as technical progress.’185 A question for international 
law then is how it can minimise the potential negativities of AWS. 
 
 
178 Melvin Kranzberg, 'Technology and History: "Kranzberg's Laws"' (1986) 27 Technology and Culture, 544, 
545-548. 
179 Alexandra Sweny, 'The Third Revolution In Warfare: AI Weapons' (Vanguard Magazine, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20150918094050/http://www.vanguardcanada.com/2015/08/18/the
-third-revolution/>. 
180 In relation to the effects of deploying UAVs, see Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, 'Drone 
Warfare: Blowback From The New American Way Of War' (2011) 18 Middle East Policy, 122. 
181 On the biases of programmers making it into their code, see, for example, Hannah Devlin, 'AI Programs 
Exhibit Racial And Gender Biases, Research Reveals' (The Guardian, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190913085159/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/a
pr/13/ai-programs-exhibit-racist-and-sexist-biases-research-reveals?CMP=twt_gu>. 
182 See Helmut Aust, ‘“The System Only Dreams in Total Darkness”: The Future of Human Rights Law in the 
Light of Algorithmic Authority’ in Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin von der Decken and Nele Matz-Lück, German 
Yearbook Of International Law (Volume 60) (Duncker & Humblot, 2018). 
183 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies And The End(S) Of Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 162-163. 
184 Weizenbaum, (n.41) 19. 




Overall, this Chapter has demonstrated how AWS should be defined and understood. AWS, 
by their nature, are not ‘autonomous’ in the same sense as human beings but their machine autonomy 
is limited to what they can be programmed to do and instructed to do.  This is fundamental; it is not 
possible for a machine to disobey its programming and instructions. 
By conceptualizing AWS as systems that select and engage targets without human 
intervention, whether or not that intervention is materially possible, and noting that their actions are 
generally foreseeable enables the thesis to focus on the actions of AWS, and their users in the 
following chapters (particularly in Chapter 5). Having noted the different paradigms used for 
understanding AWS, this provides a basis for the subsequent analysis to also consider the human-
machine relationship and technological sophistication in addition to the tasks that the system is 
instructed to perform. Having determined that AWS can only operate subject to control, the next 
Chapter explains how legal rules can apply in this context and how control relationships should be 
conceptualised as existing in different layers for each controlling entity. 
50 
 
Chapter 3: The law applicable to autonomous weapon systems in layers of control 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter noted that autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are a type of weapon 
that is qualitatively different from any which has gone before. Through delegating the application of 
targeting choices to AWS, the operators and commanders of such systems are treating them in a 
similar way to human fighters. Consequently, this means that AWS must be considered not just in 
terms of being weapons, but also in terms of their behaviours in combat.  
In order for international law to sufficiently regulate AWS, the applicability of law to these 
systems in terms of both weapons and ‘fighters’ in combat must be addressed. Indeed, there are ‘no 
doubt[s]’1 that the law of armed conflict (LoAC) applies to new technologies such as AWS. This is a 
position of ‘universal consensus.’2 But, it is unclear exactly how legal rules apply to them,3 and so this 
presents a regulatory challenge. This Chapter provides a clear account of how the legal regimes 
relevant to weapons, and to targeting, can apply to such system by showing clear links between the 
humans who legal rules are addressed to, and the use of AWS as their legal agents in an exercise of 
control. It is also explained which entities exert control over AWS and how their relationships with 
AWS are based on control that affects how they are employed. Prior to those discussions taking place, 
however, this thesis first outlines the sources and bodies of international law that are relevant to AWS. 
 
 
1 International Committee of the Red Cross, 'International Humanitarian Law And The Challenges Of 




2 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, '"Out Of The Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems And The Law Of 
Armed Conflict' (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal, 231, 243. 
3 Schmitt and Thurnher (n.2) 243. 
51 
 
2. Sources of international law relevant to AWS 
Before outlining the bodies of international law relevant to AWS, the applicability of the 
domestic law of each state who use these systems must be addressed. Most notable would be the 
criminal and service law regimes relating to responsibility for AWS operations. The potential to use 
these regimes to assist a responsibility paradigm is discussed in Chapter 6. However, on the whole, 
domestic law is not relevant to these international law discussions, except insofar as some 
international obligations requires the enaction of domestic laws. 
As stated in the statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), international law comes 
from: international agreements, such as treaties or conventions;4 international customs, of general 
state practice accepted as law;5 general principles of law, as recognised in domestic systems;6 judicial 
decisions from other courts, and the teachings of ‘highly qualified publicists’.7  
 
2.1. Treaty law 
Treaties are international agreements between states8 (or international organisations)9  that 
delineate arrangements for obligations to be carried out.10 Treaties may be ‘law-making’, meaning 
they are intended to have general applicability or a ‘treaty-contract’ between a small number of 
entities.11 Sometimes, treaty rules reflect customary rules, but they are still separate obligations even 
if they are identical.12 As such, this thesis shall separately refer to both customary and treaty 
 
4 Art.38(a), Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 24 October 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) (Hereafter: ICJ Statute). 
5 Art.38(b), ICJ Statute. 
6 Art.38(c), ICJ Statute. 
7 Art.38(d), ICJ Statute. 
8 Art.2(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTC 331 (Hereafter: VCLT). 
9 Art.1, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations (adopted 21 March 1986, not in force). 
10 Art.26, VCLT. 
11 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (8th edn, CUP, 2017) 70. 
12 Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) Merits [1986] ICJ Reports, p.14, para.177. 
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obligations where relevant. With regard to interpretation, treaty terms should be understood with 
their ‘ordinary meaning’.13 Where this is still uncertain, supplementary means of interpretation can 
be used.14 It is important to note that violation of treaty obligations can be grounds for terminating 
that treaty,15 unless it is of humanitarian character.16 
Certain treaties create, or contribute to, a particular ‘regime’. Those treaty-regimes relevant 
to AWS include: the maintenance of international peace and security;17 the conduct of hostilities;18 
human rights law;19 international criminal law.20  
 
2.2. Customary international law 
Customary international law (CIL) is generated from state practice and opinio juris. As the ICJ 
has stated, for a rule of CIL to form:  
‘[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be 
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’21 
 
13 Art.31, VCLT. 
14 Arts.31-33, VCLT. 
15 Art.60(1) to (4), VCLT. 
16 Art.60(5), VCLT. 
17 Art.2, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) (Hereafter: 
UN Charter). 
18 There are many treaties which contribute to the law of armed conflict, see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, 
Documents On The Laws Of War (3rd edn, OUP, 2004). 
19 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (Hereafter: ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (Hereafter: 
ICESCR); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (Hereafter: ECHR); American Convention on Human 
Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (Hereafter: IACHR); 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
1520 UNTS 217 (Hereafter: ACHPR). 
20 See, for example, Rome Statue Of The International Criminal Court 1998 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into 
force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3. 
21 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands) Judgement [1969] ICJ 
Reports, p.3, para.77. 
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Thus, where both of these elements exist, a rule of CIL may form. Appreciation of these 
elements must be done separately and give regard to the ‘overall context, the nature of the rule and 
the particular circumstance’.22 Primarily, acts of state organs in their executive, legislative, judicial or 
other functions constitute state practice23 (international organisations may contribute to the 
formation or expression of CIL rules,24 but non-state actors, multinational corporations, and 
individuals may not).25  
Forms of practice can be varied.26 The following discussion of AWS will focus primarily on rules 
developed from ‘operational conduct “on the ground”’ which can include ‘battlefield or other military 
activity.’27 The formation of CIL rules must be representative of the practice as a whole,28 it must be 
sufficiently widespread, representative, and consistent as to be a general practice.29 Still, 
contradictory or inconsistent practice does not necessarily preclude the recognition of practice as 
settled.30 
In terms of the opinio juris element, the practice must be ‘undertaken with a sense of legal 
right or obligation, that is, it must be accompanied by a conviction that it is permitted, required or 
prohibited by customary international law.’31 Thus, where ‘comity, political expedience[,] 
 
22 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands) Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Tanaka [1969] ICJ Reports, p.175; Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in 
Morocco (France v United States of America) Judgement (1952) ICJ Reports, p.176, p.200; International Law 
Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission on the Work of its Seventieth session’ (2018) UN 
Doc. A/73/10, para.66 (Hereafter: ILC 2018), Conclusion 3 and accompanying commentary. 
23 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) Judgement [1985] ICJ Reports, p.13, 
para.27; ILC 2018, Conclusion 5 and accompanying commentary; Nicaragua case (n.12) para.183. 
24 ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their 
rights’ in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ 
Reports, p.174, p.178; ILC 2018, Conclusion 4, commentary paras.4-7. 
25 ILC 2018, Conclusion 4, commentary paras.8-9. 
26 ILC 2018, Conclusion 6(2). 
27 ILC 2018, Conclusion 6, commentary para.5. 
28 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) Judgement [2012] ICJ Reports, 
p.99, paras.76 and 83; ILC 2018, Conclusion 7 and accompanying commentary. 
29 North Sea Continental Shelf case (n.21) para.74 and 77; ILC 2018, Conclusion 8 and accompanying 
commentary. 
30 Nicaragua case (n.12) para.186; ILC 2018, Conclusion 8, commentary para.2. 
31 ILC 2018, Conclusion 9, commentary para.2, note that ‘right or obligation’ is used to reflect the rights and 




convenience’, or seeking to abide by treaty or domestic law, are unaccompanied by a separate sense 
of right or obligation accepted as law, no opinio juris can form.32 Evidence of opinio juris can be found 
across a range of different statements, decisions, or actions of states.33 Due to AWS being recent 
developments, there is no evidence of relevant state practice combined with opinio juris which could 
be used to create specific CIL rules related to AWS. 
Some customary rules are thought of as being of greater importance than others. These are 
known as peremptory or jus cogens norms. These obligations are not owed to other states but are of 
such importance that they are owed to the international community as a whole (erga omnes).34 The 
responsibility for such rules in relation to ‘aggravated’ state responsibility is considered in Chapter 6. 
Where a state has clearly and persistently expressed opposition to a rule of CIL to other states 
during its formation, and continues to oppose it, the customary rule cannot be applied to that state 
unless it is a jus cogens norm.35 As such, if a particular state clearly and openly objected to the 
formation of rules related to autonomy in warfare, such rules would not apply to them for so long as 
they maintain their objection. 
 
2.3. General principles of law 
Due to international law being under-developed in comparison to domestic legal systems, 
gaps sometimes appear which can be solved through applying principles of law that are recognised in 
 
and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules (CUP, 2005) (Hereafter: 
ICRC Study) p.xxxii. 
32 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) Judgement [1950] ICJ Reports, p.266, pgs.277 and 286; North Sea 
Continental Shelf case (n.21) para.76; ILC 2018, Conclusion 9, commentary paras.3 and 4; John B. Bellinger III 
and William J. Haynes II, 'A US Government Response To The International Committee Of The Red Cross Study 
Customary International Humanitarian Law' (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross, 443, 445 and 
446-447. 
33 ILC 2018, Conclusion 10(2). 
 34Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) New Application: 
1962, Second Phase [1970] ICJ Reports, p.3., paras.33-34. 
35 Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway) Judgement [1951] ICJ Reports, p.116, p.131; ILC 2018, Conclusion 15 




domestic systems. This source of international law is rarely used, but it has created some important 
rules.36 This thesis applies these principles where relevant. For example, the violation of an 
international obligation generating a subsequent obligation to make reparation is discussed in Chapter 
6.37 
 
2.4. Highly qualified publicists 
Academic writing as a source of international law is generally restricted to writers of classic 
works. Such compositions mostly come from writers during the period when the natural law approach 
dominated, and so analysis rather than juridical opinion was of crucial importance.38 Yet, some later 
writers of great standing, such as Oppenheim or Rousseau, are often referred to in similar terms as 
the ‘classic’ writers and their opinions are sometimes treated as law.39 
 
2.5. Judicial decisions 
Under Article 59 of the ICJ statute, the decisions of the Court have binding effect only on the 
parties in dispute, and in respect of that dispute. In practice, however, international courts will often 
consider their previous decisions, and those from other judicial bodies in both the international and 
domestic arenas.40 As such, relevant aspects of judicial decisions are applied where applicable, both 




36 For a discussion on various principles which have been brought into international law through cases at the 
PCIJ and ICJ, see Shaw (n.11) 74-78. 
37Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for indemnity) (Germany v Poland) Merits (1928) PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 17, p.10, 29. 
38 Shaw (n.11) 84. 
39 Shaw (n.11) 84. 
40 Shaw (n.11) 82-83. 
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2.6. Other possible sources 
Whilst the ICJ statute lists only five sources of international law across four paragraphs, some 
other documents and decisions are occasionally treated as law. Resolutions of the UN Security Council 
are binding upon all states,41 and so are treated as equivalent to international law. In contrast, 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly have no binding effect.42 But, General Assembly resolutions 
that have received substantial support from states have, on occasion, been treated as law. The ‘De-
Colonisation Declaration’43 and the ‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’44 appear to have been elevated 
to the level of being treated as law even though they are not in de jure terms.45 
Other documents that are non-binding can form ‘soft law’. This means that whilst the 
documents are not law, particular attention should be given to them.46 The International Law 
Commission is tasked with developing international law47 by creating draft treaties and reports. These 
have no independent legal standing. But they are sometimes treated as if they were law, or at least as 
the preeminent determination of what the law is.48  
In other cases of soft law formation, groups of experts have made pronouncements upon how 
international law should apply to certain situations. For example, ‘International Expert Manuals’ claim 
to rearticulate LoAC for particular situations. They have covered topics such as naval warfare,49 non-
 
41 Art.25, UN Charter. 
42 Art.10 UN Charter. However, note the administrative competency of the General Assembly under Arts.15-17 
43 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (15th session, 14 December 
1960) UN Doc. A/RES/1514. 
44 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (25th session, 24 October 1970) UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625. 
45 Shaw (n.11) 86. 
46 Shaw (n.11) 87. 
47 Art.1, Establishment of an International Law Commission (2nd session, 21 November 1947) UN Doc. 
A/RES/174. 
48 Note several references to the ILC’s work in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) Judgement 
[1997] ICJ Reports, p.7, paras.50-54. 




international armed conflicts,50 air and missile warfare,51 and cyber-warfare.52 International expert 
manuals provide additional illumination in interpreting relevant treaty and customary rules for 
situations that they focus on. This has led to the adoption of some of these rules into domestic policy.53 
The policies which articulate international LoAC obligations for each domestic armed force are 
national military manuals. They are often thoroughly researched for practical application, and so they 
can also be used as a guide to the applicable LoAC rules. The manuals referred to in this thesis come 
from the UK,54 the US,55 Canada,56 Australia,57 New Zealand,58 Germany,59 and Denmark.60 
The authors of some of soft law instruments have claimed to be authoritative re-statements 
of the lex lata.61 But, the authority of such documents actually comes from the original rules within 
them. Therefore, this thesis uses such instruments as a guide to what the law is in some circumstances, 




50 Michael N Schmitt, Charles H.B Garraway and Yoram Dinstein, The Manual On The Law Of Non-International 
Armed Conflict With Commentary (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006). 
51 Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Manual On International Law Applicable To Air And Missile 
Warfare (Harvard University, 2009) (Hereafter: AMW Manual). 
52 Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul (eds), Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The International Law Applicable To Cyber 
Warfare (CUP, 2017)(Hereafter: Tallinn Manual). 
53 For example, see the application of rules from Doswald-Beck (n.49) in the chapters on air and naval warfare 
in UK Ministry of Defence, Manual Of The Law Of Armed Conflict (OUP, 2004). 
54 UK MoD (n.53). 
55 US Department of Defense, Law Of War Manual 2015, Updated May 2016 (Office of the General Counsel, 
2016)(Hereafter: US Manual). 
56 Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law Of Armed Conflict At The Operational And Tactical 
Levels (National Defence, 2001). 
57 Australian Defence Headquarters, Law Of Armed Conflict, ADDP 06.4 (Defence Publishing Service, 2006). 
58 New Zealand Defence Force, DM 69 (2 Ed) Manual Of Armed Forces Law, Volume 4 Law Of Armed Conflict 
(Directorate of Legal Services, 2017). 
59 German Federal Ministry of Defence, Law Of Armed Conflict Manual (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2013). 
60 Jes Rynkeby Knudsen, Military Manual On International Law Relevant To Danish Armed Forces In 
International Operations (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016). 
61 See, for example, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(60th session, 21 March 2006) UN Doc. A/RES/60/147. 
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3. Bodies of law relevant to AWS 
Having outlined the sources of international law and hinted at the rules and regimes of 
international law which are germane to AWS, this Chapter now turns to explore the bodies of law that 
are most relevant to such systems. These are the Jus ad Bellum, the law of armed conflict, international 
human rights law, state responsibility, and international criminal law. 
 
3.1. Jus ad Bellum 
Where a state uses force extraterritorially, the Jus ad Bellum legal regime applies to the 
recourse to that force. There is a substantial customary history of this regime.62 However, it has been 
overtaken by the scheme laid out in the UN Charter. The Charter prohibits the use of force under 
Article 2(4). But, the use of force by states can be lawful if: force is being used with the consent, 
invitation, or acquiescence of the territorial state;63 the use of force has been approved by the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;64 the state using force is acting in self-defence.65 
Artificial intelligence systems may be used for data analysis by states to assist them in determining 
whether to initiate an armed conflict.66 But, such systems are not expected to be delegated the 
decision to initiate conflicts and so are not of concern here. Still, the use of AWS may create some Jus 
ad Bellum issues.67 
Firstly, there is a risk that an AWS could malfunction, cross an international border and 
conduct hostilities. This could prima facie create an international armed conflict (IAC) due to the 
 
62 See, Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (CUP, 2005). 
63 David Wippman, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention’ in Marc Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook Of The Use Of 
Force In International Law (OUP, 2015) 805. 
64 Art.39, UN Charter. 
65 Art.51, UN Charter. 
66 For more on AI in strategic decision-making and the use of force, see Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell and 
Darragh Murray, 'Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, And The Use Of Force By States' 10 Journal of 
National Security Law & Policy, 1. 
67 Here the focus is on legal issues, but there are other issues related to moral conceptions of Jus ad Bellum, 
see Heather Roff, 'Lethal Autonomous Weapons And Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality' (2015) 47 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, 37. 
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execution of non-consensual extraterritorial violence. However, where uses of force are accidental or 
erroneous, this would not create an armed conflict.68  
Secondly, some cyber-weapons could have autonomous functions that create Jus ad Bellum 
issues. For example, if such a weapon is programmed to automatically respond to any cyber-incursion 
by launching a counter-attack, this would likely engage the computer system that launched the initial 
attack. If the initial attack were perpetrated by a non-state actor (NSA), or routed through computer 
systems in a third state, an automatic-return cyber-strike could become an armed attack if it were to 
create the required level of physical destruction.69 This could create an IAC with the state the NSA is 
residing in, and/or the third state that a cyber-attack has been routed through. 
Third, if military personnel from one state are subject to an armed attack, they may engage in 
national self-defence.70 However, if only an uninhabited system is attacked, should this also lead to 
grounds for national self-defence and the beginning of an armed conflict?71 This situation is unclear. 
Whilst surveillance uninhabited aircraft vehicles (UAVs, or ‘drones’) have been shot down over foreign 
countries without hostiles breaking out,72 the case may be different if it is a large autonomous ship,73 
for example. Such issues are obviously problematic and need further exploration, but they are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
68 UK MoD (n.53) 3.3.1. 
69 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations And The Use Of Force In International Law (OUP, 2014) 14, 42,237,285; 
Michael N. Schmitt, '“Attack” As A Term Of Art In International Law: The Cyber Operations Context', CYCON 
2012 (NATO CCD COE 2012) 4-7; See also Deeks, Lubell, and Murray (n.66) 7-11. 
70 Art.51, UN Charter. 
71 Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, 'New Capabilities In Warfare: An Overview Of Contemporary 
Technological Developments And The Associated Legal And Engineering Issues In Article 36 Weapons Reviews' 
(2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross, 483, 497-498. 
72 Jamie Tarabay, 'Israel: Iranian Drone We Shot Down Was Based On Captured US Drone' (CNN, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190412080334/https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/12/middleeast/is
rael-iran-drone-intl/index.html>. 
73 Backstrom and Henderson (n.71) 497. 
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3.2. The law of armed conflict 
The law of armed conflict applies during armed conflicts. The Appeals Chamber in the case of 
Tadić at The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is often quoted as 
defining the circumstances for the existence of an armed conflict:  
‘…an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups within a State.’74 
The LoAC treaty rules governing international armed conflicts between states have a 
significant history and are comprised from many instruments.75 However, the discussions in this thesis 
are mostly concerned with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I (API) of 1977, and to 
a lesser extent the 1907 Hague Regulations. According to the ICJ, these provisions are all also 
customary rules.76 The existence of an IAC, and the application of these rules, is from ‘the resort to 
force’77 meaning the first shot of the conflict.78 It lasts until the ‘general close of military operations.’79  
The existence of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), according to Tadić, requires the 
armed non-state actors (ANSAs) involved to be organised, and the violence to be ‘protracted’. These 
concepts have been greatly expanded upon in the Haradinaj Trial Judgement at the ICTY. The 
organisational requirement may be exhibited by a clear command structure, amongst other aspects.80 
The protraction criterion requires continuous violence over some time, rather than short isolated 
 
74 Prosecutor v Tadić (Interlocutory Appeal) Case No: IT-94-1-A [1995] ICTY, 70. 
75 See Roberts and Guelff (n.18). 
76 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Reports, p.226, paras.79-84. 
77 Tadić Interlocutory Appeal (n.74) 70. 
78 Contrast Jann Kleffener, ‘Scope of Application’ in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook Of International 
Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2013) para.202(1) with International Law Association, 'Final Report On The 
Meaning Of Armed Conflict In International Law' (ILA, 2010) p.28. Also note Akande discussing that attempts to 
include an intensity criterion to the existence of IAC are a mistaken attempt to unify the law governing IAC and 
NIAC: Dapo Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.), 
International Law And The Classification Of Conflicts (OUP, 2012) 41. 
79 Kleffener (n.78) para.222. 
80 Prosecutor v Haradinaj and others (Trial Judgement) Case No IT-04-84-T [2008] ICTY, para.60. 
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instances.81 Protraction has also come to be seen as incorporating an ‘intensity requirement’,82 that is 
determined by a large number of factors.83 
The LoAC treaty rules governing NIACs are found in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II (APII) of 1977. The rules found in Common Article 3 apply 
where ‘armed conflict not of an international character occurs’ on the territory of a state party to the 
Geneva Conventions.84 APII applies to conflicts not of an international character ‘which take place in 
the territory of a [state party] between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement [APII].’85 
They apply to both states and ANSAs who are engaged in the NIAC.86 
 The use of AWS could cause novel problems for determining the point at which a NIAC begins, 
and the applicability of the relevant rules. As AWS would not need constant monitoring, it would be 
possible for a single person to operate many AWS. Even if AWS were used in intense attacks, the 
organisational requirement for an ANSA would not be fulfilled. Thus, a situation could emerge where 
combat of an intensity usually considered to be part of an armed conflict is happening, but an armed 
conflict cannot be declared to exist due to the minimal level of organisation.87 This could be very 
problematic in terms of how states ensure the safety of their populace, as declaring a NIAC without 
the ANSA meeting the organisational requirement would open the door to attacking all terrorists as 
 
81 Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, Report No 55/97, Case no 11.137, OEA/SerL/V/II98 doc 6 rev (IACtHR, 18 
November 1997). 
82 Akande (n.78) 52. 
83 Haradinaj Trial (n.80) para.49. 
84 Common Art.3 preamble, 1949 Geneva Conventions (Hereafter: GCs). 
85 Art.1, Protocol Additional To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, And Relating To The Protection Of 
Victims Of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 609 (Hereafter: APII). 
86 Common Article 3, GCs; Art.1, APII. 
87 Sasha Radin and Justin Coates, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems And The Threshold Of Non-International 
Armed Conflict' (2016) 30 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 133, 140-147. 
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military targets when most should be treated as criminals.88 The potential for a claim of necessity to 
preclude the wrongfulness of using force in such a situation is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Customary rules regulating combat have developed over the history of warfare. In 2005, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross published their attempt to determine the customary rules 
applicable in armed conflicts. The ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law’ study has been subject 
to some criticism.89 Yet, it is still a work that makes significant steps toward a full understanding of CIL 
in armed conflict and is generally seen in a positive light.90 Consequently, this work is referred to as a 
guide to the applicable customary rules in IACs and NIACs and note particular issues where required.  
 The aspects of LoAC that are most relevant to the following discussions are those related to 
the regulation of weapons, which are sometimes collectively referred to as ‘weapons law’,91 and the 
regulation of combat.92 The term of art used in LoAC for combat is ‘the conduct of hostilities’, it is 
regulated by a legal regime sometimes known as ‘targeting law’.93 Further, there is a self-contained 
system within LoAC that governs individual responsibility for violations of specific rules and is known 
as the Grave Breaches regime.94 
 
 
88 See Christopher Greenwood, 'War, Terrorism, And International Law' (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems, 505. 
89 Bellinger and Haynes (n.32); Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau, Perspectives On The ICRC Study On 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP, 2007); Kaiyan Kaikobad et al., 'United Kingdom Materials On 
International Law 2005' (2006) 76 British Yearbook of International Law, 683, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office at 694-695. 
90 See, for example, Michael Wood, 'The Evolution And Identification Of The Customary International Law Of 
Armed Conflict' (2018) 51 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 727. 
91 See, for example, Arts.35 and 36, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 
7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (Hereafter: API); ICRC Study, Rules 70-86. 
92 See, for example, Arts.48, 51, and 57, API; Arts.13-15, APII; ICRC Study, Rules 1-45. 
93 William H. Boothby, The Law Of Targeting (OUP, 2012). 
94 Art.49, Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces 
in the field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1960) 75 UNTS 31; Art.50, Geneva 
Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the 
armed forces at sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85; Art.129, 
Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 13; Art.146, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the protection of civilian 
persons in time of war (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287; Art.86(1), 
API; ICRC Study, Rules 149-161. 
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3.3. International human rights law 
However, LoAC is not the only international legal regime that exists in situations of armed 
conflict. Apart from Israel,95 is it universally accepted by states that international human rights law 
(IHRL) does apply in armed conflicts. Indeed, the ICJ96 and the ICCPR Human Rights Committee in a 
General Comment have stated that IHRL continues to apply during armed conflict;97 and, therefore, 
would apply to the use of AWS in armed conflict. However, there is still some dispute as to how it 
applies. In order to resolve the simultaneous applicability of two bodies of law, a lex specialis approach 
has been used by the ICJ,98 the Inter-American Commission99 and Court of Human Rights,100 and the 
European Court of Human Rights.101 Consequently, this thesis will follow this concept. In doing so, the 
work of Murray102 is drawn upon. He outlines a lex specialis approach for applying LoAC as a primary 
framework and IHRL as a secondary framework that is intended to be used by practitioners. As this 
thesis is focussed on real world applications, Murray’s work is appropriate to follow. There is no 
comparable term to the ‘conduct of hostilities’ in IHRL to refer to combat, and so Murray uses the 
phrase ‘active hostilities’ to refer to such situations. 103 This thesis shall, at times, also use this phrase. 
The primary instruments of IHRL are multi-lateral treaties. There are international 
agreements, such as the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). There are also 
regional agreements, such as the European (ECHR), Inter-American (IACHR), and African (ACHPR) 
 
95 See Green (n.35) 124-126. 
96 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
[2004] ICJ Reports, p.136, paras.106-113.; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda) Judgement [2005] ICJ Reports 2005, p.168, para.216. 
97 The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Human Rights 
Committee, 80th session) 2004 UN Doc. GC.31 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, para.11; Consideration Of Reports 
Submitted By States Parties Under Article 40 Of The Covenant: Croatia, Yugoslavia’ (Human Rights Committee, 
46th session) 1993 UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1202/Add.1, para.23. 
98 Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.76) para.25; Wall Opinion (n.96) para.106; Armed Activities case (n.96) 
para.216. 
99 Coard et al v United States, Report No 109/99, Case 10951, Decision (IACtHR, 29 September 1999)., para.42. 
100 Serrano Cruz v El-Salvador, Preliminary Objections (IACtHR, 23 November 2004)., para.112; Case of the 
Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced from the Cacaria River Basin (Operation Genesis) v Colombia, 
Judgment (IACtHR, 20 November 2013) para.221; Mapiripan Massacre v Colombia, Judgement (IACtHR, 15 
September 2005) para.115. 
101 Hassan v United Kingdom, App no:29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014)., para.102. 
102 Daragh Murray (ed), Practitioners' Guide To Human Rights Law In Armed Conflict (OUP, 2016). 
103 Murray (n.102) 4.30. 
64 
 
Conventions. They protect people and their fundamental rights and freedoms from abuse by state 
power through obligating states to protect, fulfil, or respect rights, and these rules are enforced 
through a responsibility regime. IHRL case law is extensive, and it is drawn from at length throughout 
this thesis. There are cases that are relevant to the use of autonomy in weapon systems in situations 
of law enforcement104 and border security.105 But, as this work is focussed upon analysing AWS in 
situations of armed conflict, they are not discussed in this thesis.  
In the following analysis, the decisions of The European Court are cited more than other 
bodies. This is merely because the Court in Strasbourg has generated more decisions on the 
application of IHRL to armed conflict than other similar bodies. The views of the Inter-American Court, 
and less-so the African Court, are also considered to see different trends across regions, and to 
understand the different obligations which might affect states acting in multi-national military 
coalitions.106 
In terms of customary IHRL, Meron suggests that the particular nature of human rights means 
that ‘opinio juris appears to have greater weight than state practice’107 and that the burden of proof 
for creating customary human rights law should be lighter than CIL generally.108 However, this is not a 
view shared by the majority of international lawyers, nor the International Law Commission in its work 
on the formation of CIL.109 Even so, considering the vast number of human rights violations that occur, 
it would seem difficult to identify a general practice of states abiding by their human rights obligations 
in order to form protective customary IHRL rules.110 
 
104 Kakoulli v Turkey, App no:38595/97 (ECtHR, 22 November 2005) paras.108 and 115; Kallis and Androulla 
Panayi v Turkey, App no:45388/99 (ECtHR, 27 October 2009) paras.60 and 63; also see Maya Brehm, ‘Academy 
Briefing No.9: Defending The Boundary’ (Geneva Academy, 2017). 
105 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany, App nos:34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98 (ECtHR, 22 March 2001); 
Klaus Dieter Baumgarten v Germany, Comm No. 960/2000 (HRComm, 31 July 2003) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/960/2000; also see Brehm (n.104). 
106 See Murray (n.102) 5-6. 
107 Theodor Meron, Human Rights And Humanitarian Norms As Customary Law (Clarendon Press, 1991) 99. 
108 Meron (n.107) 131. 
109 ILC 2018, para.66. 
110 Brian Lepard, ‘Toward a New Theory of Customary International Human Rights Law’ in Brian Lepard (ed.), 
Reexamining Customary International Law (CUP, 2017) 240. 
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The right of most relevance to the discussion of AWS is the right to life, which is considered in 
terms of both substantive and procedural obligations across Chapters 4 to 6. Generally, the 
substantive obligation of the right to life protects people from an arbitrary deprivation of life by 
requiring state forces to only use lethal force where they believe it is absolutely necessary111 to protect 
life.112 Generally, a killing in an armed conflict that is in accordance with LoAC is not thought to be 
arbitrary.113 
Yet, the European Convention does not explicitly deal with a standard of arbitrariness, but 
provides a list of exceptional circumstances where lethal force may be used, including defending 
people from unlawful violence, to affect an arrest, or to quell a riot or insurrection.114 Thus, under a 
strict reading of the European Convention, there would appear to be little room for interpretation 
using LoAC as lex specialis. However, the Court has referred to LoAC rules as a way of interpreting 
compliance with the right to liberty with regard to cases of internment.115 As such, one can expect the 
European Court to interpret the right to life in accordance with LoAC as lex specialis.116 Indeed, the 
Court has interpreted right to life obligations in light of LoAC, by tacitly allowing targeting based upon 
status,117 not requiring threats to be immediate,118 and implicitly incorporating LoAC rules into its 
judgements.119 Thus, across the different IHRL regimes, LoAC and IHRL rules applicable to the 
development and use of AWS can be applied along similar lines. 
 
111 Nachova and Others v Bulgaria, App nos:43577/98 and 43579/98 (ECtHR, 6 July 2005) paras.94-95; McCann 
and Others v the United Kingdom, App no:18984/91 (ECtHR, 27 September 1995) para.200. 
112 Art.6, ICCPR; Art.4, IACHR; Art.4, ACPHR. 
113 Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.76) para.25. 
114 Art.2(2), ECHR. 
115 Hassan (n.101) para.102-111; Varnava and Others v Turkey, App no:16064/90 (ECtHR, 18 September 2009) 
para.185. 
116 Christof Heyns et al., 'The International Law Framework Regulating The Use Of Armed Drones' (2016) 65 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 791, 822; Stuart Wallace, The Application Of The European 
Convention On Human Rights To Military Operations (CUP 2019) 119. 
117 McCann (n.111) para.194; Ergi v Turkey, App no:66/1997/850/1057 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998) para.79; Cordula 
Droege, ‘Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law’ 90 International Review of the Red Cross, 501, 
533. 
118 Nachova (n.111) para.95 ; Droege (n.117) 533; Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, App nos:57947/00, 
57948/00 and 57949/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) para.181; Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing In International Law 
(OUP, 2008) 389. 
119 Wallace (n.116) 80-93 also note the inconsistencies of approach to incorporation of LoAC. 
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As the discussion in the following sub-sections shows, depending upon the situation, a state 
may be expected to apply the full range of human rights obligations where they exert de facto 
control,120 or they may be able to ‘divide and tailor’ the applicable rights which are relevant to the 
individuals in the circumstances.121 At a minimum, states would be expected to guarantee the right to 
life, the prohibition on torture, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detention.122 In accordance 
with the lex specialis approach of international courts, the substantive obligation to protect the right 
to life would be fulfilled by complying with LoAC. 
In terms of the procedural obligation to investigate deaths and significant injuries as part of 
the right to life, it is also applicable during armed conflict.123 Such investigations must be 
transparent,124 prompt,125 independent,126 and capable of examining the use of lethal force in the 
circumstances.127 
In difficult circumstances, the procedural obligation may be interpreted flexibly depending 
upon the situation, and in the light of LoAC.128 Standard procedures should be followed as much as 
possible.129 But, where an investigation is hampered due to the site of examination being in the 
battlespace or under enemy control, a reasonable delay130 or use of less effective means of 
investigations may be used without violating the procedural obligation.131 
 
 
120 Loizidou v Turkey, App no:15318/89 (ECtHR, 13 March 1995) para.56; Cyprus v Turkey, App no: 25781/94 
(ECtHR, 10 May 2001) para.77. 
121 Al-Skeini (n.131) para.137. 
122 Murray (n.102) para.3.21. 
123 Georgia v Russia (II), App no:38263/08 (ECtHR, 13 December 2011) para.72. 
124 See Wallace (n.116) 132-135. 
125 Ergi (n.117) para.82; for more, see Wallace (n.116) 111-112, 135-139. 
126 Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom, App no:24746/94 (ECtHR, 4 August 2001) para.106. 
127 Paul and Audrey Edwards v United Kingdom, App no:46477/99 (ECtHR, 14 June 2002) 72-73. 
128 Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania, App no:64301/01 (ECtHR, 1 December 2009); Velikova v. Bulgaria, App 
no:41488/98 (ECtHR, 18 May 2000) para.80; Murray (n.102) para.3.69-3.70. 
129 Kaya v Turkey, App no:158/1996/777/978 (ECtHR, 19 February 1998) paras.89-91. 
130 Nachova (n.111) para.113. 
131 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, App no:55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para.164, 168; Yasa v Turkey, App 




Some IHRL treaties allow for their application to be modified by state parties through 
derogation.132 Of those human rights treaties that allow for derogations, the ICCPR and IACHR do not 
allow them with respect to the right to life. Still, as noted above, under those systems, a killing in 
conformity with LoAC would be lawful under IHRL. 
However, under the ECHR, Article 15 allows for derogation of the right to life, to the extent 
strictly required, in times of ‘war … threatening the life of the nation’. ‘War’ historically only referred 
to IACs,133 but can now be understood to include NIACs also.134 Such a measure must be taken to deal 
with the relevant situation, and be in accordance with other international legal obligations (LoAC in 
this case), and the Council of Europe must be informed.135 
Thus, the content of the right to life would be changed in armed conflicts following a 
derogation.136 This could mean that the LoAC rules applicable to active hostilities would regulate 
combat without the substantive right to life being applied. However, a killing unlawful under LoAC 
would not abide by the terms of the derogation, and so would trigger the application of the right to 
life and subsequent investigations regulated by IHRL.137 
Thus, the consequence of such derogations is the absence of human rights protections for 
civilians, and military personnel,138 during combat, and killings that are lawful under LoAC not being 
examined in terms of their compliance with IHRL.139 This removes any ability for victims to launch 
litigation against states if their right to life is violated during conduct that is lawful under LoAC. Despite 
the apparent legal benefit, no state has yet derogated from the right to life under the European 
 
132 Derogation clauses are found in Art.4, ICCPR; Art.15, ECHR; Art.27, IACHR. However, there are no 
derogation clauses found in the ICESCR, or the ACHPR. 
133 Wallace (n.116) 6. 
134 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the 
answers?’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross, 881, 883. 
135 See Wallace (n.116) 193. 
136 Murray (n.102) 4.73. 
137 Wallace (n.116) 116, 118-121. 
138 Wallace (n.116) 101-106. 
139 Wallace (n.116) 194. 
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Convention during armed conflict.140 Only the UK has suggested it will presume to do so in future 
conflicts,141 and so this thesis proceeds to also examine the IHRL obligations which would be applicable 
to states who choose not to derogate. 
 
3.3.2. IHRL jurisdiction 
Human rights agreements are intended to apply wherever state parties have jurisdiction.142 
This is not the same as other exercises of jurisdiction. For example, foreign crimes and criminals can 
sometimes come within a state’s criminal jurisdiction.143 Criminal jurisdiction relates to the exercise 
of sovereign rights.144 However, human rights jurisdiction is concerned with whether a state has de 
facto control over an area, or people, such that human rights obligations are triggered and the state 
becomes the guarantor of the rights of people under their control.145 Consequently, it is the ‘physical 




140 Murray (n.102) 4.73; States have, however, derogated with regard to detention in domestic security 
situations, see Wallace (n.116) 197-199. 
141 Marko Milanovic, 'UK To Derogate From The ECHR In Armed Conflict' (Ejiltalk.org, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20161026071716/http://www.ejiltalk.org/uk-to-derogate-from-the-
echr-in-armed-conflict/>. 
142 Art.1, ECHR; Art.1, IACHR; Art.2, ICCPR; note that the ACPHR does not contain a jurisdiction clause. See 
Murray (n.101) paras.3.12-3.13. 
143 See the statement of the Home Office Minister, in Kaiyan Kaikobad et al., 'United Kingdom Materials On 
International Law 2006' (2007) 77 British Yearbook of International Law, 597, 756; Cutting’s Case in John 
Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Vol.II) (Government Printing Office 1906) 228; Joyce v Director of 
Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347; M. Christian Tomuschat (rapp.) 'Universal Criminal Jurisdiction With Regard 
To The Crime Of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity And War Crimes' (Institute de Driot International, 2005) 
para.1. 
144 Samantha Besson, 'The Extraterritoriality Of The European Convention On Human Rights: Why Human 
Rights Depend On Jurisdiction And What Jurisdiction Amounts To' (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 857, 869; Marko Milanovic, 'From Compromise To Principle: Clarifying The Concept Of State Jurisdiction 
In Human Rights Treaties' (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review, 411, 420-422. 
145 Wallace (n.116) 24. 
146 Al-Skeini (n.131) para.136. 
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3.3.3. Application of IHRL in armed conflicts on a state’s own territory 
If a state were engaged in a NIAC in its own country, then areas that the state has de facto 
control over would be within their human rights jurisdiction.147 This extends to vessels and aircraft, 
that are part of a state’s jurisdiction.148 Yet, it is difficult to determine whether a state has de facto 
control when its territory is contested.149 
The European Court has mixed practice in this area. In one line of cases, the Court has 
suggested that where an adversary takes territory from the territorial state such that the territorial 
state loses de facto control, this would rebut a presumption of the territorial state being in control.150 
Such a situation changes the territorial state’s human rights jurisdiction, rather than removes it, and 
the territorial state should still take ‘diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures’ to secure the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention.151 As such, human rights obligations can be modified where a 
state loses de facto control over its territory. 
Conversely, in another line of cases, the Court stated that even if the presumption of the 
territorial state being in control is rebutted,152 the human rights jurisdiction and obligations of the 
territorial state remain unchanged.153 This can be attributed to the reluctance of the Court to allow a 
situation where there would be no de jure guarantor of human rights.154 These two lines of cases 
present a legal grey area. In anticipation that an IHRL tribunal might require states to abide by their 
human rights obligations despite a loss of de facto control, AWS use during NIACs on a state’s own 
 
147 Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no:48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004) paras.311, 331; Assanidze v 
Georgia, App no:71503/01 (ECtHR, 8 April 2004) para.139. 
148 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, App no:27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012) para.77. 
149 Francoise Hampson, 'Direct Participation In Hostilities And The Interoperability Of The Law Of Armed 
Conflict And Human Rights Law' (2011) 87 International Law Studies, 187, 189. 
150 Ilaşcu (n.147) para.312; Assanidze (n.147) paras.139-142; Azemi v Serbia, App no:11209/09 (ECtHR, 5 
November 2013) para.47. 
151 Ilaşcu (n.147) para.330-331; Assanidze (n.147) p.139-142. 
152 Isayeva v Russia, Judgment, App no:57950/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) para.178. 
153 Sargsyan v Azerbijan, App no:40167/06 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) paras.146-150. 
154 Wallace (n.116) 31-32. 
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territory should be in accordance with the full range of human rights obligations of the state as far as 
is practicable. 
 
3.3.4. Extraterritorial application of IHRL 
Extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction is allowed for in IHRL regimes155 in exceptional 
circumstances,156 such as security157 and military operations.158 Extraterritorial jurisdiction can be 
based upon the effective control of an area, or a state agent’s exercise of authority and control, 
including during the exercise of public powers.159 
Effective control is where, for all intents and purposes, one state has control over a portion of 
another state.160 This applies in situations of military occupation of another state,161 or when one state 
has ‘decisive authority’ or ‘effective influence’ over a local administration.162 The exercise of effective 
control brings people in the area within the human rights jurisdiction of the state exercising that 
control.163 Controlling states are expected to apply the full range of human rights obligations.164 Yet, 
obligations may be divided and tailored where such jurisdiction is temporary.165  
State agent authority and control is where a state agent, e.g. military personnel,166 exert such 
authority/control over someone in another state that the individual comes under the jurisdiction of 
 
155 Art.1, ECHR; Art.1, IACHR; Art.2, ICCPR; note that the ACPHR does not contain a jurisdiction clause. See 
Murray (n.101) paras.3.12-3.13. 
156 Al-Skeini (n.131) paras.131 and 133. 
157 Öcalan v Turkey, App no:46221/99 (ECtHR, 12 May 2005) para.91; Issa and Others v Turkey, App 
no:31821/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004) para.55. 
158 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom, App no:61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010) para.140; Al-Skeini 
(n.131) paras.131-140; Case of Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, App no:27021/08 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011); Markovic 
and other v Italy, App no:1398/03 (ECtHR, 14 December 2006); Pad v Turkey, App no:60167/00 (ECtHR, 28 
June 2007); Loizidou (n.120) para.62. 
159 Al-Skeini (n.131) paras.133-140. 
160 Al-Skeini (n.131) paras.138-140. 
161 Armed Activities case (n.96) para.178. 
162 Catan and Others v the Republic of Moldova and Russia, App nos:43370/04, 8252/ 05, 18454/06 (ECtHR, 19 
October 2012) paras.106-107. 
163 Cyprus v Turkey (n.120) para.77. 
164 Loizidou (n.120) para.56, 62. 
165 Issa (n.157) paras.74-76; Murray (n.101) paras.3.56-3.58. 
166 Cyprus v Turkey, App nos:6780/74 and 6950/75 (ECommHR, 26 May 1975) 125, 136. 
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the state which that agent represents.167 Such jurisdiction clearly applies in situations of taking 
prisoners, for example.168 As this Chapter discusses below (Section 5.8), state agents can be viewed as 
acting through AWS such that they could exert control over individuals. In circumstances of human 
rights jurisdiction being based upon state agent authority/control, obligations may be divided and 
tailored to the situation at hand.169 There is debate as to whether an instantaneous act such as 
bombing or shooting someone is enough to exert the required level of control.170  
In one line of cases, the European Court stated that neither aerial bombing, 171 nor the 
boarding of a drug-smuggling ship by commandos,172 constituted acts of control because it did not 
involve any ex ante exercise of control over those killed,173 and there was no ‘“cause and effect” notion 
of “jurisdiction”’.174 Conversely, the Inter-American Commission decided that a military aircraft 
shooting down a civilian aircraft in international airspace did constitute an exercise of control.175 In 
addition, the European Court has decided that the killing of civilians by a helicopter gunship,176 and 
the shooting of Cypriot civilians from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus were acts of control.177 
The case law of IHRL courts does not provide us with any firm answers. However, the European Court 
has maintained a position that it does not want to be involved in reviewing all uses of force by 
contracting states,178 and so is unlikely to bring instantaneous lethal acts within its purview in the 
future.179 
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In an attempt to clarify the discrepancies of the state agent authority/control approach to 
jurisdiction with regard to instantaneous acts, the European Court suggested that the performance of 
policing or security operations as ‘public powers’ could be a base for jurisdiction.180 This requires 
effective control over an area before a state agent can exert such control over an individual to bring 
them within the human rights jurisdiction of their state.181 This, therefore, mixes both the personal 
jurisdiction of state agent authority and control with the spatial jurisdiction of effective control.182 This 
approach has been followed in several cases,183 despite criticism in academic literature184 and 
domestic courts.185 It presents us with a situation whereby an individual could be shot from a distance 
and not be under the human rights jurisdiction of a contracting state, but would be under their 
jurisdiction if they had been shot whilst in the custody of that state.186 As such, it is possible that the 
European Court will again attempt to clarify the situation. 
In terms of how these three bases for jurisdiction can apply to AWS, where a state engages in 
active hostilities within an extraterritorial area under its effective control, then this would seem to 
come under its human rights jurisdiction. However, an instantaneous act of killing by an AWS without 
ex ante control by a state agent would not come within the human rights jurisdiction of a state, unless 
it is within an extraterritorial area of effective control and a sufficient jurisdictional link is created by 
the exercise of public powers.187 One could imagine a state using AWS to defend an area under its 
effective control from attack due to the intensity of violence, or use of communication-jamming by 
the enemy, thus bringing attacks by the AWS within the human rights jurisdiction of the deploying 
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state. In addition, as Chapter 5 notes, it would be possible for adversaries to surrender to an AWS, and 
subsequently be taken prisoner. In such a situation, they would be subject to the state 
authority/control of the commander using the AWS and would, therefore, come within the IHRL 
jurisdiction of the deploying state. Such actions would be regulated by both LoAC as lex specialis and 
IHRL as a secondary framework. However, the use of AWS away from the spatial jurisdiction of the 
deploying state would not seem to come under their human rights jurisdiction, and so would be 
regulated solely by LoAC. 
 
3.3.5. Application of IHRL to NSAs 
As this Chapter noted above (Section 3.3.3), where an armed non-state actor is so powerful 
that they push state forces out of a territory, this could, potentially, alter the human rights jurisdiction 
of the territorial state. One could argue that where the ANSA is supported by a state, that the territory 
under the de facto control of the ANSA comes within the human rights jurisdiction of the supporting 
state.188 
However, where the ANSA is not in receipt of external support, only the ANSA itself could be 
thought of as having enough de facto control over the area to be a guarantor of human rights. The UN 
Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council have all addressed IHRL obligations 
towards ANSAs,189 and a UN Special Rapporteur suggests that, in such a situation, ANSAs should be 
obligated to respect and protect the right to life.190 Yet, this all hinges upon the ANSA in question 
voluntarily respecting and protecting the rights of people under their de facto control. At least 230 
ANSAs have accepted some human rights responsibilities,191 but there are no guarantees that ANSAs 
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will shoulder such obligations during armed conflicts or at all. As such, the use of AWS by an ANSA 
could result in them being used in a vacuum of human rights jurisdiction, hence the reluctance of the 
European Court to accept that states losing de facto control equates to a loss of human rights 
jurisdiction. 
 
3.4. State responsibility 
There is a substantial history of rules on state responsibility emanating from CIL and judicial 
decisions. The work of the International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts compiled substantial amounts of evidence from both of these 
sources. These rules have generally, although not exclusively,192 met with a positive reaction.193 As the 
Articles themselves are soft law, they can be treated as an interpretive guide to how these rules should 
be applied. In Chapter 6, the Articles are used to describe the responsibility regime that exists for 
states who violate their obligations through using AWS. 
 
3.5. International criminal law 
The treaty international criminal law rules that are of most relevance to the use of AWS are 
found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is because they apply into 
the future, whereas the rules of previous international criminal tribunals applied to specific situations. 
Still, the statutes and decisions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Nuremberg Trials, amongst others, are relevant 
to assisting the interpretation and progress of ICL. The ICC statute regulates four major crimes: 
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aggression; genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes. AWS, like any other weapon, could be 
used in the commission of such crimes. Chapter 6 explores how this could be done, and how 
responsibility could be attributed, particularly regarding controllers of AWS who can be deemed 
criminally responsible for ‘acting through’ a machine. 
 
3.6. Other legal regimes 
In addition to the bodies of law considered in this thesis, Crootof notes that the law of the sea 
could apply to marine and submarine AWS in much the same way as it applies to conventional naval 
vehicles,194 also space law could apply to AWS that are equipped with nuclear weapons in outer space, 
or are stationed on celestial bodies.195 Further, those AWS using the electromagnetic spectrum or 
international telecommunications networks would be governed by the International 
Telecommunications Union Constitution and Convention.196 In addition, those aerial AWS functioning 
outside of armed conflict would be subject to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.197 Finally, 
the law on neutrality is also relevant where belligerent parties enter the jurisdiction of neutral 
states.198 However, none of these bodies of international law will be considered in this thesis as they 
regulate highly-specialised situations either far narrower, or well beyond, the present investigation of 
AWS in armed conflict.  
Administrative law is also relevant in the domestic sphere. Lieblich and Benvenisti suggest 
that, when considering combat as a form of executive action, requirements to exercise constant 
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discretion would be impossible and therefore AWS would be unlawful under this body of law. 
However, the authors themselves admit that this is an argument quite firmly placed in the lex 
ferenda199 and so will not be considered here. 
 
4. The applicability of weapons law rules 
Having outlined the potential sources and bodies of international law which can apply to AWS, 
the thesis now considers the application of the legal regime applicable to weapons. The phrase 
‘weapons law’ is generally used to refer to the LoAC rules applicable to weapons, this thesis also 
includes applicable IHRL rules. Although it may sound counterintuitive, AWS must first be defined in 
terms of the weapons law regime in LoAC in order to apply them. Then, the very nature of AWS must 
be considered to determine if it makes them unlawful per se. Following this discussion, the challenge 
of applying legal rules normally applied to fighters is discussed. 
 
4.1. Classification of AWS 
As we saw in the discussion of different AWS definitions in the last Chapter, the autonomous 
nature of these systems in the selection and engagement of targets is their major defining aspect. 200 
Such critical functions have always been a task carried out by fighters. Some authors wrongly suggest 
that AWS could, therefore, be classed as a combatant due to misunderstanding the performance of 
human-like activities as actually approaching being a human and therefore a combatant.201  
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Aside from these metaphysical issues, AWS cannot be defined as combatants under 
international law. Article 43 of API defines combatants as members of the armed forces202 who are 
under a responsible command and are subject to an ‘internal disciplinary system.’203 Whilst AWS could 
certainly be used under a responsible command, they cannot be subject to discipline, as they are just 
machines and so cannot be combatants according to LoAC. 
In addition to engaging in the roles formerly exclusive to fighters, AWS are, fundamentally, 
artefacts used for conducting attacks. In order for the legal rules regulating weapons to apply to AWS, 
they must be defined as such under LoAC. This thesis is mostly focussed upon physical systems that 
will create a kinetic effect in the same vein as the Taranis and nEUROn UAVs currently in development 
(see Chapter 2). As such, whilst some so-called ‘cyber-weapons’ could be AWS, they are not the focus 
here.204 
Autonomous UAVs firing munitions would be instruments intended to cause damage within 
an armed conflict, and so would be a ‘means’ of warfare. This is a broad category encompassing 
equipment including platforms, weapons, and weapon systems.205 The following paragraphs discuss 
which type of means is most appropriate for AWS. Means of warfare are contrasted by ‘methods’ of 
warfare. These are the tactical ways in which military capabilities are employed to harm the enemy.206 
One could see UAVs as a ‘platform’ delivering munitions to the target rather than an offensive 
technology in and of itself. A platform is generally seen to be equipment from which an activity is 
carried out by sub-systems, for example carrying surveillance cameras or missiles.207 The execution of 
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various tasks and application of algorithms in combat, however, makes AWS qualitatively different 
from other simple platforms.208 
As AWS play a significant role in creating military violence, they could be considered as 
weapons. There is no universal definition of ‘weapon’ in LoAC.209 However, the commentary of the Air 
and Missile Warfare Manual states: ‘“Weapon” means a means of warfare used in combat operations, 
including a gun, missile, bomb or other munitions, that is capable of causing either (i) injury to, or death 
of, persons; or (ii) damage to, or destruction of, objects.’210 As it is the munitions that an AWS would 
actually fire that impart injury and damage, an AWS is more than just a weapon. 
A ‘weapon system’ is defined as: ‘A combination of one or more weapons with all related 
equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment.’211 Thus, as an AWS 
will be a combination of munitions, and everything else it needs to be deployed, the term weapon 
system is most appropriate. As AWS can be categorised as weapon systems, and a means of warfare, 
for the purposes of international law, this means that the relevant weapons law rules are applicable 
to them. 
 
4.2. Weapons law, weapons reviews, and whether AWS are unlawful per se 
The weapons law regime is applied during weapons reviews and regulates the development 
of weapons by assessing their ability to comply with international law during their study, 
development, and use.212 This is done because the right of parties to conflicts to choose different 
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means and methods of warfare is not unlimited.213 International law does not specify how weapons 
should be assessed. But, states have developed weapons review frameworks to apply the legal rules 
relevant to means of warfare.214  
Some authors have argued that AWS will be so complex that current methods of review are 
inadequate, and the lawfulness of an AWS could not be guaranteed.215 Yet, testing of complex systems 
can take place against simulations or physical facsimiles of the battlespace that the AWS will be used 
in to give reviewers an understanding of how the complexities of the system will act on operations 
such that they should be able to make determinations as to its compliance with legal rules.216  
Weapons reviews have not proliferated to all states, however. The vast majority of states who 
are required by treaty217 to perform legal reviews of weapons do not.218 This is indeed a problem for 
legal regulation of weapons as countries without a review process, or one that is inadequate, could 
be fielding weapons that would have been prohibited in states which respect international law with 
more seriousness. However, this thesis is concerned with the sufficiency of current international law, 
rather than the inadequacy of some weapons reviews. So, in the next Chapter, the relevant rules are 
applied to AWS to determine whether they are unlawful as a type of weapon. But, at this point, it is 
important to determine whether AWS are outright unlawful. 
The lawfulness of weapons is dependent upon the absence of a prohibition rather than a need 
for authorisation.219 As such, a weapon is unlawful per se if it is either specifically prohibited or cannot 
be used in conformity with the rules regulating the development and use of weapons.220 As the next 
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Chapter notes, there are several weapons with autonomy that are prohibited, but there is no rule of 
international law that specifically prohibits AWS.  
In terms of regulatory rules which all means of warfare must be built in accordance with, 
weapons which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,221 or are 
inherently indiscriminate222 are always unlawful. At this point, it can be said that whether an AWS 
causes a prohibited level of harm is related to the munitions used by the system rather than the 
autonomous nature of the system itself. Further, as with other advanced weapons, AWS are likely to 
be highly accurate and therefore capable of being used discriminately.223 As such, AWS are unlikely to 
be per se unlawful. 
But, AWS could still be used in unlawful ways. This is the same for any other lawful weapon. 
For example, whilst a rifle could be used to carry out an unlawful massacre, it could also be used to 
carry out lawful attacks.224 This is an important distinction to make, as conclusions about the 
lawfulness of a weapon per se based upon a potential unlawful use of a weapon225 simply obfuscate 
the debate226 and go beyond what the law requires. Indeed, the ‘Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’ is 
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arguing for an international prohibition on AWS,227 despite them not being unlawful per se. A weapon 
cannot be considered unlawful per se simply because it is ‘novel or employs new technology’.228 
 
5. The regulatory challenge 
In the previous Chapter, we saw that AWS can do more than previous weapon systems 
because they conduct targeting.229 It has already been demonstrated how international law can apply 
to AWS qua weapons. But, in order for international law to apply to AWS in their totality, it must also 
regulate them as being subject to the same rules as fighters during active hostilities. It is, however, 
unclear how this can happen. Simply applying current international law rules to AWS by analogy to 
fighters would be insufficient as the responsibility regime that reinforces rules of conduct cannot apply 
to AWS. Thus, AWS present two regulatory challenges: can non-human entities abide by rules 
intended for humans? And how can responsibility be attributed for the actions of a robot? 
 
5.1. Human judgement and technological analyses 
In order to address the application of legal rules to AWS, it must be determined whether it is 
possible for non-human entities to comply with them. The work of Wagner,230 Egeland,231 Chengeta,232 
and Human Rights Watch233 suggests that there is something fundamental about autonomy, or the 
lack of human involvement in targeting, that prevents LoAC rules from being complied with. This idea 
suggests that there is something implicit in homo sapiens that is required to fulfil these rules intended 
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for humans.234 With some very difficult combat decisions requiring qualitative analysis, such as 
weighing the proportionality of incidental harm against military advantage,235 this is true. 
Qualitative assessments are currently beyond the capabilities of today’s technology, and, due 
to the inherent complexities, may never be possible for machines to determine.236 But, an incapability 
to do everything is not necessarily fatal to the capability to lawfully do something. As such, autonomy 
in and of itself does not prevent legal compliance by an autonomous system, but does, at this time, 
require human beings to perform some of the tasks of targeting. Consequently, this leads us to ask 
what level of technological capability is required for an AWS to autonomously perform those tasks 
that do not currently require human judgement. 
The works of Schmitt,237 Thurnher,238 Boothby,239 Sassóli,240 Crootof,241 Anderson, Reisner, and 
Waxman242 all take a view of AWS by comparing the relevant legal requirements to the technological 
capabilities available now or in the near future. These authors generally agree that autonomy in 
weapon systems today is not yet developed enough for lawful use beyond very narrow operational 
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contexts (such as defensive systems that protect military bases by automatically attacking incoming 
ordnance).243  
By contrast, some authors suggest that AWS will never have enough technical capability to 
perform legally required battlefield tasks in accordance with the law.244 The difference in opinion can 
be accounted for through methodology. Authors who view AWS as technologically inadequate in 
comparison to LoAC rules base their assessment on what technology is available today and apply that 
to all future AWS.245 The better view is taken by those authors mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
Through outlining what is required for compliance with the legal rules and then determining what 
technological capabilities an AWS would need to meet the compliant standard, these authors show 
the capabilities and limitations of the underlying technologies that make up AWS. From this, it is 
possible to see what tasks it might be possible to delegate to an AWS and which need to be retained 
by humans. 
In doing so, Scharre’s paradigm for viewing autonomy can be useful.246 If a mission requires 
tasks A, B, and C, but the sophistication of the system can only automate A and B, then the human-
machine relationship will primarily revolve around task C.247 It is important to remember that 
technologies are continually advancing, and so whilst some systems might be legally inadequate for 
some tasks today, future iterations may be able to perform at or above the legally required standard 
in the near future. Indeed, Gillespie and West suggest that AWS could be developed to be 
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technologically compliant with current legal frameworks,248 and Arkin outlines what legal rules it 
would be technologically possible for an AWS to comply with in the near future.249 Thus, in order for 
international law to sufficiently regulate AWS, it must be capable of guiding the development of these 
systems such that only those that abide by the weapons law framework are produced, and restricting 
the use of these systems such that they are subject to the same rules as fighters are during combat. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the autonomous nature of AWS is compared to legal rules on developing and 
using weapons, respectively, to see if this is possible. 
 
5.2. Responsibility for using force 
We noted in the last Chapter that attribution of accountability is a major moral requirement 
for the use of AWS to be ethically permissible. Human Rights Watch250 and Chengeta251 argue that 
attribution of individual responsibility is required for the lawful use of AWS. Strictly speaking, there is 
no requirement for the law to provide an individual responsibility mechanism for when regulations 
are violated. Indeed, violations of international law are generally the responsibility of states and not 
individuals. 
Thus, the legal logic of Human Rights Watch and Chengeta has been subject to criticism.252 Still 
whilst an individual responsibility mechanism is not strictly required by law, the absence of it could 
create impunity for individual users of AWS that would be a negative development. Thus, in order for 
international law to sufficiently regulate a responsibility paradigm for AWS, it would need to hold 
states (and potentially non-state actors) responsible when their state agents (or non-state actor 
 
248 Robin West and Tony Gillespie, 'Requirements For Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems Set By Legal Issues' 
(2010) 4 The International C2 Journal, 1; Tony Gillespie, 'New Technologies And Design For The Laws Of Armed 
Conflict' (2015) 160 The RUSI Journal, 50. 
249 Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour In Autonomous Robots (CRC Press, 2009). 
250 Human Rights Watch, 'Mind The Gap' (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
251 Thompson Chengeta, 'Accountability Gap, Autonomous Weapon Systems And Modes Of Responsibility In 
International Law' (2016) 45 Denver Journal of International Law, 1. 
252 Charles James Dunlap, 'Accountability And Autonomous Weapons: Much Ado About Nothing?' (2016) 30 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 63, 65, 71, 75. 
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equivalent) carries out an internationally wrongful act, and also hold individuals responsible when 
they carry out a criminal act. 
 
5.3. Options for dealing with the regulatory challenge 
On the face of it, there would seem to be three options to regulate the use of AWS in combat: 
first, avoid the issue of whether or not AWS can be sufficiently regulated by prohibiting them; second, 
create specific regulation for AWS that would rearticulate, mutatis mutandis, current human-centric 
legal rules on the development, use, and responsibility for weapons; third, apply international law to 
the people who develop and use AWS in such a way that the current rules indirectly regulate these 
systems, and hold these people responsible for the actions of the system. The first and second options 
can be discussed together. 
 
5.4. The potential for a specific international instrument regulating AWS. 
For both prohibitionist and regulatory approaches to AWS, the ideal outcome for each camp 
would be a comprehensive treaty. Prohibitionists obviously desire an international agreement that 
outlaws AWS.253 The regulatory camp, however, would favour a treaty that covers the development, 
manufacture, use, and responsibility for AWS, in addition to anti-proliferation measures.254 
In the hope of finding a way forward between these two camps, talks have been taking place 
at the United Nations since 2014. This has been under the auspices of the Certain Conventional 
Weapons Convention (CCW).255 This convention is a ‘living instrument’ in the sense that regular review 
 
253 HRW 2012 (n.227) 5. 
254 Anderson et al. (n.242) 406-408; Crootof (n.119) 1897. 
255 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III) (adopted 10 
October 1980 entered into force 2 December 1983) 1342 UNTS 137 (Hereafter: CCW). 
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conferences can initiate committees to examine particular issues and can adopt additional 
protocols.256 
One of the additional protocols to the CCW prohibits blinding-laser weapons.257 This was 
agreed after a successful civil society campaign.258 AWS prohibitionists have been open about basing 
their movement for AWS proscription on this previously successful campaign. 259 However, research 
by Crootof260 and Watts261 suggests that there are significant differences between the campaigns and 
AWS are unlikely to be prohibited.262 
Indeed, states are split between positions of for and against a prohibition, or for continuing 
discussions. Currently, there are 28 out of 125 high contracting parties in favour of a prohibition, 263 
and five in opposition to a ban.264 This divergence means that the CCW is unlikely to agree any 
international instrument on AWS as this body relies upon consensus to make decisions.265 The 
meaning of ‘consensus’ in international law is generally taken to mean that there is an absence of any 
formal objection.266 As we saw in the last Chapter, states have not yet even agreed on a common 
 
256 Boothby 2016 (n.223) 92. 
257 Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons to the CCW. 
258 On this campaign and others, see Brian Rappert, et al., 'The Roles Of Civil Society In The Development Of 
Standards Around New Weapons And Other Technologies Of Warfare' (2012) 94 International Review of the 
Red Cross, 765. 
259 See Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic, 'Precedent For Preemption: The Ban On 
Blinding Lasers As A Model For A Killer Robots Prohibition' (2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20170519102833/https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting
_resources/robots_and_lasers_final.pdf>. 
260 Rebecca Crootof, 'Why The Prohibition On Permanently Blinding Lasers Is Poor Precedent For A Ban On 
Autonomous Weapon Systems' (Lawfare, 2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20181030050403/https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-prohibition-
permanently-blinding-lasers-poor-precedent-ban-autonomous-weapon-systems>. 
261 Sean Watts, 'Autonomous Weapons: Regulation Tolerant Or Regulation Resistant?' (2016) 30 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal, 177. 
262 Also see Scharre (n.208) 331-345 for a discussion on what factors have resulted in agreed weapons bans 
being complied with by states. 
263 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 'Country Views On Killer Robots' (Stopkillerrobots.org, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912144030/https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/KRC_CountryViews22Nov2018.pdf>. 
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definition of AWS. Further, these disagreements are within a wider trend amongst states avoiding 
large treaties dealing with LoAC issues.267 Thus, there is currently no hope for an international 
agreement being reached on AWS. 
 
5.5. Legal personhood and legal agenthood 
In contrast to the international discussions, academic literature has suggested that robots 
could be specifically regulated by providing them with legal personality either on the international or 
domestic levels. If this is done on the domestic level, it would not require an international treaty. 
Doing so could enable relevant legal rules to be applied to AWS with a subsequent capability for 
attributing responsibility for violating those rules.268 Fictional legal personhood is provided to 
corporations as dealing with a single artificial legal person is more efficient than dealing with multiple 
people and allows for financial transparency and accountability.269 Different rights and responsibilities 
could be ascribed to an AWS as a legal person, depending upon the precise approach.270  
Yet, the creation of artificial legal personhood for AWS would transfer responsibility for 
unlawful acts from the persons who caused them onto a fictional entity. This can lead to a risk that 
artificial legal personhood for an AWS ‘would shield human actors from accountability’.271 States 
discussing AWS at the United Nations have managed to endorse a view that transference of 
 
267 Boothby 2014 (n.239) 437; Peter Lee, 'Death, Truth And Knowing In The Drones Imaginarium' (The Body of 
War: Drones and Lone Wolves, Story Institute Lancaster, 24-25 November 2016). 
268 Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders, 'On The Morality Of Artificial Agents' (2004) 14 Minds and Machines, 349; 
For the notion of ‘electronic persons’, EU Committee on Legal Affairs, 'Draft Report With Recommendations To 
The Commission On Civil Law Rules On Robotics (2015/2103(INL))' (2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190803144706/http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/
JURI-PR-582443_EN.pdf?redirect>, para.31(f). 
269 Ugo Pagallo, 'Vital, Sophia, And Co.—The Quest For The Legal Personhood Of Robots' (2018) 9 Information, 
230, 10. 
270 Ugo Pagallo, The Laws Of Robots (Springer Netherlands, 2013) 152-170. 
271 International Tin Council Case, JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry [1989] 3 
WLR 969, 986-987; Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis and Thomas D. Grant, 'Of, For, And By The People: 
The Legal Lacuna Of Synthetic Persons' (2017) 25 Artificial Intelligence and Law, 273, 287. 
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responsibility away from human beings is undesirable,272 and so legal personhood is not a solution to 
the regulatory challenge of AWS. 
Still, as Pagallo correctly states, even if robots are not provided with legal personality, they 
can still be legal agents in a similar way to children or animals in the modern world, or slaves in Ancient 
Rome. 273 Yet, as Crootof notes, the use of analogies to construct a legal approach to AWS should not 
take wholesale transplants of frameworks for dealing with other legal agents as this can stretch or 
constrain what is needed for dealing with AWS.274 As such, a sui generis approach to dealing with them 
must be developed. 
Legal agency is where an entity acts on behalf of a principal and is subject to the control of 
the principal.275 In the classic formulation of legal agency, the agent is a facilitator for the acts of the 
principal and incurs no rights or responsibilities.276 These reside with the principal.277 Such agency can 
be established in relationships of the principal having authority,278 or power,279 over the agent, and 
this need not be a de jure relationship.280 This would seem to include the relationships between an 
AWS and those who exert control over them. 
We noted in Chapter 2 that AWS are subject to their programming, and any instructions they 
are given by their users.281 According to Ohlin, this places these systems into a functionally similar 
 
272 See Report Of The 2018 Session Of The Group Of Governmental Experts On Emerging Technologies In The 
Area Of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, by Chairperson Amandeep Singh Gill, 2018 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 23 October 2018) UN Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, paras.23(f) and (g). 
273 Pagallo 2013 (n.270) 40-43; Pagallo 2018 (n.269) 1-2. 
274 Rebecca Crootof, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems And The Limits Of Analogy' (2018) 9 Harvard National 
Security Journal, 1. 
275 Roderick Murray, Agency: Law and Principles (3rd edn., OUP, 2016) 1.01. 
276 Phonogram Ltd v Lane [1982] 3 CMLR 615, 23; Murray (n.275) 1.07. 
277 Pagallo 2013 (n.270) 40-43; Pagallo 2018 (n.269) 1-2. 
278 Murray (n.275) 1.28. 
279 Murray (n.275) 1.29. 
280 Peter Watts and F.M.B Reynolds (eds.), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (19th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 
1-010. 
281 Elliot Winter, 'Autonomous Weapons In Humanitarian Law: Understanding The Technology, Its Compliance 
With The Principle Of Proportionality And The Role Of Utilitarianism' (2018) 6 Groningen Journal of 




position as combatants, as both are subordinate to the control of a superior in during combat.282 
Indeed, a soldier obeys the orders of their commander, and an AWS obeys their algorithms. The legal 
relationship of commanders to their subordinates is not close enough to be one of legal agenthood. 
Commanders do have authority and power over their subordinates and may be responsible for 
unlawful acts which they ’knew or should have known’ their subordinates were engaged in.283 But, 
their subordinates are not subject to absolute control. Military personnel are under an obligation to 
question, and disobey, orders they believe to be unlawful.284 Whilst a soldier may be a subordinate, 
they are still their own person and subject to responsibility for their own actions. 
An AWS, however, would follow its programming and instructions without even 
comprehending that questioning may be a possibility.285 As such, the controlling relationship between 
those who exert control over AWS and the system is absolute. This would seem to establish the 
necessary connection to define an AWS as a legal agent of its controllers. 
Control is ‘the sending of messages which effectively change the behaviour of the recipient.’286 
As such, it is the changing of the AWS behaviour that transforms the AWS from a simple machine into 
a legal agent performing actions at the behest of those controlling it. The consequence of such a 
relationship is important to outline.287 The result of this agenthood is that the legal rules that govern 
the development and use of AWS can be applied by, and to, those who exert control over AWS. 
 
282 Jens David Ohlin, 'The Combatant's Stance: Autonomous Weapons On The Battlefield' (2016) 92 
International Law Studies, 1, 11-21. 
283 Art.28, Rome Statue Of The International Criminal Court 1998 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3. 
284 ICRC Study, Rule 154. 
285 ‘contrary to what is suggested by science-fiction scenarios, the danger is not that robots begin to disobey. 
Quite the reverse: it is that they never disobey.’, See Gregoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (Penguin Books 2015) 
217; note that Arkin seeks to develop an ‘ethical governor’ which would evaluate the morality and legality of 
all orders before enacting them. See Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour In Autonomous Robots (CRC 
Press, 2009)127-153. 
286 Norbert Weiner, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1950) 
8. 
287 See DeMott in Samir Chopra and Laurence F. White, A legal theory for autonomous artificial agents 
(University of Michigan Press, 2011) 18-19. 
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Subsequent to this, where an AWS violates a legal rule whilst subject to the control of a particular 
entity, the controller (or principal) can be held responsible. 
 
5.6. Approaches to applying international law to AWS via controlling relationships 
Having outlined that a control relationship can generate the legal agenthood of an AWS, and 
so law can be applied to them, and through them, how the controlling relationships work must be 
outlined in this context. In relation to AWS, there are three major approaches. The first approach for 
applying law to AWS suggests that, the strength of the connection with the system must be sufficiently 
strong such that there is ‘meaningful human control’ and so the operator is responsible for the 
application of legal rules during the use of an AWS. The second and third approaches, are varieties of 
arguing that legal rules should be applied to entities which exert control over AWS and responsibility 
for AWS should be ascribed to them where an AWS is their legal agent. There is some debate about 
which entities should be seen as controlling AWS, and how the relationships should be seen. The 
second approach sees controlling entities as forming a socio-technical system with quasi-legal 
personhood. The third approach, which this thesis argues for, considers each controlling entity to exert 
control distinctly with their responsibility separate from other entities.  
 
5.7. Meaningful human control 
Meaningful human control (MHC) is a concept advocated by the anti-AWS lobby.288 It has been 
subject to much debate, with 192 different combinations of seemingly synonymous terms for this 
concept.289 It is a method of optimising the human-machine relationship such that the best qualities 
 
288 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, ‘The threat of fully autonomous weapon systems’ (Stopkillerrobots.org, 
2019) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190929102338/https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/learn/>. 
289 The report of the 2018 GGE on AWS lists a number of different adjective combinations. See the Report of 
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of both can work together. Different approaches to this optimisation290 include: human-machine 
teaming;291 centaur warfighting;292 an intelligent partnership;293 symbiotic autonomy;294 human-
centred autonomy.295 MHC is the most common approach to trying to optimise the human-machine 
relationship, and so will be focussed upon here. 
Despite the various conceptions of MHC, there are some common characteristics: first, a 
human operator has full contextual and situational awareness to make a conscious decision to engage 
in each attack; second, the operator has sufficient time and information to make a decision that they 
can be sure is morally, ethically, and legally correct and is not guided toward a decision by the system 
itself; third, the operator deciding on engagements is responsible for their actions; fourth, that there 
are means for aborting an engagement; fifth, that operators are adequately trained to ensure effective 
control over the system.296 
 
290 For state and NGO views on human-machine interactions, see Amandeep Singh Gill, 'Chart-2 Consideration 
Of The Human Element In The Use Of Lethal Force; Aspects Of Human-Machine Interaction In The 
Development, Deployment And Use Of Emerging Technologies In The Area Of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems' (Geneva, 30 August 2018) 
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sets)/A37FBECB28CF7D7FC125826C00495E97/$file/Chart.2.pdf>. 
291 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 'Human-Machine Teaming (JCN 1/18)' (UK Ministry of 
Defence, 2018). 
292 Scharre (n.208) 321-325. 
293 See UK UNOG Delegation, 'Statement To The Informal Meeting Of Experts On Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems 11 - 15 April 2016’ 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(Geneva, 14 April 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20180420101121/https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAs
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ngdom.pdf> and UK UNOG Delegation, 'Statement To The Informal Meeting Of Experts On Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems 11 - 15 April 2016' 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
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The mandatory inclusion of a human in decision-making in each attack means that if MHC 
were adopted, it would, in effect, prevent the use of fully-autonomous systems. As such, it is a 
prohibition of AWS through the back door, hence its popularity with the anti-AWS lobby. 
Implementation of this concept would remove the advantages that AWS bring. Further, it is 
difficult to reconcile with international law rules and current targeting practices. The legal regime 
governing the conduct of hostilities places requirements upon fighters to protect civilians but does 
not say how this should be done (Chapter 5). By forcing humans to take meaningful control of attacks, 
this goes beyond what the law requires.297 Additionally, attacks using artillery or some missiles against 
targets beyond-visual-range that take place today are unlikely to meet the MHC requirements even 
when they are perfectly legal due to the inability of attackers to have full awareness of the situation 
at the site and time of attack.298 Thus, MHC also goes further than current military doctrine.299 
Consequently, it is not a method of applying current law that could be used to assess its sufficiency 
for regulating AWS. 
Still, there are aspects of the MHC concept which would be beneficial when using semi-
autonomous weapon systems in order to avoid ‘automation bias’. This is where humans using a system 
begin to trust the system more than themselves. For example, many drivers blindly follow satellite 
navigation systems with some ending up in dangerous situations, despite obvious signs that they were 
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on the wrong course.300 Automation bias can lead to performing errors of commission, i.e. approving 
system recommendations which contradict training or other indicators, or omission, i.e. missing 
events/decision-making opportunities when not prompted by the system.301 Additional training of the 
operators of these systems does not prevent automation bias,302 but increasing their awareness of 
being held accountable for their actions can reduce the number of incidents.303  
Automation bias can lead to ‘functional autonomy’,304 meaning that if an operator approves 
the suggestions of a machine without fully thinking about the relevant issues, the human oversight 
that is supposed to act as a safeguard is actually worthless. Thus, automation bias combined with the 
ease of killing at a distance, could result in operators of semi-autonomous weapon systems simply 
engaging all targets suggested by the machine305 without fully appreciating what they are doing.306 
The system would be functioning autonomously for all intents and purposes. Such a situation is hugely 
problematic because a system that is not supposed to be operating beyond human control is, in effect, 
doing so. However, Sharkey suggests that providing ‘sufficient decision-making time’ could enable 
deliberative reasoning by operators of semi-autonomous weapon systems such that automation bias 
can be neutralised. 307 
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As such, parts of MHC could be helpful for operations using semi-autonomous weapon 
systems (or modes). But, implementation of it as a whole would both prevent the benefits of fully-
autonomous systems being realised and place an unnecessary burden on military forces. As such, it is 
‘deceptively alluring but substantively vague and unhelpful’308 and cannot work as a method of 
applying law to AWS. 
 
5.8. Approaches based upon controlling entities 
As an alternative to MHC, this thesis now considers that when entities such as politicians, 
weapons manufacturers, and users make decisions about how AWS should act, they contribute to 
changing behaviours of the system in an exercise of control. As Sections 5.5-5.6 noted above, such an 
approach enables AWS to be seen as legal agents of those controlling them, and the application of 
legal rules to AWS through such persons who can be held responsible for violations of those rules. 
There are two approaches to doing this, either by focussing upon the relationships between the 
controlling entities and the AWS, or on the effect the decisions have upon the AWS.  
The former approach is outlined in the work of Kruipy, who describes a matrix of relations 
between politicians, arms manufacturers, weapons designers, commanders, and operators that 
creates a socio-technical system.309 This thesis does not dispute that such interactions could be viewed 
as a socio-technical system, but the implication of Kruipy’s work is that this system as a whole is 
responsible for the actions of an AWS.310 In effect, this would be creating quasi-legal personhood for 
the socio-technical system controlling AWS. As such, it repeats the problem of shielding individual 
wrongdoers from their responsibility. 
 
308 Deeks, Lubell, and Murray (n.66) 16. 
309 Tetyana Kruipy, ‘Regulating a Game Changer: Using a Distributed Approach to Develop an Accountability 
Framework for Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2018) 50 Georgetown Journal of International Law, 45. 
310 Kruipy (n.309) 111. 
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Consequently, the better view is to see persons exerting control over AWS discretely and in 
parallel, without necessarily impacting on the control exercised by other entities. One entity may 
decide to use an AWS in situation A, and another may decide to use it for tasks B. Those decisions do 
not necessarily affect the lawfulness of the other but do contribute to the way in which an AWS can 
be used. The contribution of each controlling entity ultimately delineates what an AWS can or cannot 
do autonomously. When this is encoded into the programming of the AWS it creates what Lessig refers 
to as an ‘architecture’,311 as explained below, this is built up in layers of control. 
When the controlling entities make decisions in accordance with the law, this places a 
boundary upon what an AWS can do. By being completely subject to their programming and 
instructions, the resultant AWS should only be able to operate in accordance with those legal rules. 
By placing legally compliant actions into the programming of an AWS, this means it is not just a 
translation of law into code. But, the code becomes a means of enforcing the law as unlawful actions 
should not be possible.312 Even if an AWS is equipped with machine learning, these algorithms should 
be programmed in such a way that legally-critical parts of its code cannot be re-learned or re-
programmed by the system itself: the programming of the system is wholly under human control. In 
determining how an AWS will function, the controlling entities act through the AWS. 
In terms of those who control AWS, we have already viewed Kruipy’s suggestion of politicians, 
manufacturers, and users of these systems. However, it is important to remember the role of weapons 
reviewers. As Corn notes, they only approve weapons for use in situations, and according to guidance, 
which, to them, renders unlawful actions unforeseeable.313 As such, they play a key role in exerting 
control over AWS to enforce legal compliance. 
 
311 Lessig uses the term ‘architecture’ to describe encoded regulation in cyberspace, but the concept is equally 
applicable to other systems running on code. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006). 
312 Lessig (n.311) 61. 
313 Geoffrey Corn, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing The Inevitability Of 'Taking The Man Out Of The 
Loop', in Nehal Bhuta, et al.(eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016) 233. 
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By deciding how an AWS should act, these controlling entities also outline how human beings 
will need to act in concert with the AWS. LoAC rules regulating combat require the performance of 
certain actions. When some of these actions are delegated to machines, those which remain must be 
performed by humans in order to maintain legal compliance. For Lessig, the potential to perform tasks 
is seen as doors; whether or not a system is allowed to perform a task the ‘door’ is open or locked, 
respectively.314  
Brownsword refers to this idea as ‘technological management’.315 He suggests that 
technologies can be constructed in such a way as to ‘technologically manage’ undesirable behaviours 
such that they become impossible to perform. A classic example of this is geo-restricting GPS-enabled 
golf carts so that they can only be used on specifically intended paths and cannot be abused by 
joyriders, or cause damage to the greens.316 In the present case, AWS could be constructed in such a 
way to be in conformity with the rules regulating weapons, and only function autonomously in 
accordance with the rules of targeting. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, taking this approach to 
AWS can render non-compliance with some rules impossible. 
So, for example, a state may decide to engage in an armed conflict. This defines the situation 
an AWS could be used in, and the relevant legal rules. A weapons reviewer defines how the AWS could 
be lawfully developed and used. The manufacturers build AWS in such a way as to be legally compliant, 
or to enable lawfully compliant usage of the system. Finally, commanders/operators instruct an AWS 
as to what it should do. Only after each layer of control has been exerted can the system actually 
engage in targeting. 
This is not without issue, however. Brownsword notes that by constructing technologies in 
such a way as to enforce compliance with the law, this can lead to atrophy of moral judgement 
 
314 See Lessig (n.311) 81-82. 
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because users of the technology need not make the ‘right’ choices about using it.317 However, as 
human judgement is required to lawfully perform some tasks using AWS for the foreseeable future, 
this criticism is only partly applicable to the layers of control approach. 
By enforcing legal compliance through code, this means that rather than requiring an AWS to 
understand and comprehend all the relevant international law rules, something that is impossible in 
the present and near-future,318 AWS only needs to be able to perform certain legal-centric tasks within 
a wider architecture of control. This reduces the capability required of AWS from a (near-)human level 
of understanding to being a tool used by humans for certain tasks.319 As such, the discussion in 
Chapters 4 and 5 outlines different ‘doors’. Those ‘open’ to AWS can be autonomously performed by 
the system, and those ‘locked’ must be performed by a human. Thus, this also delineates a legally 
required minimum level of human control over, and involvement with, AWS.320  
By exercising control over AWS and contributing to constraining their autonomous behaviour, 
each controlling entity can be thought of as adding a layer of control to limit potential AWS actions. 
This can be thought of as constituting four levels of concentric circles (political, procurement, 
technical, and tactical control (See Fig.1). Each layer of control narrows the possible behaviours that 
an AWS could autonomously perform until only those which are lawfully compliant and operationally 
desirable are left. 
 
 
317 Roger Brownsword, ‘What the World Needs Now: Techno-Regulation, Human Rights and Human Dignity’ in 
Roger Brownsword (ed.) Global Governance and the Quest for Justice Volume 4: Human Rights (Hart, 2004). 
231-231; Brownsword (n.315) 34-38. 
318 On the future potential for algorithms to comprehend some aspects of the law and help lawyers to gain 
further understanding, see Kevin D. Ashley, Artificial Intelligence And Legal Analytics (CUP, 2017). 
319 This is not intended to imply an instrumentalist approach. See Elke Schwarz, 'The (Im)Possibility Of 
Meaningful Human Control For Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems' (Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190716220002/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2018/08/29/im-possibility-meaningful-human-control-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/>. 
320 This notion has been discussed previously but has not actually been investigated. See Thompson Chengeta, 






Figure 1. A diagram illustrating how the layers of control approach to controlling AWS can be seen as 
concentric circles. 
 
5.8.1. Political Control 
The outer layer of this architecture is the political control exercised by states, or non-state 
actors (NSAs), whose forces use AWS. This is inspired by the UK ‘perspective on human control over 
weapon development and targeting cycles’ document.321 However, the rest of that framework focuses 
upon specific details related to UK policy rather than international law generally and so is 
unnecessarily complicated for present purposes. 
By deciding upon the international obligations, domestic laws (or NSA equivalent), policies, 
and strategic direction to abide by, these entities set the widest possible boundary within which an 
 
321 UK UNOG Delegation, 'Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s Perspective On Human Control 
Over Weapon Development And Targeting Cycles’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 8 August 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, 5-6. 
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AWS could be used. For example, an AWS could not be employed during an armed conflict without 
the approval of the state or NSA that is engaged in the conflict. Consequently, by deciding how AWS 
will be used, the exercise of political control also determines which legal regimes are relevant.  
The reference to NSAs exercising political control is intentional as there is a trend of increasing 
democratisation of technology mixed with an erosion of the state monopoly on violence322 leading to 
NSAs acquiring advanced offensive technologies.323 Thus, one would expect that NSAs will eventually 
acquire AWS.324 
By deciding upon the initiation of an armed conflict, political control is, fundamentally, 
concerned with the Jus ad Bellum. We have already seen that issues that AWS cause for this body of 
law are beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important to note also that, by deciding to engage in a 
conflict, this results in certain legal rules, such as those regulating targeting under LoAC and IHRL 
becoming relevant. Further, the obligations in IHRL and most of LoAC are directed at states, and so 
responsibility for the exercise of political control can be dealt with under the state responsibility 
regime and lead to states being held responsible if legal rules are violated (see Chapter 6). 
 
5.8.2. Procurement control 
The next layer is procurement control. This is inspired by what Corn refers to as ‘procurement 
responsibility’.325 Where a procurement team, and specifically a weapons reviewer (see Chapter 4), 
 
322 See, for example, Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Michelle Keck and José Nava, 'Losing The Monopoly Of 
Violence: The State, A Drug War And The Paramilitarization Of Organized Crime In Mexico (2007–10)' (2015) 4 
State Crime Journal, 77. 
323 For example, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, 'ISIS Drones Are Attacking U.S. Troops And Disrupting Airstrikes In 




324 Dyani Sabin, 'ISIS Will Use Killer Robots One Day, Says A.I. Expert' (Inverse, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190725103910/https://www.inverse.com/article/32929-isis-killer-
robots>. 
325 Corn (n.313) 230-238. 
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evaluates weapons to be purchased or developed, they must apply the international law rules relevant 
to the intended use of the weapon.326 They can advise on the lawfulness of weapons in 
development,327 and authorise final products for use subject to particular conditions that should 
render unlawful conduct unforeseeable.328 This narrows the boundaries of potential AWS uses. 
In terms of exercising procurement control, this involves the application of the LoAC and IHRL 
rules relevant to weapons, and their use. As this Chapter has discussed, it is imperative to consider 
AWS as relevant both to the rules on weapons and on targeting. In the following Chapter, we see how 
these rules must be applied to AWS in a flexible manner to ensure sufficient regulation of AWS and 
their ability to select and engage targets. In terms of responsibility for this type of control, Chapter 6 
explores in detail the notion of ‘procurement responsibility’, that Corn suggests, and applies it as a 
modest lex ferenda advancement of the law.329 
 
5.8.3. Technical control 
There is an enduring influence which programmers, designers, and engineers (collectively 
referred to here as ‘developers’) have over the autonomous systems they create, that this thesis calls 
‘technical control’. This is inspired by McFarland’s concept of ‘autonomous control’ which also 
suggests that developers exert control over autonomous systems through programming them.330 
By writing the underlying code for an AWS, developers determine how it will comprehend 
objects in its environment. In the targeting context, this means that developers decide what 
 
326 Art.36, API. 
327 Marie Jacobsson, 'Modern Weaponry And Warfare: The Application Of Article 36 Of Additional Protocol I By 
Governments' (2006) 82 International Law Studies, 183, 188; Alexander Bolt, ‘The Use of Autonomous 
Weapons and the Role of the Legal Adviser’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), International Humanitarian Law And The 
Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 131-133. 
328 Corn (n.313) 230-238. 
329 Corn (n.313) 219. 





characteristics are relevant to targeting, input those into a database,331 and programme how the 
system should sense and process these characteristics. Thus, it is developers who define what a 
‘target’ is to an AWS. For example, if an AWS recognises the barrel, tracks, and shape of a tank as 
indicating a target, it could only do this because someone programmed it to do so.332 Thus, developers 
have an enormous impact on how AWS will perform targeting.  
With regard to technical control, the use of machine learning algorithms could seem to 
remove the influence of developers because the learning algorithms themselves would be writing part 
of the code of an AWS. However, developers must decide what sort of learning algorithms will be 
used,333 and what they can learn, thereby exerting control over them. Thus, whilst the influence of 
programmers may be less direct than with symbolic algorithms, it is not absent.334 Ultimately, whether 
a system is programmed with symbolic or learning algorithms, all of their outputs could be traced back 
to the decision of a programmer exerting control.335 Indeed, by remembering that all of the actions 
and choices of AWS are the result of their programming and instruction, we can again see that AWS 
do not make decisions, but they apply decisions from their algorithms.336 
In order that only lawful targets are recognised, the criteria used by developers must be 
something that signifies lawful targetability.337 So, for example, an enemy uniform would indicate a 
targetable person,338 but someone holding a firearm could not be used to differentiate between an 
 
331 Brian Handy (ed.), 'Royal Air Force: Aircraft And Weapons' (Royal Air Force, 2007) 87; Vincent Boulanin and 
Maaike Verbruggen, ‘Mapping The Development Of Autonomy In Weapon Systems’ (SIPRI, 2017) 24. 
332 Weizenbaum (n.281) 259-260. 
333 For an overview of some major computational methods that could be used in AWS, see International Panel 
on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 'Computational Methods In The Context Of LAWS' (Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017) 9-13. 
334 See McFarland (n.330). 
335 Weizenbaum (n.281) 259-260. 
336 Winter (n.281) 193. 
337 Using characteristics to identify targets goes back to at least biblical times, with Gileadite soldiers 
identifying Ephraimites by their pronunciation of the word ‘shibboleth’. See Henry Wansbrough (ed.), The New 
Jerusalem Bible (Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985) Judges 12:6. 
338 Art.48, API; ICRC Study, Rule 1. 
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adversary or a civilian who is armed for their own protection.339 Thus, choosing lawful target 
characteristics is key to enabling lawful targeting by AWS. 
As developers will be selecting the criteria which signify targets for an AWS database, we can 
see a parallel to intelligence analysts who consider target criteria in developing target lists for military 
operations such as targeted killing.340 Targeted killing is the extraterritorial killing of a designated 
(suspected) terrorist.341 Such designations are made through applying target criteria to suspicious 
individuals. 342 Heller suggests that only five of the 14 criteria used by the US to identify individuals for 
targeted killing are lawfully compliant.343 The results of using these criteria suggest that unlawful 
targets have been attacked.344 What this shows us is that the complexities of why someone is a target 
have been simplified into the chosen criteria, and these simplifications are so wide as to include non-
terrorists. As Gramsci noted, ‘[t]o simplify means to misrepresent and falsify.’345 Consequently, AWS 
developers need to be in close contact with both procurement teams and users of AWS to ensure that 
the criteria they choose to identify targets are not overly-simplified such that unlawful targets are 
being attacked by AWS. 
 
339 Art.13(3), APII; AMW Commentary (n.205) Rule 12(a), para.3. 
340 For a discussion on the legal issues of target lists in general, see Aurel Sari, 'Missing The Mark: Reprieve, 'Kill 
Lists' And Human Rights Advocacy' (EJIL Talk, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20161114070952/http://www.ejiltalk.org/missing-the-mark-reprieve-
kill-lists-and-human-rights-advocacy/>; The term ‘target list’ is used here to maintain conceptual distinction 
between those used in conventional military operations and that within an AWS, despite target lists now also 




341 Markus Gunneflo, Targeted killing: A legal and political history (CUP, 2016) 1. 
342 In targeted killing, target criteria are known as ‘signatures’ which are used to identify targets for ‘signature 
strikes’ as opposed to ‘personality strike’ where the identity of the target is known to be of ‘high-value’. See 
Columbia Law School, 'The Civilian Impact Of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions' (Columbia 
Law School, 2012) 8-9. 
343 Kevin J. Heller, 'One Hell Of A Killing Machine': Signature Strikes And International Law' (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 89. 
344 Spencer Ackerman, '41 Men Targeted But 1,147 People Killed: US Drone Strikes – The Facts On The Ground' 
(The Guardian, 2014) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190910112222/https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147>. 




Thus, the exercise of technical control is relevant to both the development of weapons and 
their use. In Chapters 4 and 5, this thesis considers how technical control is essential to building AWS 
in conformity with the LoAC and IHRL rules relevant to both weapons and to targeting. Chapter 6 
discusses how failures to comply with these rules can generate criminal responsibility for individual 
developers of AWS, and for senior management of the companies who manufacture these systems 
under ICL. It also explores how AWS manufacturing companies could be held responsible as legal 
persons. 
 
5.8.4. Tactical control 
The final level of control is held by the operators and commanders of AWS. By deciding that 
an AWS should be employed on a particular mission, and instructing it on what to do, they exert 
‘tactical control’ over AWS. This is inspired by ways of controlling weapons with autonomy that are in 
use today.346 For example, a commander/operator,347 would decide that an AWS should be employed 
against targets A and could function autonomously in B time-frame at C location using D weapons (or 
causing E effects).348  
In order to determine these restrictions, commanders would need to evaluate where the 
enemy is expected to be, when they are expected to be there, and what available munitions are 
capable of completing the task. Further, they would need to consider the expected civilian presence 
and any harm that might come to them, along with any precautions which could minimise civilian 
harm,349 and what would be a proportionate amount of harm in comparison to the expected military 
 
346 See, Scharre (n.208) 162-169. 
347 The precise role of each would depend upon the formation of AWS units and the mission. A mission planner 
may also make these decisions. 
348 Boothby 2013 (n.198) 56-57; Ford suggests that all systems, autonomous and non-autonomous, are 
restricted in terms of space, time and effect and that this creates a method of control. See Christopher M. 
Ford, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Law' (2017) 69 South Carolina Law Review, 423, 455-458, citing 
William H. Boothby, Weapons And The Law Of Armed Conflict (OUP, 2009) 233, and Asaro (n.225) 695. 
349 Art.57, API; ICRC Study, Rules 15-21. 
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advantage if some harm is unavoidable.350 Thus, an AWS could not be used to ‘fish’ for targets a 
commander is unaware of. This means that AWS will be less susceptible to enemy-initiated 
diversionary tactics,351 and if, somehow, a civilian object is misidentified as a target it could only be 
engaged if it is present at the site and time of the attack. Therefore, this reduces the overall risk which 
an erroneously programmed AWS would pose to civilians. 
Creating such restrictions happens with beyond-visual-range attacks carried out by artillery, 
or some missiles today352 – the commander makes decisions about targets, precautions, and the 
acceptability of incidental civilian harm based on intelligence, rather than direct observation.353 The 
similarities between AWS and beyond-visual-range attacks are even stronger when considering that a 
commander may need to attack an object not in the memory of the AWS, for example, if adversaries 
occupy an abandoned civilian building. The AWS could not recognise it as a target, but a commander 
could instruct the system to attack a particular set of coordinates, for example. Such ad hoc attacks 
grant more control to a commander as it removes any freedom that the AWS would otherwise have. 
Yet, unlike artillery shells and missiles, an AWS may be contactable in some operational circumstances 
so giving a commander an ability to re-call an AWS provides them with greater control where possible 
and necessary.354  
Therefore, the rules of LoAC and IHRL relevant to targeting are of primary relevance to the 
exercise of tactical control and can be applied by commanders/operators. In Chapter 5, we see how 
AWS could be used for target engagement and how human beings would need to perform some tasks 
in this process. Consequently, responsibility for failures to comply with the legal rules is discussed in 
 
350 Arts.51(5)(b) and 57(2)(iii) and57(2)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
351 Backstrom and Henderson (n.71) 496. 
352 On beyond visual range attacks by aircraft, and how they do not exhibit meaningful human control, see 
Ekelhof (n.298); See Boothby 2013 (n.198) 58 referring to tactical cruise missiles; See Akerson (n.201) 86, 
referring to intercontinental ballistic missiles; also note Backstrom and Henderson (n.71) 488, 489. 
353 On the importance of intelligence in modern targeting, see Merel A.C. Ekelhof, 'Lifting The Fog Of Targeting: 
"Autonomous Weapons" And Human Control Through The Lens Of Military Targeting' (2018) 71 Naval War 
College Review, 1, 63; Boothby 2016 (n.223) 256-257. 
354 See, for example, Laurent Orseau and Stuart Armstrong, 'Safely Interruptible Agents.' (2016) Proceedings of 
the 32nd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 25-29 June 2016) 68. 
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Chapter 6. That discussion is primarily focussed on the individual criminal responsibility of AWS 
operators, and the responsibility of their commanders. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This Chapter has outlined the sources and regimes of international law that are relevant to 
AWS. Through discussing these systems as weapons, it has noted that LoAC and IHRL rules regulate 
their development. In terms of the behaviours that AWS are expected to engage in during combat, 
this Chapter has shown how the LoAC and IHRL rules relevant to targeting can be applied to them.  
The meaningful human control approach and approaches based on controlling entities were 
discussed. The later approaches were preferred as methods by which law could be indirectly applied 
to these systems as legal agents of those who exert control over them; specifically the layers of control 
approach was favoured in order to show and apply responsibility for each controlling entity separately 
from the others, rather than as a controlling socio-technical system.  
Following the layers of control approach allows controlling entities to apply legal rules to 
restrict the autonomous functions of AWS so that their behaviour is in accordance with legal rules. 
Ultimately, then, this not only enables international law to regulate the development of AWS as 
weapons, but also their use in combat, and responsibility for their abuse under international law. The 
application of these rules is discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Applying the weapons review framework to AWS 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters outlined that autonomous weapon systems (AWS) are weapon systems 
that have a computational capacity to apply algorithmic rules about attacks, and so they must be 
considered in terms of both weapons law and targeting law. The present Chapter discusses AWS qua 
weapon systems with particular regard to the legal framework applied during weapons reviews, that 
are required under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (API). The requirement for reviewing weapons 
exists because the right of parties to conflicts to choose different means and methods of warfare is 
not unlimited.1 As such, this Chapter demonstrates how weapons law can sufficiently regulate the 
development of AWS by applying its rules to deal with the novelty of AWS, and preventing unlawful 
weapons with autonomy from being produced. Chapter 5 follows on from this and looks at the ability 
of AWS to be used in conformity with, and apply, targeting rules. 
 
2. Weapons in the layers of control 
One could assume that compliance with weapons law would primarily come under technical 
control, i.e. the control exerted by weapons developers, as it is they who must produce weapons that 
comply with international law. However, as we saw in the last Chapter, weapons are subject to 
weapons reviews by the states who intend to use them.2 This is an exercise of procurement control 
through which a reviewer determines if a weapon can be lawfully used, and how that should be done. 
Thus, both technical and procurement control are exerted over weapons in the development phase, 
 
1 Art.35(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 
UNTS 3 (Hereafter: API). 
2 Art.36, API; Justin McClelland, 'The Review Of Weapons In Accordance With Article 36 Of Additional Protocol 
I' (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross, 397, 401. 
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and so contribute to restricting AWS to being developed and used in lawful ways through 
implementing each layer of control respectively. 
Procurement control is exerted by: communicating with and feeding back information to 
manufacturers on what capabilities they need new weapons to have to ensure legal compliance;3 
actually testing the system to determine that they abide by legal rules in the weapons review 
framework4 and can be authorised for use;5 writing guidance for how weapons should be used so as 
to be in conformity with legal rules relevant to targeting. 
In terms of technical control, this is exercised through the production of the system. As the 
previous Chapter noted, with AWS, this is regulated by both the rules traditionally applied to weapons, 
and those applied to targeting due to the significant impact that weapons developers have on the 
ability of an AWS to engage in targeting. As such, when an AWS is reviewed, the evaluation must 
consider them under both weapons law and targeting law.  
This requires a reviewer to embrace the flexibility of weapons review frameworks to interpret 
rules slightly differently (as the obligation to conduct reviews does not state how they should be done, 
this provides freedom to tailor the testing to the novelty of the new weapon). For example, 
interpreting the prohibition of indiscriminate weapons to consider the accuracy of a system to 
recognise targets rather than just hit its aimpoint. Further, the flexibility of the framework allows for 
the incorporation of targeting rules that would not be applied to conventional weapons reviews. Doing 
so allows the novelty of autonomous targeting to be evaluated within the weapons review framework. 
This should allow reviewers, in their exercise of procurement control, to construct ways to use an AWS 
 
3 Alexander Bolt, ‘The Use of Autonomous Weapons and the Role of the Legal Adviser’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), 
International Humanitarian Law And The Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 131-133. 
4 Marie Jacobsson, 'Modern Weaponry And Warfare: The Application Of Article 36 Of Additional Protocol I By 
Governments' (2006) 82 International Law Studies, 183, 188; See reference to different reviews (or ‘gates’) 
taking place during the development of weapons: UK Ministry of Defence, UK Weapons Reviews 
(Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2016) 4; Australian UNOG Delegation, 'The Australian Article 36 
Review Process’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 30 
August 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.6, 4. 
5 Geoffrey Corn, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing The Inevitability Of 'Taking The Man Out Of The 
Loop', in Nehal Bhuta, et al.(eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016) 230-238. 
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where unlawful conduct is, to them, unforeseeable.6 In this thesis, however, the weapons law regime, 
and the targeting law regime are considered in separate chapters so that each can receive the required 
focus. Consequently, this Chapter and the next should be read together. 
It is important to remember that applying targeting rules to AWS does not mean that such 
systems would need to be able to apply these rules itself, but merely that the system can be employed 
in such a way as to comply with targeting law.7 Indeed, these legal obligations are imposed on the 
people using an AWS, and not the machine itself.8 
 
3. A historical example 
Often, when new technologies produce remarkable results, those who are particularly 
enthusiastic about it can view the technology as being far better than it is. For example, when chess 
computers were first developed, many thought they would also be capable of strategic decision-
making due to the inherent strategizing when humans play chess.9 Thus, it is vitally important that 
weapons reviewers take a realistic approach to understanding the capabilities of AWS technologies. A 
vignette from the US experience during the Vietnam War illustrates how wayward things can go when 
technology is trusted beyond its capability. 
Between 1968-1972, during the Vietnam War of 1955-1975,10 there were a series of US 
military operations known collectively as ‘The Electronic Battlefield’.11 These operations used sensors 
to detect acoustic, magnetic, electro-magnetic and seismic changes in areas of known activity by the 
 
6 Corn (n.5) 233. 
7 See Kathleen Lawand, 'Reviewing The Legality Of New Weapons, Means And Methods Of Warfare' (2006) 88 
International Review of the Red Cross, 925, 928-929. 
8 Also see US Manual, para.6.5.9.3. 
9 Garry Kasparov, Deep Thinking (John Murray Publishers, 2017) 26-28. 
10Jesse Gatlin, 'Igloo White (Initial Phase)' (Project CHECO, 7th US Air Force ,1968). 
11 Paul Dickson, The Electronic Battlefield (2nd edn, Foxacre Press, 2012); Anthony Tambini, Wiring Vietnam 
(Scarecrow Press, 2007). 
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then US adversaries, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).12 This, supposedly, allowed the US to know 
the time and location of NVA movements.13 
The US Air Force part of the project was known as Operation Igloo White.14 It was an attempt 
to prevent NVA forces from circumventing the then in-force de-militarized zone between North and 
South Vietnam15 by traversing the 8,100-mile-long Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia and 
into the South Vietnamese Delta.16 
The jungle-covered ‘trail’ was actually a sophisticated network of roads and encampments 
transporting thousands of NVA soldiers into South Vietnam.17 The Air Force air-dropped sensors to 
discover NVA positions and personnel travelling along the trail.18 Through tracking the time and 
distance between different sensor activations,19 US computer technicians were able to estimate the 
time of arrival at a pre-selected attack location lower down the Trail.20 Air strikes were launched to 
coincide with the arrival of supposed NVA personnel at these locations.21 
Initially, forward air controllers would visually confirm targets for attack aircraft.22 Eventually, 
a sub-operation called ‘Operation Commando Bolt’ was launched in October 196923 and sensor 
activations were then analysed by a computer.24 A three-person team evaluated the computer analysis 
 
12 For a detailed explanation of the different types of sensors used, see Tambini (n.11) 29-46. 
13 Tambini (n.11) 10, 75; Dickinson (n.11) 85. 
14 Operation Igloo White existed within Operation Command Hunt which covered all bombing of the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail, not just those operations that were directed using sensors. See Earl H Tilford, Setup: What The Air 
Force Did In Vietnam And Why (Air University Press, 1991); Gatlin (n.10); Philip Caine, 'Igloo White July 1968 - 
December 1969' (Project CHECO, 7th US Air Force, 1970); Henry Shields, 'Igloo White January 1970 - 
September 1971' (Project CHECO, 7th US Air Force 1971). 
15 Alan Rohn, 'Vietnamese DMZ' (Vietnam War, 2014) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190717171216/https://thevietnamwar.info/vietnamese-dmz/>. 
16 Tambini (n.11) 130 
17 Tambini (n.11) vii, 130-131 
18 John Correll, 'Igloo White' (2004) 87 Air Force Magazine, 57. 
19 Caine (n.14) 12. 
20 Tambini (n.11) 75. 
21 Tambini (n.11) xii, 75; Dickinson (n.11) 86-87. 
22 Gatlin (n.10); Tambini (n.11) 164-165. 
23 Shields (n.14) 15-18. 
24 Caine (n.14) 16-17. 
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and recommended times and locations of strikes.25 This was transmitted to computers on-board 
aircraft that gave a course to fly on and an appropriate speed so that weapons release was timed to 
synchronise with the arrival of supposed adversaries in the pre-determined target area.26 
Skilled technicians could use sensors to determine general information about what was 
happening on the Trail,27 but could not identify the causes of sensor activations with any accuracy. 
False positives were regularly misinterpreted and acted upon, with civilians, dead bodies, cattle,28 
water buffalo, jungle elephants, and even the wind causing sensor activations that resulted in attacks 
being launched.29 Civilians were plainly put at risk of being mistakenly and unlawfully attacked, with 
US bombing in these areas creating 17,000 refugees.30 
Military officers taking part in, and overseeing, these operations should have recognised that 
this was unlawful according to US interpretations of the law at the time.31 Yet, following a display of 
the technology, then US Commander in Vietnam General Westmorland, called for ‘a full automated 
battlefield’.32 An effective evaluation of these systems that considered legal rules would have found 
this operation to be unlawful. 
From this example, we can see that it is imperative for weapons reviewers to take a realistic 
view of the technologies they evaluate in order that they are accurately assessed, and to prevent 
undue enthusiasm about AWS from overpowering the legal reality. Weapons should be reviewed in 
terms of their normal or expected use, according to several interpretations of the weapons review 
 
25 Caine (n.14) 16-18. 
26 Pilots were originally given the speed and course to fly (Shields (n.14) 21), but this was later automated, see 
Dickinson (n.11) 86-87; Tambini (n.11) 75; Harry Blout, 'Air Operations In Northern Laos 1 Apr - 1 Nov 1970' 
(Project CHECO, 7th US Air Force, 1971) 26-27. 
27 Tambini (n.11) 20 
28 Dickinson (n.11) 41-42 
29 Dickinson (n.11) 109 
30 Cornel University, The Air War in Indochina, 1971, cited in Dickinson (n.11) 92 
31 US Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare FM27-10 (Department of the Army, 1956) paras.25, 
41. 
32 Dickinson (n.11) 75 
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obligation.33 Thus, the exercise of procurement control is legally required to be in realistic terms. If a 
weapon passes or fails a review due to exceptional circumstance, that is not a judgement of how the 
weapon would normally work in the field and so serves little purpose. With regard to AWS, this means 
that they would need to be assessed in terms of what data their sensors and processors can deal with, 
i.e. quantitative rather than qualitative data, in realistic scenarios. 
 
4. Weapons reviews 
The conformity of a weapon system with the relevant legal rules was perhaps most famously 
discussed by the International Court of Justice in their Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons.34 However, weapons are routinely evaluated in the context of a weapons 
review by states before they are used.35 This is an analysis of a technology for its conformity with the 
weapons law rules, and any policy requirements that a reviewing state wishes to apply (a non-state 
actor may voluntarily review weapons, but there is no legal obligation to). States party to API are 
obligated to carry out reviews under Article 36. However, some states not party to API carry out 
reviews, with the US beginning their domestic process two years before API was adopted.36 The API 
obligation states: 
‘In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method 
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any 
other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.’ 
 
33 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary On The Additional Protocols 
Of 8 June 1977 To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987); William H 
Boothby, Weapons And The Law Of Armed Conflict (2nd edn, OUP, 2016) 343; Michael Bothe, et al., New Rules 
For Victims Of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) 200-201. 
34 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Reports, p.226. 
35 Vincent Boulanin, 'Implementing Article 36 Weapon Reviews In The Light Of Increasing Autonomy In 
Weapon Systems' (SIPRI, 2015) 
36 US Manual, para.6.2.3., and fn.18, p.314. 
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This treaty obligation is only applicable in International Armed Conflicts (IACs). But, this does 
not mean that states are relieved from their responsibility to field only lawful weapons in Non-
International Armed Conflicts (NIACs).37  
It is unclear whether there is a customary obligation to review weapons for use in IACs or 
NIACs. Several authors suggest there are obligations,38 others submit that they arguably exist,39 and 
some are undecided.40 As Jevglevskaja points out, however, all arguments for weapons reviews being 
a customary obligation are grounded in the customary rules that weapons reviews are based upon, 
and the logic that in order to abide with these rules, weapons must be reviewed.41 This implies a duty 
to review weapons to ensure that customary rules of the law of armed conflict (LoAC) are not 
breached by the development and use of newly devised, or acquired, equipment and tactics.42 This is 
in contrast to the normal evaluation of customary international law (CIL) based on the existence of 
state practice and opinio juris.43 There does not, however, appear to be sufficient evidence of either 
element to create a customary rule in the traditional sense.44 
On the point of customary law, this thesis makes use of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law’ Study as a general reference point for 
 
37 Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Commentary On The HPCR Manual On International Law 
Applicable To Air And Missile Warfare (Harvard University, 2010) (Hereafter: AMW Commentary), Rule 9, 
para.3 of commentary. 
38 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, '"Out Of The Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems And The Law Of 
Armed Conflict' (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal, 231, 271; AMW Commentary, Rule 9 (note that this 
only applies to means of warfare); Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Mathew Waxman, 'Adapting The 
Law Of Armed Conflict To Autonomous Weapon Systems' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 335, 398, fn.27. 
39 International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide To The Legal Review Of New Weapons, Means And 
Methods Of Warfare (ICRC, 2006) 4; Daragh Murray, Practitioners' Guide To Human Rights Law In Armed 
Conflict (OUP, 2016) para.7.25. 
40 Michael N Schmitt and Liis Vihul, Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The International Law Applicable To Cyber 
Operations (CUP 2017)(Hereafter: Tallinn Manual), Rule 110, para.4 of commentary. 
41 Natalia Jevglevskaja, 'Weapons Review Obligation Under Customary International Law' (2018) 94 
International Law Studies, 1887, 188. 
42 ICRC (n.39) 4; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume I: Rules (CUP, 2005) (Hereafter: ICRC Study) Rule 71 (final paragraph of commentary). 
43 Jevglevskaja (n.43) 188. 
44 Jevglevskaja (n.43) 207-213. 
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applicable CIL. But, as it has been particularly criticised in its assessment of weapons law,45 the present 
Chapter cites this work as additional evidence of legal rules regarding weapons, rather than as a guide 
to rules as in other chapters. 
 
4.1. The applicable law 
As Article 36 is present in a LoAC treaty, one could assume that this means that only LoAC is 
applicable during weapons reviews. However, the Article allows for ‘any other rule of international 
law applicable to the High Contracting Party’ to be applied. Thus, the treaty obligation itself allows for 
an interpretation of the lawfulness of weapons beyond that found purely within LoAC. The national 
manuals of the UK,46 the US,47 Canada,48 Australia,49 and New Zealand50 take a narrow view and only 
refer to LoAC in interpreting this obligation.51  
Yet, the Danish manual explicitly refers to LoAC and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), 
in particular, the right to life and freedom from torture. But, the application of IHRL is stated in this 
document to only be relevant to the assessment of less-than-lethal weapons.52 Further, the German 
 
45 D. Turns, 'Weapons In The ICRC Study On Customary International Humanitarian Law' (2006) 11 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law, 201. 
46 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual Of The Law Of Armed Conflict (OUP, 2004) para.6.20.1; This position is the 
same in UK Ministry of Defence, 'Legal Review Of Newly Acquired Or Developed Weapons Or Associated 
Equipment (2009DIN04-217)' (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2009); note however UK Ministry 
of Defence, UK Weapons Reviews (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2016) 4 refers to ‘all relevant 
rules of international law’. 
47 US Manual, para. 6.2. 
48 Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law Of Armed Conflict At The Operational And Tactical 
Levels (National Defence, 2001) para.530. 
49 Australian Defence Headquarters, Law Of Armed Conflict, ADDP 06.4 (Defence Publishing Service, 2006) 
para, 4.2. 
50 New Zealand Defence Force, DM 69 (2 Ed) Manual Of Armed Forces Law, Volume 4 Law Of Armed Conflict 
(Directorate of Legal Services, 2017) para.7.4.1. 
51 Reportedly, the UK is considering whether to take IHRL into account in its weapon reviews. See Dustin A. 
Lewis, 'Legal Reviews Of Weapons, Means And Methods Of Warfare Involving Artificial Intelligence: 16 




52 Jes Rynkeby Knudsen, Military Manual On International Law Relevant To Danish Armed Forces In 
International Operations (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016) Section 9.4 (hereafter: Danish Manual) 
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manual refers to ‘the rules of international treaty law and customary international law’, as ‘determined 
by the Federal Ministry of Defence’,53 but offers no further explanation. As such, it can be assumed 
that LoAC is the primary framework they would consider. Sweden, in its International Law Monitoring 
of Arms Project considers LoAC (including disarmament treaties) and IHRL.54 But, this mechanism 
appears to take a wider role than Article 36 reviews and includes evaluations of proposed weapons 
procurement by Swedish Police, Coast Guard, and Prison Service,55 and so the precise rules applied in 
that process are unclear.56 Additionally, of those international expert manuals which refer to weapons 
reviews (the Air and Missile Warfare Manual and the Tallinn Manual on Cyber-Warfare), neither 
expand on the bodies of law to be considered.57  
Thus, in the totality of available resources that refer to the bodies of law applied in weapons 
reviews, it would appear that LoAC is the primary (and in some cases only) legal regime that new 
means and methods are evaluated against. This is not overly problematic regarding compliance with 
IHRL, as it is broadly consistent with LoAC in terms of understanding the legality of weapons and 
provides further context for that understanding.58 Indeed, LoAC duties to review weapons are 
consistent with IHRL requirements to consider ‘foreseeable consequences’ or ‘foreseeable risks’ 
associated with the use of weapons or other state activity.59 Such consequences and risks may include 
long-term effects, such as if shrapnel may have carcinogenic effects in the body.60 It is important to 
note that states are required to evaluate products they purchase in terms of their compliance with 
 
53 Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, Law Of Armed Conflict Manual (2013) para.405. 
54 Jacobsson (n.4) 185. 
55 Jacobsson (n.4) 186. 
56 For wider information on national weapons review policies of Sweden, the United States, Norway, and 
Australia, see Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland and Rikke Ishoey, 'New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation Of 
States To Assess The Legality Of Means And Methods Of Warfare' (2002) 84 International Review of the Red 
Cross, 345, 354-361; for more information on the review processes of Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the 
US, see Boulanin (n.35) 19-25; for information on Article 36 reviews by specific US services in relation to AWS, 
see Ryan Poitras, 'Article 36 Reviews & Autonomous Weapon Systems: Supporting An International Review 
Standard' (2018) 34 American University International Law Review, 465. 
57 AMW Commentary (n.37) Commentary to Rule 9; Tallinn Manual (n.40) Commentary to Rule 110. 
58 See Murray (n.39) paras.7.22-7.29 and 7.04-7.10. 
59 Murray (n.39) para.7.05. 
60 Murray (n.39) paras.7.06-7.07. 
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IHRL obligations under the bourgeoning business and human rights regime (see Chapter 6, Section 
8.2). 
In summary, then, weapons reviews must include relevant LoAC rules, but states can choose 
to include other international law rules as relevant. This may include IHRL61, disarmament law,62 or 
specialised regimes such as law of the sea for maritime weapons. Consequently, in the exercise of 
procurement control, a reviewer (or reviewing team)63 may consider a wide variety of legal rules that 
might be applicable. As such, the application of IHRL in weapons reviews would slightly expand the 
focus on the review, with application of LoAC rules on their own already fulfilling most of the IHRL 
requirements with regard to evaluating weapons. 
 
4.2. What is subject to review? 
As the previous Chapter (Section 4.1) noted, AWS are a weapon system and can, therefore, 
be considered as a means of warfare. States are obligated to initiate reviews during the ‘the study, 
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method[s] of warfare.’64 When 
considering algorithmic technologies, it is important to take a broad view of how different sub-systems 
impact upon the lawfulness of the system overall. Indeed, the UK Weapons Review policy includes 
opportunity to review ‘data links and software used for processing target data’.65 As such, whilst an 
 
61 Note that Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK do give consideration to the ability of a weapon to be used in 
conformity with IHRL as some operations may be governed by IHRL as the primary framework, such as law 
enforcement operations during peacekeeping, see Boulanin (n.35) 6. 
62 Lawand (n.7) 929. 
63 UK MoD 2009 (n.46) para.9. 
64 Art.36, API; Note the minority view that AWS are ‘robot-combatants’ and so are not subject to review. See 
Thompson Chengeta, 'Are Autonomous Weapon Systems The Subject Of Article 36 Of Additional Protocol I To 
The Geneva Conventions?' (2016) 23 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, 65, 76-81. 
65 UK MoD 2016 (n.46) 4. 
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AWS would be tested as a whole, the component parts, in particular the software, could be considered 
individually.66 
Whilst the obligation routinely applies during the ‘study, development, acquisition or 
adoption’ of new systems,67 a modified weapon can also be thought of as ‘new’ for the purposes of 
Article 36 and, therefore, be subject to re-review.68 This is of particular importance if an AWS is 
equipped using machine learning algorithms.69 In order to be classified as ‘new’, a modification 
through machine learning should cause a system to operate in a way not contemplated by the original 
review that potentially affects the ability of the system in question to be used in compliance with the 
relevant legal rules (the same test would, presumably, apply to other types of software update).70 
However, where a system is learning continuously during operations, it may be difficult to re-review 
a weapon after each modification. Thus, where the weapons reviewers could understand what stimuli 
a system would be exposed to, and how that might change the programming of the system, then a 
system could be authorised for use during a period of time or a particular operation/exercise, after 
which the system would need to be re-reviewed.71  
However, other commentators suggest that machine learning would add unpredictability to 
the system, and therefore systems using such algorithms in their critical functions are incompatible 
 
66 This is particularly important where parts of an AWS many be produced by different manufacturers. Alan 
Backstrom and Ian Henderson, 'New Capabilities In Warfare: An Overview Of Contemporary Technological 
Developments And The Associated Legal And Engineering Issues In Article 36 Weapons Reviews' (2012) 94 
International Review of the Red Cross, 483, 510. 
67 Opportunities to review are thought of as ‘gates’ which a new system must pass through. See Australian 
UNOG Delegation (n.4)4; UK MoD 2016 (n.46) 4. 
68 James Farrant and Christopher Ford, 'Autonomous Weapons And Weapon Reviews: The UK Second 
International Weapon Review Forum' (2017) 93 International Law Studies, 389, 403; UK MoD 2016 (n.46) 4; 
Boothby 2016 (n.33) 346 and 355; McClelland (n.2) 404; Daoust et al. (n.56) 352; Tallinn Manual (n.40) 
commentary to Rule 110, para.9; Danish Manual (n.52) 381; also note references to states changing their legal 
opinions in response to improvements in weapons in Declaration Renouncing The Use, In Time Of War, Of 
Certain Explosive Projectile (adopted 11 December 1868, entered into force 11 December 1868).  
69 Farrant and Ford (n.68) 403. 
70 Farrant and Ford (n.68) 406 
71 Farrant and Ford (n.68) 407 
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with the traditional weapons review regimes.72 If a system is truly unpredictable, then it could not be 
reviewed as it would be impossible to assess it in its normal or expected use.73 Consequently, it could 
not pass an initial review or be lawfully used. We saw in Chapter 2 that whilst the precise actions of 
an AWS may be unpredictable, their behaviours would be generally foreseeable and so this point does 
not particularly affect the ability of a reviewer to assess an AWS. 
A decision to re-evaluate weapons where the effects of a weapon may be different from the 
initial review is also required by IHRL. Failure to initiate re-review after such information comes to 
light may indicate that a state ‘knew or ought to have known’ about risks associated with the 
weapon.74  
 
5. The review criteria 
In terms of the actual considerations of a weapons review, Article 36 does not lay out a 
framework for review. States, therefore, consider whether a weapon is prohibited by a particular legal 
instrument, or if it is possible to use the weapon in conformity with generally applicable rules 
regarding weapons. The criteria used in all publicly known review frameworks ask whether a system 
is specifically prohibited, is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and if it 
is inherently indiscriminate.75 Some reviews also evaluate whether a weapon will cause a prohibited 
 
72 Netta Goussac, 'Safety Net Or Tangled Web: Legal Reviews Of AI In Weapons And War-Fighting' 
(Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919080050/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/04/18/safety-net-tangled-web-legal-reviews-ai-weapons-war-fighting/>. 
73 Sandoz et al. (n.33) 343; Bothe et al. (n.33) 200-201. 
74 Murray (n.39) para.7.29; For negligent appreciations of risk in other contexts, see Brincat and Others v 
Malta, App nos:60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 62312/11 and 62338/11 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014), and O’Keefe v 
Ireland, App no:35810/09 (ECtHR, 28 January 2014). 
75 UK MoD 2009 (n.46) para.10; US Manual, para.6.2.2; New Zealand manual (n.50) para.7.3.1; Australian 
UNOG Delegation (n.4) 5. 
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level of environmental harm, and whether a weapon is likely to be prohibited in the near future.76 
Others also appraise the ability of a weapon to abide by the Martens Clause.77 
With regard to highly-automated and autonomous systems, however, Boothby suggests that, 
in his opinion, a reviewer should also consider whether the way in which the weapon system is going 
to be used would enable compliance with, at a minimum:78 the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks,79 
precautions in attack,80 distinction,81 and the doubt rules.82 Thus, a reviewer should consider both 
weapons and targeting law together and be satisfied that the AWS can be used in conformity with 
both regimes.83 As was noted above, this thesis separates these regimes into distinct chapters. 
Where specific knowledge is needed in order to adequately conduct a review, a reviewer can 
routinely call on experts for advice. This may include medical specialists who can provide a greater 
understanding of how a munition would affect the human body84 or experts in computer science in 
the case of AWS.85 
 
5.1. Specific prohibitions 
The first question that a review must answer is whether a weapon is subject to a prohibition. 
There is a significant body of treaty and customary laws proscribing specific weapons. This is 
sometimes known as disarmament law.86 It follows a trend from ancient times of prohibiting weapons 
 
76 UK MoD 2009 (n.46) para.10; Australian UNOG Delegation (n.4) 5. 
77 Australian UNOG Delegation (n.4) 5. 
78 Boothby 2016 (n.33) 348-349. 
79 Art.51(4)-(6), API; Art.13(2), APII; ICRC Study, Rules 11 and 12. 
80 Art.57, API; ICRC Study, Rules 15-21. 
81 Art.48, API; Art.13(3), APII; ICRC Study, Rules 1, 6, and 7; Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.78. 
82 Arts.50(1), and52(3), API; ICRC Study, Rules 6 (Situations of doubt as to the character of a person) and 10 
(Situations of doubt as to the character of an object). 
83 William Boothby, ‘Dehumanisation: Is There a Legal Problem Under Article 36?’ in Wolff Heintschel von 
Heinegg, Robert Frau and Tassilo Singer (eds.), Dehumanization Of Warfare (Springer, 2018) 40-41. 
84 Daoust et al. (n.56) 352-353; Lawand (n.7) 929. 
85 Also note UK policy which encourages reviews to ‘engage widely’ with experts. See UK MoD 2009 (n.46) 
para.11. 
86 See Lawand (n.7) 929. 
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thought to be particularly offensive to contemporary sensibilities such as poisons and poisoned 
weapons,87 and crossbows.88  
In modern times, those weapons that are specifically prohibited under treaty and CIL are: 
explosive projectiles under 400 grams in weight,89 or ‘exploding bullets’;90 asphyxiating gases;91 bullets 
which expand or flatten easily in the human body;92 poisons and poisoned weapons;93 automatic 
submarine contact mines;94 asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and bacteriological methods of 
warfare;95 bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons;96 environmental modification techniques;97 
herbicides;98 weapons with non-detectable fragments;99 mines, booby-traps, and other devices 
designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated manually, by remote control or 
 
87 These were prohibited by Greek, Roman, and Hindu customs, see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, 
Documents On The Laws Of War (3rd edn, OUP, 2004) 53. 
88 Pope Innocent II banned the use of crossbows against Christians in 1139, see Paul Scharre, Army Of None 
(WW Norton & Company, 2018) 331. 
89 St Petersburg Declaration 1868 (n.68). 
90 ICRC Study, Rule 78. 
91 Hague Declaration (II) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 
1900). 
92 Hague Declaration (III) Concerning Expanding Bullets (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 
1900); Arts.8(2)(b)(xix) and 8(2)(e)(xv), Rome Statue Of The International Criminal Court 1998 (adopted 17 July 
1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3 (Hereafter: ICC Statute); ICRC Study, Rule 77; Also note 
William Boothby, 'Difference In The Law Of Weaponry When Applied To Non-International Armed Conflict' 
(2012) 88 International Law Studies, 197, 198-204, 205. 
93 Art.23(a), Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 
1910); Arts.8(2)(b)(xvii) ad 8(2)(e)(xiii), ICC Statute; ICRC Study, Rule 72. 
94 Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (adopted 18 October 1907, 
entered into force 18 January 1910)(Hereafter: Hague Convention VIII). 
95 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (adopted 17 June 1925, entered into force 8 February 1928); 
Arts.8(2)(b)(xviii) and 8(2)(e)(xiv), ICC Statute. 
96 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) 
and toxin weapons and on their destruction (adopted 19 April 1972, entered into force 26 March 1975) 101 
UNTS 163 (Hereafter: Biological Weapons Convention); Arts.8(2)(b)(xxvii) and 8(2)(e)(xvi), ICC Statute; ICRC 
Study, Rule 73. 
97 Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques 
(adopted 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 October 1978) 1108 UNTS 151 (Hereafter: ENMOD Treaty); 
Also note Boothby 2012 (n.92) 204-205. 
98 ICRC Study, Rule 76. 
99 Protocol (I) on Non-Detectable Fragments to, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects (with Protocols I, II and III) (adopted 10 October 1980 entered into force 2 December 1983) 1342 UNTS 
137.(Hereafter: CCW) ; Arts.8(2)(b)(xxviii) and 8(2)(e)(xvii), ICC Statute; ICRC Study, Rule 79. 
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automatically after a lapse of time;100 incendiary weapons;101 blinding laser weapons;102 explosive 
remnants of war;103 chemical weapons;104 anti-personnel mines;105 riot-control agents as a method of 
warfare;106 cluster munitions.107 
Some of these proscriptions are only designed to apply in IACs.108 But, as Boothby points out, 
the effect of prohibiting such weapons means they should not be present in the arsenals of signatory 
states. This means that they would not be available for use in NIACS.109 They are, therefore, 
functionally prohibited in NIACs also, despite there being no specific legal obligation. 
Where a reviewer evaluates a weapon in terms of whether it is prohibited under any of these 
regulations, or any national laws, they exercise their procurement control by preventing any weapon 
which contravenes this rule from passing review. But, there is no specific prohibition of autonomy in 
weapon systems.110 One could look at the prohibitions on submarine-mines and landmines to suggest 
that it is the autonomous nature of these systems that is problematic, rather than the specific systems 
themselves. However, upon a reading of the exact provisions, it is apparent that they are focused on 
reducing or minimising harm to those not involved in combat.  
 
100 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices to 
CCW (Hereafter: CCW Amended Protocol II); ICRC Study, Rules 80, 81, 82, and 83. 
101 Protocol (III) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons to CCW; ICRC Study, Rules 84 
and 85 
102 Protocol (IV) on Blinding Laser Weapons to CCW; Arts.8(2)(b)(xxix) and8(2)(e)(xviii), ICC Statute; ICRC Study, 
Rule 86 
103 Protocol (V) on Explosive Remnants of War to CCW 
104 Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction (adopted 3 September 1992, entered into force 29 April 1997) 1974 UNTS 45 (Hereafter: Chemical 
Weapons Convention); ICRC Study, Rule 74. 
105 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction (adopted 18 September 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999) 2056 UNTS 211 
(Hereafter: Anti-Personnel Mines Conventions). 
106 ICRC Study, Rule 75. 
107 Convention on Cluster Munitions (adopted 30 May 2008, entered into force 1 August 2010) 3688 UNTS 39 
(Hereafter: Cluster Munitions Convention). 
108 Chemical Weapons Convention; Biological Weapons Convention; Anti-Personnel Mines Convention; Cluster 
Munitions Convention. 
109 Boothby 2012 (n.92) 198. 
110 US Manual, para.6.5.9.2. 
121 
 
The 1907 Convention on automatic submarine contact mines prohibits the use of such 
weapons beyond human control or where they are emplaced to harm innocent civilians in specific 
instances.111 As such, they are not outlawed because of their autonomy. Concerns regarding human 
control are relevant to AWS, as an uncontrollable autonomous system would be undesirable. AWS 
are, however, subject to multiple layers of control and so do not raise the same concerns as automatic 
submarine contact mines. Thus, whilst this prohibition cannot outlaw AWS, it does inform us that AWS 
should remain under human control. 
There is a similar rationale in the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) Protocol 
dealing with mines, booby-traps and other devices.112 Some of the general provisions of the protocol 
prohibit use of such weapons against civilians.113 But, those most relevant to AWS proscribe the 
irresponsible use of mines, booby-traps, and other devices by preventing them from being made 
safe,114 or using them in geographically115 or temporally116 unrestricted ways. As with the 1907 
Convention, the CCW protocol does not focus upon the autonomy in the weapon system but places 
restrictions upon the use of these weapons in order that they are directed at lawful targets. What can 
be learned from these provisions is that placing restrictions upon the time, space, and effects117 of 
how a weapon with autonomy can use that autonomy would enable greater civilian protection. We 
saw in the last Chapter that such restrictions are key to the exercise of tactical control by commanders. 
Consequently, there is no evidence of a weapon ever being prohibited based upon the 
autonomy it has with regard to attacks. Still, ensuring that weapons with autonomy are under some 
 
111 Arts.1 and 2, Hague Convention VIII. 
112 ‘Other devices’ means weapons similar to mines and booby-traps. 
113 Art.3(3), (7), (8), (9), (10), CCW Amended Protocol II. 
114 Art.3(5), (6), CCW Amended Protocol II. 
115 Art.5, CCW Amended Protocol II, note that this provision does not apply to remotely-delivered mines. 
Specific restrictions on their use are deal with in Art.6, but this does not provide for geographic restrictions. 
116 Technical Annex Art.3, CCW Amended Protocol II. 
117 Note also the consideration of these dimensions as methods of controlling AWS in Christopher M. Ford, 
'Autonomous Weapons And International Law' (2017) 69 South Carolina Law Review, 413; also note the 
discussion of these dimensions of control in the next Chapter. 
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human control and are restricted in their autonomous functions in time, space, and effects so that 
only lawful targets can be attacked would seem to be good practice for use of AWS. 
 
5.2. Likelihood of a future prohibition 
In terms of whether AWS are likely to be subject to a prohibition in the future, the previous 
Chapter (Section 5.4) noted that there is no consensus between states on the international level in 
terms of either regulating or prohibiting AWS. Thus, no new protocol to the CCW banning AWS is likely 
to come into being. 
However, after several years of discussions, campaigners for a prohibition on AWS are 
contemplating initiating a treaty-making process outside of the CCW forum: ‘If the CCW cannot deliver 
a negotiating mandate in 2019—after six years of work—it is time to look elsewhere.’118 This happened 
with the Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti-personnel mines that was agreed during ad hoc 
conferences outside the auspices of the CCW due to the frustrations from pro-ban states with slow 
progress.119 However, such a move would only bind those states that consent to a treaty. Any states 
that oppose a prohibition on AWS (France, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States)120 could not be compelled to sign such an agreement. As these states are developing some of 
the most advanced weapons with autonomy,121 any prohibition is unlikely to affect these countries or 
 
118 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 'Statement To The Convention On Conventional Weapons Group Of 
Governmental Experts On Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems’ 2019 Group of Governmental Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Geneva, 27 March 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919085101/https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAs
sets)/6FDBADBE15A26515C12583CB003E9791/$file/KRC_StmtCCW_27Mar2019_TODELIVER.pdf>. 
119Melissa Chan, 'The Rise Of The Killer Robots – And The Two Women Fighting Back' (The Guardian, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190822142738/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08
/the-rise-of-the-killer-robots-jody-williams-mary-warehan-artificial-intelligence-autonomous-weapons>.; See 
also Anti-Personnel Mines Convention. 









their weapons review processes. However, should such a prohibition be agreed and subsequently 
become CIL and these states fail to announce themselves as persistent objectors, then the customary 
prohibition would apply to them.122 
During a weapons review, a reviewer would need to assess the current obligations, and the 
future likelihood of their state prohibiting AWS either unilaterally or as part of a multi-lateral treaty. 
By doing so, a reviewer exercises their procurement control over the AWS. 
 
5.3. Of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering 
In terms of prohibiting weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,123 and 
are not already specifically prohibited, this principle originates in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration. 
The instrument suggested that, in order to weaken enemy forces, it is sufficient to ‘disable’ (i.e. make 
hors de combat) adverse combatants and that uselessly aggravating their suffering would go beyond 
this purpose.124 As Boothby states, weapons that would cause such suffering ‘exceed the legitimate 
object to be accomplished by States in war. If it exceeds that which is legitimate, it is illegitimate and 
thus unlawful.’125  
 
technology.com/features/featuretaranis-neuron-europe-combat-drone-revolution-4220502/>; Israel 
Aerospace Industries, 'Harop' (IAI, 2018) Accessed 24 June 2020. Available at:<https://www.iai.co.il/p/harop>; 
Noel Sharkey, 'Killer Robots From Russia Without Love' (Forbes, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20181128204229/https://www.forbes.com/sites/noelsharkey/2018/1
1/28/killer-robots-from-russia-without-love/>; Scott Wierzbanowski, 'Collaborative Operations In Denied 
Environment (CODE)' (DARPA, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190430115949/https://www.darpa.mil/program/collaborative-
operations-in-denied-environment>. 
122 Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway) Judgement [1951] ICJ Reports, p.116, p.131; ILC 2018, Conclusion 15 
and accompanying commentary; International Law Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission 
on the Work of its Seventieth session’ (2018) UN Doc. A/73/10, para.66, Commentary to Conclusion 15. 
123 For a medical perspective on this concept from the ill-fated SIrUS project, see Robin M. Coupland and Peter 
Herby, 'Review Of The Legality Of Weapons: A New Approach' (1999) 81 International Review of the Red Cross, 
583; See also McClelland (n.2) 400. 
124 This concept is repeated in Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.78. 
125 Boothby 2016 (n.33) 47. 
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This prohibition is restated in API and is a customary rule in IACs and NIACs (according to the 
ICRC); it deals with those weapons ‘of a nature’,126 rather than those that are ‘calculated to cause’, 
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.127 This is an important distinction. A weapon of a nature 
to cause such prohibited harm would create that damage whenever it is used,128 whereas one that is 
used with the intention to cause such injury would not always do so.129 This is not to say that a weapon 
the result of which is great or horrendous suffering,130 or no chance of survival,131 is necessarily 
banned. One can only judge what is superfluous or unnecessary in comparison to what is necessary.132 
This principle outlaws weapons ‘of a nature’133 to cause such injuries, and a weapon would only fail a 
review on this ground if the harm caused by the weapon goes beyond military necessity for all 
circumstances.134 This is consistent with IHRL, where a distinction can also be made between weapons 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and those that could be used to cause 
such harm.135 A weapon causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering may be in qualitative 
terms (the weapon causes an increased level of suffering to the target(s)), or quantitative (the weapon 
causes harm to more people than those targeted).136  
With regard to AWS, there is nothing about the autonomous nature of such machines that 
would necessarily generate a level of harm unnecessary for all situations. Indeed, whether the 
selection and engagement of targets is done by a system using AI software or by a human being has 
 
126 Art.35, API; ICRC Study, Rule 70. 
127 The discrepancy comes from a difference in translation from the original French versions of the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions, respectively. See Roberts and Guelff (n.87) 77, fn.3; Boothby 2016 (n.33) 48-49; 
However note that ‘calculated to cause’ might be the more accurate translation, see US Manual, para.6.6.1., 
fn.124. 
128 Boothby 2016 (n.33) 49. 
129 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct Of Hostilities Under The Law Of International Armed Conflict (2nd edn, CUP, 
2012) 64. 
130Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins [1996] ICJ Reports, 
p.583 (Hereafter: Higgins Dissenting Opinion) paras.13-18. 
131 Dinstein (n.129) 65. 
132 McClelland (n.2) 400, ’Without determining what is militarily necessary it will not be possible to establish 
whether injuries are superfluous or the suffering unnecessary.’ 
133 Art.35, API; ICRC Study, Rule 70. 
134 See W. Hays Parks, 'Means And Methods Of Warfare' (2006) 38 George Washington International Law 
Review, 517, fn.25. 
135 Murray (n.39) para.7.04. 
136 McClelland (n.2) 407. 
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no bearing on the subsequent damage that will be caused: assuming the same munitions are used, 
the injuries caused would be the same regardless how a decision to fire was made. Thus, the issue of 
whether a weapon is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is, in fact, directly 
related to the munitions used by the system rather that its control processes.  
One could argue that, as with drones used in counterterrorism operations,137 AWS create 
psychological harm to those living in their zones of operation and therefore cause an unnecessary 
level of suffering. Whilst psychological suffering is horrific, this rule is focussed upon prohibiting ‘the 
employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable.’138 It is, therefore, focussed upon physical injury and the psychological implications of using 
AWS do not fit within the understanding of this weapon review criteria.  
Consequently, there is nothing about autonomy in a weapon system that necessarily makes it 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and so, generally, AWS could not fail a weapons 
review under this ground. By adjudging that issues of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering are 
related to the munitions used by an AWS, rather than the system itself, a reviewer can exercise their 
procurement control to ensure that prohibited munitions are not used with AWS. 
 
5.4. Environmental harm 
With regard to the international legal protections of the environment in times of armed 
conflict, those rules that are most relevant to the use of AWS in military operations are contained in 
the 1976 Convention on the prohibition of military or any hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques (ENMOD treaty) and in API. The ENMOD treaty prohibits  
 
137 James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg and Sarah Knuckey, 'Living Under Drones: Death, Injury And Trauma 
To Civilians From US Drone Practices In Pakistan' (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, 
Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, Global Justice Clinic 2012. 
138 St Petersburg Declaration (n.68); also note that there are no references made to psychological harm in the 
commentary to Rule 70 of the ICRC Study, nor in the API commentary regarding the scope of the prohibition, 
Sandoz et al. (n.33) paras.1417-1425. 
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‘military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, longlasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury 
to any other State Party.’139 
 Such a level of harm would require  
‘serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources 
or other assets’ for ‘a period of months’ approximating a season over ‘an area on the scale 
of several hundred square kilometres.’140 
Environmental modification techniques are a method of warfare specifically designed to use 
the natural environment as a weapon.141 In order to enable this, an AWS would need to be specifically 
programmed to perform, or learn, such techniques. Thus, the required specificity of the programming 
indicates that this would not be a general feature of AWS, and, through their exercise of procurement 
control, a reviewer would need to advise manufacturers not to include such programming in a system. 
Therefore, weapon systems with autonomy would generally pass this part of the review. Ensuring that 
such capabilities are not present in an AWS is an exercise of technical control that, through 
technological management, should close the ‘door’ and prevent these unlawful capabilities being 
included in an AWS. 
In terms of the environmental protections in API,142 this relates to prohibiting the use of 
environmentally damaging weapons such as defoliants or pollutants according to the treaty 
negotiations.143 Thus, those weapons that cause ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ environmental 
damage are prohibited by the protocol. Although an almost identical term is used in the ENMOD 
 
139 Art.1, ENMOD Treaty. 
140 ENMOD Treaty Annex, ‘Understandings regarding the Convention’. 
141 US Manual, para.6.10.3, fn.215. 
142 Arts.35(3) and 55, API. 




treaty, 144 the formulation in API is less firm. The API rapporteur suggested that precise agreement on 
defining these terms was impossible, and that the most cogent understanding of the API rules is: 
‘What the article is primarily directed to is thus such damage as would be likely to 
prejudice, over a long term, the continued survival of the civilian population or would risk 
causing it major health problems.’145  
IHRL is consistent with this understanding and can provide additional regulation of weapons 
that may affect the sustainability of food and water, or other objects indispensable for survival, for 
the civilian population.146 
As the API prohibition relates primarily to munitions that have an environmentally damaging 
effect of the prohibited level, this does not affect AWS unless they are equipped with such munitions. 
Even then, it would be the munitions themselves that are unlawful, rather than the AWS. However, 
should a particular model of AWS use a radioactive or carcinogenic substance as part of its propulsion 
system, for example, and there was a particular risk of exposure to such a substance if the AWS was 
damaged, this could give rise to that particular system failing a review. But, this is not related to the 
autonomous nature of AWS and so could not apply to all autonomous systems. 
Thus, in their exercise of procurement control, a reviewer could, if possible, require 
developers to produce an AWS so that it cannot use an environmentally damaging munition. For 
example, the AWS could be programmed not to fire a missile unless a code associated with a pre-
approved type of (non-environmentally harmful) munition was inputted prior to its mission. Where 
this is not possible, a reviewer would need to advise commanders to avoid equipping environmentally 
harmful munitions to an AWS. Ergo, compliance with this rule is dependent upon tactical control, but 
could potentially also involve technical control. Note also that attacks using conventional means that 
 
144 Note the difference between ‘long-term’ in API, and ‘longlasting’ in the ENMOD treaty.  
145 Report of the Rapporteur, cited in Sandoz et al. (n.33) paras.1454; Also note Boothby 2016 (n.33) 83. 
146 Murray (n.39) para.7.10, see also Section 5.1 in the next Chapter. 
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could cause a similarly prohibited level of harm are discussed separately in the next Chapter (Section 
5). 
 
5.5. Of an indiscriminate nature 
The consideration of whether a weapon is of an indiscriminate nature is sometimes thought 
to relate only to the prohibition of such weapons found in API.147 However, it has a much deeper 
history. The API rules prohibiting weapons that cannot be directed at a military objective148 or cannot 
be controlled149 are actually orientated to prohibit weapons that are incapable of being used in 
accordance with the distinction and proportionality targeting principles, respectively.150 Distinction 
prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects.151 For it to be impossible for a weapon to abide 
by this rule, it would need to be so inaccurate that it cannot be relied upon to hit the target it is aimed 
at.152 Weapons that have contravened this part of the prohibition include bombs attached to balloons 
and rockets without guidance systems.153 
Proportionality requires that, if there is incidental harm to civilians to be expected from an 
attack, it is prohibited for it to be excessive in comparison to the military advantage to be gained.154 
For it to be impossible to use a weapon in accordance with this rule, it would need to have 
uncontrollable effects such that there is an inevitability of excessive civilian harm.155 Therefore, the 
minimal military utility associated with such weapons is always outweighed by the incidental harm.156 
 
147 Chengeta (n.64) 94. 
148 Art.51(4)(b), API. 
149 Art.51(4)(c), API. 
150 US Manual, para.6.7; Higgins Dissenting Opinion, para.24; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘The Principle of 
Discrimination in Twenty First Century Warfare’, in Michael N. Schmitt, Essays On Law And War At The Fault 
Lines (TMC Asser Press, 2012) paras.8 and 14; Michael W. Meier, 'Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems 
(LAWS): Conducting A Comprehensive Review' (2016) 30 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 
119, 129. 
151 Arts.48 and 52(2), API; Art.13(2), APII; ICRC Study, Rules 1 and 7. 
152 Art.51(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 12(b). 
153 US Manual, para.6.7.3; Schmitt (n.150) para.8. 
154 Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
155 Art.51(c), API; ICRC Study, Rule 12(c). 
156 US Manual, para.6.7.4 
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Examples of such weapons include communicable diseases,157 tiny incendiary devices tied around the 
necks of bats,158 and anti-tank mines strapped to the back of dogs.159  
At this point, it is important to note that an AWS could be equipped with nuclear weapons. It 
has been suggested that the massive destructive force of nuclear weapons would always make their 
use disproportionate and therefore they are indiscriminate weapons.160 However, it is not impossible 
to imagine that the use of nuclear weapons in a military area without civilian presence could be lawful, 
particularly if low-yield nuclear weapons are used.161 As such, an AWS equipped with nuclear weapons 
would not necessarily be indiscriminate,162 even if the opportunities for lawfully using nuclear 
weapons are very rare. 
A weapon that would always violate the distinction and proportionality rules is prohibited.163 
By preventing such indiscriminate weapons from passing review, a weapons reviewer encourages 
more accurate weapons to be developed. Increased precision allows for force to be applied to the 
exact intended target, and simultaneously reduce incidental civilian harm. Consequently, in this area, 
military and humanitarian concerns converge.164 Further, as IHRL requires the force applied to be the 
minimum that is absolutely necessary, weapons that go beyond this to create disproportionate, and 
therefore indiscriminate, levels of harm are inconsistent with this rule.165 
 One should not, however, view the fact that highly-accurate weapons increase the ability of 
a military force to abide by the distinction and proportionality rules as meaning that less-accurate 
weapons cannot be used in accordance with them. Indeed, weapons should be assessed in terms of 
 
157 US Manual, para.6.7.4; Schmitt (n.150) para.8. 
158 See Greenwood referring to an example provided by the US Navy, cited in US Manual, p.340, fn.151. 
159 Turns (n.45) 235. 
160 Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.92. 
161 See Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.94. 
162 See Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.95. 
163 Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.78. 
164 Sandoz et al. (n.33) para.1958; note also Boothby 2016 (n.33) 60-61, 69; McClelland (n.2) 408. 
165 Murray (n.39) para.7.09. 
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their intended use166 and a weapon that is not very accurate could, for example, still be intended to 
be used against areas of land which become military objectives.167 Thus, it would not be indiscriminate 
or prohibited.168  
Regarding the low threshold for weapons to be discriminate, along with the poor military 
utility of indiscriminate weapons, it suggests that the likelihood of any AWS being inherently 
indiscriminate is very low.169 As Boothby notes, the increasing technological sophistication of precision 
weapons means that this prohibition is increasingly likely to be complied with.170 Robotic weapons are 
often highly accurate, with some claiming up to 100% accuracy, due to being able to provide a platform 
more stable than the human body from which to fire.171 As such, one would expect an AWS to be 
highly accurate and discriminating, and to pass this part of review without difficulty.  
Normally, the consideration of whether a weapon is indiscriminate, is related to the munitions 
used as they create the actual effects in the battlespace.172 However, as AWS will apply algorithms to 
potentially lethal decisions, it seems appropriate to consider the on-board computer in terms of this 
rule. This is because, in terms of direction at a military objective, this prohibition is fundamentally 
about the accuracy of the weapon. With AWS, the accuracy of the system being able to fire a munition 
at its target is already accounted for, but the accuracy of the AWS in determining the target is not. 
This could quite reasonably be considered with the discussion of the distinction targeting rules 
in the next Chapter. But, it is assessed here as target recognition by AWS first needs to be shown to 
be possible and accurate before it can be applied to actual targeting situations. Indeed, it is of 
imperative importance for the reviewer to determine whether the machine can distinguish proposed 
 
166 Michael W. Meier, ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Is It the End of the World as We Know It . . . Or 
Will We Be Just Fine?’ in Winston S. Williams and Christopher M. Ford(eds.), Complex Battlespaces: The Law Of 
Armed Conflict And The Dynamics Of Modern Warfare (OUP, 2019) 306. 
167 US Manual, para.6.7.2. 
168 US Manual, para.6.7.3-6.7.4. 
169 Meier (n.150) 129; Greenwood (n.158). 
170 Boothby 2016 (n.33) 69. 
171 P.W. Singer, Wired For War (Penguin Press 2009) 31. 
172 Boothby 2018 (n.83) 39. 
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(lawful) targets from non-targets173 during testing. In terms of the actual technologies which could be 
used by an AWS to recognise targets, most would appear to need some development before reaching 
maturity, as the following sub-section demonstrates. 
 
5.5.1. Target recognition technologies 
Computer vision algorithms would seem to be the predominant data processing method to 
be used by an AWS as the characteristics that will be recognised by an AWS to indicate a target are 
likely to be similar to those used by human beings. Such technologies can, in some circumstances, 
exceed human abilities. People generally have a 5% error rate in classifying images.174 Machines using 
computer vision have shown error rates of 4.58%.175 These, admittedly impressive, tests were carried 
out under laboratory conditions and not the messy and unstructured real world. Still, these 
technologies are expected to maintain an exponential rate of progress176 and will likely be able to 
replicate their laboratory performance beyond those boundaries in the near future. 
Other methods of sensing data from potential targets could include using nano-robotics to 
sample the metallic content, or ‘metallic footprint’, of objects to determine whether it is made of gun 
metal and therefore a weapon.177 In terms of objects, this method could potentially identify military 
equipment such as artillery pieces or tanks. But, in terms of identifying people, this could only 
 
173 Boothby 2018 (n.83) 39. 
174 Andrej Karpathy, 'What I Learned From Competing Against A Convnet On Imagenet' (Karpathy Github, 
2014) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190914180008/http://karpathy.github.io/2014/09/02/what-
i-learned-from-competing-against-a-convnet-on-imagenet/>. 
175 Ren Wu, et al., 'Deep Image: Scaling Up Image Recognition' (2015) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20171118111440/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.02876v2.pdf>; Alex Hern, 
'Computers Are Now Better Than Humans At Recognising Images' (The Guardian, 2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190523144342/https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/1
3/baidu-minwa-supercomputer-better-than-humans-recognising-images>. 
176 Computing power generally doubles roughly every 18 months. See Gordon Moore, 'Progress In Digital 
Integrated Electronics' (1975) Technical Digest International Electron Devices Meeting, IEEE, 11. This may be 
slowing, Tom Simonite, ' Moore’s Law Is Dead. Now What?' (MIT Technology Review, 2016) Accessed 24 June 
2020. Available at:<https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/05/13/245938/moores-law-is-dead-now-
what/>. 
177 William H. Boothby, Conflict Law: The Influence Of New Weapons Technology, Human Rights And Emerging 
Actors (Asser Press, 2014) 108. 
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differentiate between those who are armed and those who are not. Using such a method to recognise 
enemy fighters, for example, could misidentify those who are armed: for personal protection;178 for 
ceremonial reasons;179 police officers; hunters.180 Further, the development of advanced plastics and 
objects manufactured using nanotechnologies with reduced metal content indicates that they will 
likely be used to build weapons and so this method of identifying arms would likely have limited 
applicability in the future.181 
In terms of identifying civilians directly participating in hostilities (DPH),182 because they do 
not wear a uniform they can usually only be distinguished through their actions. As such, to 
differentiate from someone who is armed for their own protection and someone who is armed to 
directly participate in hostilities, one would need to look at their behaviour (for a discussion of this in 
terms of targeting rules, see Chapter 5, Section 3.2). Some progress has been made toward using AI 
systems to recognise peoples’ intentions and emotions, and proponents suggest could be used to 
identify when an individual is about to engage in an attack.183 If this is possible, it could, potentially, 
be used to identify civilians DPH. However, current attempts at creating technologies for this have so 
far been unsuccessful.184 Consequently, it is presently unforeseeable that an AWS could lawfully use a 
technology to identify a target based upon their emotional state as an indication of their intentions. 
Yet, it may be possible to recognise some civilians DPH based upon objective behavioural 
measures. For example, Ford suggests that an AWS using radar and a spectrograph might be able to 
 
178 AMW Commentary (n.37) Commentary to Rule 12(a), para.3.  
179Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, App no:55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) paras.35-36. 
180Jeroen van den Boogaard, 'Proportionality And Autonomous Weapons Systems' (2016) 2016-17 Amsterdam 
Center for International Law, 15. 
181 Boothby 2014 (n.177) 108, fn.62. 
182 Art.13(3), APII. 
183 SBIR, 'Adversary Behavior Acquisition, Collection, Understanding, And Summarization (ABACUS) Tool' (SBIR, 
2012) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190919095142/https://www.sbir.gov/sbirsearch/detail/398783>.; 
Noah Shachtman, 'Army Tracking Plan: Drones That Never Forget A Face' (Wired, 2011) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20180910175130/https://www.wired.com/2011/09/drones-never-
forget-a-face/>. 
184 Lisa Feldman Barrett, et al., ‘Emotional Expressions Reconsidered: Challenges to Inferring Emotion From 
Human Facial Movements’ (2019) 20 Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 1. 
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detect an individual planting a roadside bomb.185 Other potential examples include: someone in 
possession of explosives in or near a combat zone;186 the presence of an armed individual within a 
restricted area that is well signposted;187 a person not from a friendly force firing weapons in a high-
intensity combat zone;188 or a person who attacks the AWS (see Chapter 5, Section 3.3).189 
Programming these abilities would enable distinction of some civilians DPH in some circumstances. 
However, in areas where celebratory gunfire is common, returning any fire in a combat zone could 
result in an AWS attacking misidentified civilians.190 
Other suggestions for recognising civilians DPH involve individualised targeting akin to 
‘targeted killing’. Where a person has already been adjudged to be a lawful target, an AWS could use 
facial recognition191 or iris scanning192 to identify such persons. On a wider scale, Henderson et al. 
suggest that if biometric data on enemy forces could be stolen, then they could be targeted 
individually using similar methods.193 As with the discussion of target characteristics in the previous 
Chapter, the lawfulness of engaging in this behaviour would depend upon the quality of criteria. 
 
185 Ford (n.117) 438. 
186 Kevin J. Heller, 'One Hell Of A Killing Machine': Signature Strikes And International Law' (2013) 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 89, 95-96. 
187 This is the same concept of operations as the Samsung SGR-A1 sentry gun. See John Pike, 'Samsung Techwin 
SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot' (Global Security, 2011) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190827141904/https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok
/sgr-a1.htm>. 
188 Technologies exist for locating firing weapons, which an AWS could use to identify shooters who would 
distinguish themselves as directly participating. See Raytheon Corporation, 'Boomerang III' (Raytheon, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190820114216/https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/
boomerang>. 
189 Such a person would distinguish themselves as directly participating. See Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal 
Behaviour In Autonomous Robots (CRC Press 2009) 46, 60. Arkin suggests that an AWS could act as ‘bait’ to 
encourage adversaries to fire upon it and distinguish themselves, or fire upon the general direction of 
adversaries to encourage them to return fire thereby distinguishing themselves. 
190 See, for example, Al-Skeini (n.179) paras.35-36. 
191 Shachtman (n.183). 
192 Such technology is now available on smartphones, see Shams, 'List Of All Eye Scanner (Iris, Retina 
Recognition) Smartphones' (Webcusp, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20181122005317/http://webcusp.com/list-of-all-eye-scanner-iris-
retina-recognition-smartphones/>. 
193 Ian S Henderson, Patrick Keane and Josh Liddy, ‘Remote and autonomous warfare systems: precautions in 
attack and individual accountability’ in Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Research Handbook On Remote Warfare 




5.5.2. Simulation, bias, and basic algorithms 
In order to test target recognition capabilities, a reviewer might need to evaluate the 
performance of the system in recognising targets and non-targets in a variety of different situations. 
Setting up physical facsimiles of the intended operating environments could require significant 
investment and time, and so a reviewer might use computer simulations.194 Simulations could be run 
thousands of times so that a statistical assessment of system performance could be seen and 
compared to a desired standard.195 
However, a reviewer might also need to evaluate the simulation software. Weapons reviews 
are already comprehensive enough to test software related to targeting.196 Should weapons systems 
include software that models effects of several potential attacks in order to determine the most 
appropriate,197 this would also need to be tested. 
With the lawful use of AWS being dependent upon correctly functioning software, a reviewer 
would need to be aware of potential biases that could be present in the algorithms.198 If the dataset 
that targeting algorithms were trained on was developed or curated in such a way that it biases the 
results, this could create the potential for sexist or racist effects to be produced through, for example, 
a greater likelihood of recognising a particular type of person as a target.199 Such effects are unlawful 
under LoAC.200 
 
194 Backstrom and Henderson (n.66) 508-509. 
195 Defense Science Board, 'Summer Study On Autonomy' (US Department of Defense, 2016) 29; Meier (n.188) 
309. 
196 UK MoD 2016 (n.46) 4 
197 Defense Science Board (n.195) 33-34; Meier (n.188) 312. 
198 Joni R. Jackson, 'Algorithmic Bias' (2018) 15 Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics, 55. 
199 Noel Sharkey, 'The Impact Of Gender And Race Bias In AI' (Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190721041416/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2018/08/28/impact-gender-race-bias-ai/>. 
200 Common Article 3(1) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; Arts. 9(1), 75(1), and 84(4)(c), API 
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In order to pass review, an AWS would need to display an ability to recognise at least some 
lawful targets reliably.201 The system could then be authorised for missions against targets of the same 
nature which it has previously displayed an ability to recognise.202 This would allow AWS to be lawfully 
used even if target recognition technologies do not reach a high level of sophistication and can only 
be used to identify the most basic of objects, such as the shape of artillery pieces or tanks.203 The 
expected incremental development of AWS indicates that as the technology advances,204 AWS will 
become lawfully capable of recognising more types of targets in different circumstances. Where this 
can be shown during review, the system could be authorised for those types of engagements also. 
In terms of procurement control, a reviewer should ensure that an AWS can be used in 
conformity with the distinction and proportionality principles in order to abide by the prohibition on 
indiscriminate weapons. Through their exercise of technical control, manufacturers can ensure that 
weapons they produce are not inherently indiscriminate by building them so that they are highly 
accurate, recognise only those targets they are supposed to, and do not, as a feature of their use, 
create a level of incidental harm that would be excessive in all circumstances. 
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5.6. The Martens Clause 
The Martens Clause was originally formulated at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.205 It has 
been updated in 1907,206 1949,207 and 1977.208 Today, the version found in API is commonly used when 
referring to the Martens Clause: 
‘In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international 
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience.’209 
The Clause serves two purposes. First, to prevent the assumption that anything not explicitly 
prohibited in API is permitted (particularly where API reflects CIL at the time of adoption).210 Second, 
to ensure that the principles detailed in API apply regardless of future developments in conflict 
situations or technologies.211 Clearly then, due to the lack of specific regulation of AWS, and their 
novelty, the Martens Clause is relevant to AWS. This rule is of particular relevance to Article 36, as it 
could come within the ‘any other rule of international law’ element of that obligation. As such, it could 
be applied during a weapons review. Indeed, the ICRC suggests that states should apply the Martens 
 
205 Preamble, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 
1900). 
206 Preamble, Hague Convention (IV) 1907 (n.93). 
207 Art.64, Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1960) 75 UNTS 31; Art.62, Geneva 
Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the 
armed forces at sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85; Art.142, 
Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135; Art.158, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the protection of civilian 
persons in time of war (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. 
208 Preamble, APII. 
209 Art.1(2), API. 
210 Nuclear Weapons Opinion (n.34) para.84. 
211 Sandoz et al. (n.33) para.55. 
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Clause during their weapons reviews.212 Australia is the only country to publicly acknowledge they do 
so.213 
The Clause is, however, difficult to understand and apply as it has been subject to widely 
differing interpretations. In a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), they argue that AWS contravene 
the ‘principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.’214 However, this is based upon a 
moralistic understanding of humanity,215 rather than a legal one,216 with HRW focussing on how 
empathy and compassion are required in order to treat others humanely.217 Yet, treating others 
humanely and the ‘principles of humanity’ in the Martens Clause are not the same thing.  
The work of Meron218 and Cassese219 suggests that not only are there legal understandings of 
humanity in the Martens Clause (which is different from the principle of humanity that is sometimes 
referred to in LoAC),220 but that relevant case law and documents generally reflect basic LoAC 
provisions of: the rules in Common Article 3;221 the prohibition on targeting civilians;222 the limitation 
on means and methods;223 the prohibition on torture;224 the principle of distinction;225 sparing civilians 
 
212 ICRC (n.39) 17. 
213 Australian UNOG Delegation (n.4) 5. 
214 Art.1(2), API. 
215 Human Rights Watch, 'Heed The Call' (Human Rights Watch, 2018) 19-27. 
216 See Theodor Meron, 'The Martens Clause, Principles Of Humanity, And Dictates Of Public Conscience' 
(2000) 94 The American Journal of International Law, 78; Antonio Cassese, 'The Martens Clause: Half A Loaf Or 
Simply Pie In The Sky?' (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law, 187. 
217 HRW (n.215) 21. 
218 Meron (n.216) 82-83. 
219 Cassese (n.216) 202-208. 
220 Meaning that ‘infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military 
purpose’ is forbidden. US Manual, para.2.3 
221 Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) Merits [1986] ICJ Reports, p.14, para.218; The Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) Judgement [1949] 
ICJ Reports, p.4, 22; United Nations: Secretary-General's Report On Aspects Of Establishing An International 
Tribunal For The Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For Serious Violations Of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed In The Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia (1993) 32 International Legal Materials, 1159, 1191. 
222 Prosecutor v Martić (Trial Judgement) Case No: IT-95-11-T [2007] ICTY, para.13. 
223 Martić (n.222) para.13; Report On The Situation Of Human Rights In Kuwait Under Iraqi Occupation, Walter 
Kälin (Economic and Social Council, 48th Session) 1992 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, para.36 
224 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgement) Case No: IT-95-17/1 [1998] ICTY, para.137; Klinge case (1946), 
Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, Year 1946, 263, and K.W. case (1950), 30 Revue 
de droit penal de criminologie (1949-1950) 562-568, cited in Cassese (n.216) 202-203, 207. 
225 Kälin (n.223) para.36 
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as much as possible;226 the prohibition on belligerent occupiers exercising collective punishment;227 
acts not prohibited not being automatically permitted;228 delineating the degree and types of violence 
that may be used by belligerents.229 Thus, the understanding of ‘humanity’ that HRW suggest not only 
does not have any basis in law, but law itself suggests a completely different conception.  
Further, the HRW report also overemphasises the impact which public opinion can have in 
terms of the Martens Clause and seems to suggest that a general groundswell of public opinion would 
create a legal rule.230 As Meron notes, there is no elaboration in international law as to how public 
conscience should be observed, quantified, or implemented. Further, he reminds us that public 
opinion can easily be swayed under certain circumstances, such as the popularity of anti-Semitism and 
fascism prior to World War II,231 and so should not always be listened to. Furthermore, Greenwood 
argues that ‘public conscience’ is such a vague concept that it is impractical and has garnered little 
support anyway.232 Thus, despite the arguments of HRW, there is no delineated threshold that would 
enable public opinion to outlaw a means or method of warfare and so it cannot function as a legal 
notion. 
Whilst ‘humanity’ in terms of the Martens Clause could be defined as a multi-dimensional 
workable legal concept, it is not applied in practice and nor are the ‘dictates of public conscience’.233 
In the Australian weapons review process, the Martens Clause is used  
 
226 Kälin (n.223) para.36 
227 Rauter case (1949), Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, Year 1949, 541, cited in 
Cassese (n.216) 203-204. 
228 Colombian Constitutional Court Ruling No. C-225/95, 207-208. 
229 The War Office, The Law Of War On Land (HMSO, 1958) para.3. 
230 HRW (n.215) 28-43. 
231 Meron (n.216) 83-85. 
232 Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis’, in: Dieter Fleck and Michael Bothe, The 
Handbook Of Humanitarian Law In Armed Conflicts (1st edn, OUP, 1995) para.129(2). 
233 Note, however, that the ICRC does suggest considering a weapon in terms of the principles of humanity and 
the dictates of public conscience where treaty law is silent. See, ICRC (n.39) 17. 
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‘in the narrow sense of preserving customary international law. That is the Martens clause 
‘prevents the assumption that anything which is not explicitly prohibited by the relevant 
treaties is therefore permitted.’’234 
 Indeed, the Clause is a reminder that customary principles apply even in the absence of 
specific regulation.235 Therefore, if customary law is applied as part of the weapons review framework, 
the Clause is already taken into account when evaluating weapons.236 Still, Dinstein notes that it may 
enable an evolved understanding of customary principles to be applied to weapons assessments.237 
Consequently, as CIL rules have already applied alongside treaty rules in the earlier discussion of the 
weapons review framework, it has already been established that AWS could be used in conformity 
with the Martens Clause. Thus, an exercise of procurement control would enforce the Martens Clause 
by not approving weapons which could not be used in accordance with customary rules. 
 
6. Guidance 
This Chapter has alluded to the concept of a weapon only being authorised for use in certain 
situations. The US238 and Australian239 weapons review policies refer to reviewers providing 
advice/guidance on the use of a weapon once it has passed review.240 Therefore, a reviewer could 
advise that an AWS should only be used in particular circumstances.241 A reviewer could also suggest 
that AWS commanders/operators should carry out particular training, or changes to doctrine for using 
the weapon.242 As such, in evaluating weapons, not only does the reviewer set the boundaries that 
 
234 Australian UNOG Delegation (n.4) 5, citing Sandoz et al. (n.33) para.55; note suggestions for reviewing new 
weapons against customary law separately from the Martens Clause, see Daoust et al. (n.56) 350-351. 
235 William H Boothby, New Technologies And The Law In War And Peace (CUP, 2019) 40; Greenwood (n.232) 
para.129(2); for other interpretations of the Martens Clause, see Sean Watts, 'Regulation-Tolerant Weapons, 
Regulation-Resistant Weapons And The Law Of War' (2015) 91 International Law Studies, 540, 557-558. 
236 Meier (n.166) 306-307. 
237 Dinstein (n.129) 9, citing Greenwood (n.232). 
238 US Manual, para.6.2.2. 
239 Australian UNOG Delegation (n.4) 6. 
240 Also note Boothby 2016 (n.33) 345-346; Boothby 2018 (n.83) 39-40. 
241 Boothby 2018 (n.83) 39-40. 
242 US Manual, para.6.2.2. 
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manufacturers must abide by in order to produce a lawful weapon (see Section 2), they can also place 
requirements onto operators/commanders to ensure lawful use of AWS.243 
For example, a reviewer could require a particular standard of accuracy in target recognition 
to be satisfied that an AWS will recognise lawful targets, or require a manufacturer to include relevant 
safety features such as deactivation processes.244 This safeguard is currently in development.245 A 
reviewer could also require operators/commanders to exercise their human judgement in evaluating 
the proportionality of an intended attack. As the next Chapter demonstrates, this guidance will have 
a significant impact upon how AWS are used. 
In terms of testing, however, an important point to note is that some algorithms produced 
today are so complex that they cannot be understood by human beings. As such, this creates massive 
difficulties for manufacturers, reviewers, and users of systems to actually understand what the system 
will do, and how it uses the algorithms it is programmed with.246 Where a reviewer cannot understand 
or adequately test a weapon, they should not pass it for review as a lack of knowledge about the 
workings of the system would prevent the provision of adequate guidance to commanders and 
operators of AWS. Such knowledge is required for operators to fulfil their legal duties,247 and for the 
exercise of command responsibility.248 Where this information cannot be provided, it could constitute 
 
243 Corn (n.5) 233. 
244 Lewis (n.51); Laurent Orseau and Stuart Armstrong, 'Safely Interruptible Agents.' (2016) Proceedings of the 
32nd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 25-29 June 2016) 68. 
245 Cherry and Korpela (n.203). 
246 See Joshua G. Hughes, 'The Law Of Armed Conflict Issues Created By Programming Automatic Target 
Recognition System Using Deep Learning Methods' (2018) 21 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 99. 
247Marco Sassóli, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions And Legal Issues To Be Clarified' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 308, 324; Ford (n.117) 456. 
248 Command responsibility involves ensuring that subordinates are adequately trained in LoAC. If this standard 
can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to AWS, then this would require a commander to ensure that such systems 
are compliant with relevant international law. See Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Pre-Trial Chamber II) Case No: 
ICC-01/05-01/08-424 [2009] ICC, para.438 
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a state failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 36.249 As such, a reviewer could require 
manufacturers to produce AWS with algorithms that are understandable, or can be explained.250  
Where, however, a system is not found to perform satisfactorily in particular circumstances, 
then reviewers should recommend that an alternative means of warfare is used in such situations.251 
Alternatively, they could suggest certain changes to the functioning of a system that would enable 
legal compliance252 (for example the use of an AWS in a semi-autonomous mode). Where an AWS fails 
to perform the required tasks, it would fail a review. 
 
7. Conclusion 
At the outset of this Chapter, we saw that evaluating AWS using realistic interpretations of 
their capabilities is key to a successful review. Such understanding is also key to knowing if a system 
using machine learning needs re-review. 
We have evaluated AWS in terms of weapons law and determined that there is nothing in the 
autonomous nature of these systems that would cause them to be necessarily unlawful under this 
regime: they are not specifically prohibited, or likely to be so; they do not necessarily cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; they would not necessarily cause a prohibited level of 
environmental harm; they are not inherently indiscriminate; they do not breach the Martens Clause. 
The discussion of prohibited weapons yielded useful suggestions of good practice: that AWS 
should be kept under some level of human control; that when AWS operate beyond direct human 
control, they should be restricted in their autonomous functions in terms of time, space, and effects. 
In addition, the discussion of weapons which are inherently indiscriminate concluded that, in terms of 
 
249 Sassóli (n.247) 324. 
250 Note that Lewis suggests transparency of algorithms is a key aspect of successfully reviewing a system using 
AI. See Lewis (n.51). 
251 Boothby 2018 (n.83) 41. 
252 Boothby 2018 (n.83) 43. 
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AWS, the ability of the system to distinguish targets from non-targets was the deciding factor for 
whether a weapon with autonomy should pass a review on this ground because most munitions these 
days are highly accurate. Indeed, it is the control system that is most relevant to lawful targeting. 
The exercise of procurement control is key to the development and eventual use of AWS, as 
the exercise of this concept should, as Corn notes, make unlawful use of AWS unforeseeable.253 Thus, 
the reviewer, in their guidance, should set boundaries within which an AWS could be used lawfully; 
for this thesis, the implementation of guidance can be seen as creating a layer of procurement control. 
By providing feedback to AWS developers, they enable some undesirable behaviours to be made 
impossible through technological management in an exercise of technical control. Further, if AWS 
users follow their advice on how AWS should be used then they enable and promote the lawful use of 
AWS, and no legal issues should arise. Thus, weapons reviews are a key event for implementing human 
control over AWS in the procurement and technical layers, and for contributing to AWS being 
developed in compliance with the applicable law so as to enable lawful use of AWS under technical 
control. 
Consequently, we can see that current international law rules are sufficient to regulate the 
development of AWS as their real-world application would ensure AWS that pass review cannot be, 
by their nature, unlawful. However, this requires the flexibility of the weapons review framework to 
be used to expand the consideration of inherently indiscriminate weapons from its usual concerns of 
the accuracy and effects of munitions to incorporate looking at the ability of an AWS to distinguish 
targets. It is the ability of the framework to be used flexibly that enables current international law to 
sufficiently regulate AWS as weapons. If the weapons review framework is strictly applied, and the 
autonomous nature of AWS is not adequately evaluated, then current international law would not be 
able to regulate AWS properly and so would be insufficient. 
 
253 Corn (n.5) 233. 
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As such, it is the quality of the review that determines whether AWS are sufficiently regulated 
by weapons law. Therefore, a conclusion of this Chapter that AWS are lawful weapons should not be 
construed as suggesting that all future AWS would be lawful weapons. The next Chapter shows how 




Chapter 5: Applying targeting law to the use of AWS 
 
1. Introduction 
Having applied the legal rules governing weapons to autonomous weapon systems (AWS) and 
determined that they can sufficiently regulate AWS in terms of them being a means of warfare, this 
thesis now turns to consider the efficacy of targeting law rules with regard to the use of AWS. To do 
so, this Chapter demonstrates how the exercise of tactical control within the limitations of technical 
control, and the guidance of procurement control, can enable the lawful use of AWS. 
Targeting is often thought to be the sole preserve of fighters in the battlespace. However, 
according to the US Department of Defense, targeting is ‘The process of selecting and prioritizing 
targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and 
capabilities.’1 As developers populate the database that AWS will use to recognise targets, they are 
clearly involved in the selection of targets within this process. Consequently, targeting law must also 
be considered during the manufacturing stages of an AWS – which is happening with some advanced 
systems using autonomy.2 
It is important to demonstrate the enduring influence of developers that, via programming, 
affects how AWS will perceive and recognise targets.3 Such technical control exists above the tactical 
control exerted through operators/commanders instructing AWS in terms of where, when, and what 
 
1 US Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms (US DOD, 2018)(Hereafter: DoD 
Dictionary) see ‘Targeting’. 
2 Keith Rigby, 'Future Design Drivers For Autonomous Systems Technology' (Royal Aeronautical Society, 
London, 19 July 2017), Rigby, who leads development of the Taranis UAV, stated that parts of Dennis 
Mandsager (ed.), Rules Of Engagement Handbook (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2009) were 
being incorporated into the programming of the Taranis system. 
3 Tim McFarland, 'Autonomous Weapons And Human Control' (Humanitarian Law & Policy, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190719081210/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2018/07/18/autonomous-weapons-and-human-control/>; Brian Handy (ed.), 'Royal Air Force: Aircraft 
And Weapons' (Royal Air Force, 2007) 87; Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, Mapping The 
Development Of Autonomy In Weapon Systems (SIPRI, 2017) 24; Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power And 
Human Reason (WH Freeman, 1976) 260. 
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targets to attack, and which munitions should be used.4 Before a commander can use an AWS to 
perform a task, the developer must build the capability to perform that task into the AWS. Therefore, 
these systems apply the instructions set by the commander/operator according to their 
programming.5 A weapon system that is employed in targeting would have already been through a 
weapons review, and so should only be used within the boundaries set by the reviewer in their 
guidance for using the AWS. Thus, having the recognition of targets under technical control, how the 
AWS will function on each mission under tactical control, and both of these subject to the 
procurement control of a reviewer shows that targeting is a clear example of how AWS operate within 
layers of control. 
The legal rules governing targeting are found in customary international law (CIL),6 treaty law,7 
and case law8 that make up the law of armed conflict (LoAC) and international human rights law (IHRL) 
as is applicable to targeting. Also relevant are the domestic military manuals of states,9 and 
international expert manuals.10 The violation of the legal targeting rules results in responsibility and is 
discussed in the next Chapter. 
 
4 Christopher M. Ford, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Law' (2017) 69 South Carolina Law Review, 
413, 455. 
5 Elliot Winter, 'Autonomous Weapons In Humanitarian Law: Understanding The Technology, Its Compliance 
With The Principle Of Proportionality And The Role Of Utilitarianism' (2018) 6 Groningen Journal of 
International Law, 183, 193. 
6 The CIL rules in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume I: Rules (CUP, 2005)(Hereafter: ICRC study) are used as a guide to the applicable rules, having noted 
the criticisms and overall positive reception of it in Chapter 3.  
7 There are many treaties governing and regulating the conduct of hostilities, for a detailed list see Adam 
Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents On The Laws Of War (3rd edn, OUP, 2004). 
8 See, for example, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Reports, 
p.226. 
9 For example, UK Ministry of Defence, Manual Of The Law Of Armed Conflict (OUP, 2004)(Hereafter: UK 
Manual); US Department of Defense, Law Of War Manual 2015, Updated May 2016 (Office of the General 
Counsel, 2016)(Hereafter: US Manual); Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law Of Armed Conflict 
At The Operational And Tactical Levels (National Defence, 2001); Australian Defence Headquarters, Law Of 
Armed Conflict, ADDP 06.4 (Defence Publishing Service, 2006); Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, Law Of 
Armed Conflict Manual (2013); Jes Rynkeby Knudsen, Military Manual On International Law Relevant To Danish 
Armed Forces In International Operations (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016). 
10 For example, HPCR, 'Manual On International Law Applicable To Air And Missile Warfare' (Harvard University 
2009) (AMW Commentary); Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul (eds), Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The International 
Law Applicable To Cyber Warfare (CUP, 2017)(Hereafter: Tallinn Manual). 
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In Chapter 2, we saw that the autonomous use of AWS during armed conflicts in the near to 
medium-term is likely to be for attacks in communication-denied environments, and in situations of 
combat at super-human intensities. Both of these situations would be instances of active hostilities 
and so LoAC would be the primary legal framework (lex specialis) with IHRL reinforcing its provisions 
as a supplementary legal framework.11 Recall also from Chapter 3 that the human rights jurisdiction 
of states exists where states have de facto control over territory, where state agents exercise control 
or authority over a person, or a state is exercising public powers, and this triggers the application of 
IHRL obligations with regard to the actions of military personnel from that state. In this Chapter, the 
IHRL discussion centres around the substantive obligation under the right to life, although others are 
mentioned where relevant. 
The reinforcement of LoAC rules by IHRL does not necessarily create onerous additional steps 
for a military force engaged in combat, as human rights obligations can be interpreted flexibly in these 
situations. Where there are no serious time constraints regarding the use of AWS, the actions of the 
force deploying them will be subject to close scrutiny.12 Where a fast response is required by AWS 
users, the level of scrutiny will not be as close.13 If an operation includes both pro-active and reactive 
elements, there will be flexibility with regard to those aspects that do not allow for much 
deliberation.14 
If a human rights tribunal examines an attack, the force under investigation will be required 
to explain, and provide evidence of, its rationale for choosing the means and methods used in the 
attack and why others were not selected. Generally, such a question would focus on why less harmful 
means and methods were not used. For example, why use an air strike to achieve a goal when ground 
 
11 For more on this, and situations of ‘Active Hostilities’ in comparison with ‘Security Operations’ (where IHRL 
would be the primary framework with LoAC being a supplementary framework), see, Daragh Murray, 
Practitioners' Guide To Human Rights Law In Armed Conflict (OUP 2016) paras. 4.25-4.71. 
12 Esmukhambetov and Others v Russia, App no:23445/03 (ECtHR, 29 March 2011) para.138; Isayeva v Russia, 
Judgment, App no:57950/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) para.184-200. 
13 Ahmet Ozkan and Others v Turkey, App no:21689/93 (ECtHR, 6 April 2004), paras.296-305. 
14 Murray (n.11) para.5.57. 
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troops could likely achieve the same with less civilian harm.15 With regard to AWS, a force should be 
required to explain, and evidence, why an attack used such a system and why it was deployed in a 
fully-autonomous mode, rather than a semi-autonomous one, and what the level of human oversight 
was and why. This would be particularly relevant to cases where the circumstances at the site of attack 
change after an AWS is launched and the actual level of civilian harm is greater than expected.16 As 
the next Chapter details, violations of IHRL are a matter of state responsibility, but the same conduct 
might breach rules of individual criminal responsibility also. 
 
2. Legal issues of technical and tactical control within procurement control 
With regard to the legal rules relevant to targeting, the following LoAC rules are considered in 
terms of technical and tactical control: distinction;17 the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks;18 the 
rules on environmental protection;19 precautions in attack.20 Although the proportionality principle is 
often discussed in its own right, it is discussed here in terms of its constituent parts in the rules on 
indiscriminate attacks and precautions in attack.21 Further, some of these rules make very similar 
requirements and so there is some overlap between the analysis of them in this Chapter. As IHRL is a 
secondary framework in this discussion, such rules are applied as reinforcement for each of the LoAC 
obligations, but these would only be applicable where the situation is within the human rights 
jurisdiction of a state, subject to derogations. 
 
15 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.148. 
16 Marco Sassóli, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions And Legal Issues To Be Clarified' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 308, 331-332. 
17 Art.48, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 
UNTS 3 (Hereafter: API); Art.13(2), Protocol Additional To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, And 
Relating To The Protection Of Victims Of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (Hereafter: APII); ICRC Study, Rules 1 and 7. 
18 Art.51, API; ICRC Study, Rule 11. 
19 Art.35(3), API; ICRC Study, Rules 43-45. 
20 Art,57, API; ICRC Study, Rules 15-21. 
21 Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), and 57(2)(b), API. 
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The importance of applying these rules to weapons developers is underlined by the fact that 
once target characteristics are inputted into an AWS database,22 any entity matching these criteria 
could be attacked. This, therefore, suggests that such entries should be regularly re-reviewed. Indeed, 
target lists for targeted killing are reconsidered every 60 days.23 Having regular chances to update 
target criteria not only reduces the likelihood that civilians will be misidentified, but also provides the 
benefit of being able to keep up with adversaries who make changes to the exterior of their clothing 
or equipment to increase the camouflage effect. This would require accurate and consistent data 
collection.24 Consequently, the exercise of technical control and inclusion of weapons developers 
within the targeting cycle is not a single occurrence but is a role of continuing participation that is 
subject to targeting rules.25 
Tactical control, on the other hand, revolves around the instructions that a commander or 
operator gives to the AWS about what it should do in each mission. For example, a commander, or 
mission planner, would decide that an AWS should be employed against target(s) A and could function 
autonomously in B time-frame at C location using D weapons (or causing E effects).26 Thus, the 
targeting law regime applies to these decisions as they form the engagement part of hostilities. As we 
saw in Chapter 3, this is reminiscent of beyond-visual-range attacks, particularly with ad hoc targeting 
(i.e. where a target is not present in the AWS database and so, like using a missile or artillery, the 
commander could input coordinates for the AWS to fire munitions at). When deciding to use an AWS 
in autonomous or ad hoc targeting, the commander would need to take all decisions on the basis of 
intelligence that is reasonably available in advance of the mission.27 By evaluating available 
 
22 Handy (n.3) 87; Boulanin and Verbruggen (n.3) 24. 
23 See Cora Currier, 'The Kill Chain: The Lethal Bureaucracy Behind Obama's Drone War' (The Intercept, 2015) 
Accessed 24 June 2020. Available at:<https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-kill-chain/>. 
24 Note the failures in data collection leading to strategic errors during the Vietnam War. See Antoine 
Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare (Columbia University Press, 2009) 155-156. 
25 Such actions would not amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities’ under most definitions, as this is a 
support role, see Section 3.2. 
26 Ford (n.4) 455. 
27 On the importance of intelligence in modern targeting, see Merel A.C. Ekelhof, 'Lifting The Fog Of Targeting: 
"Autonomous Weapons" And Human Control Through The Lens Of Military Targeting' (2018) 71 Naval War 
College Review, 61, 63. 
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intelligence, a commander, and their advisors, can determine what restrictions to place on an AWS so 
that civilians, their property, and other protected entities are safeguarded and applicable legal rules 
are complied with. This may include, where possible, human oversight of the AWS, or use of a semi-
autonomous mode. 
The ability of a commander to use an AWS for targeting, and the ability of a developer to input 
targets into an AWS database, would both be subject to the guidance of a weapons reviewer following 
an assessment of the AWS. By abiding by the boundaries that a reviewer lays out for building and using 
an AWS, developers and commanders/operators should ensure that AWS are legally complaint under 
the weapons and targeting law regimes. This Chapter, therefore, outlines what the guidance of a 
reviewer will likely be with regard to how AWS should be developed and used in ways that enable 
AWS to be used in legally compliant ways under targeting law. 
A key aspect of ensuring AWS can be used lawfully is the exercise of technological 
management.28 As was previously noted in Chapter 3, this is a method of constructing technologies 
whereby undesirable, or unlawful, actions are made impossible for the system to perform 
autonomously. However, the necessity of qualitative analysis in the battlespace requires human 
judgement, and so cannot be technologically managed. Following the guidance of a reviewer should 
result in the lawful development and use of AWS.29 This arguably ‘manages’ the behaviour of AWS 
developers and users by opening or closing certain ‘doors’.30 But, unlike machines, humans can choose 
to go against their guidance for nefarious ends, responsibility for such actions is discussed in the next 
Chapter. The present Chapter now moves to look at the application of legal targeting rules and 
 
28 Roger Brownsword, 'In The Year 2061: From Law To Technological Management' (2015) 7 Law, Innovation 
and Technology, 1; Roger Brownsword, 'Technological Management And The Rule Of Law' (2016) 8 Law, 
Innovation and Technology, 100; Roger Brownsword, ‘What the World Needs Now: Techno-Regulation, Human 
Rights and Human Dignity’ in Roger Brownsword (ed.) Global Governance and the Quest for Justice Volume 4: 
Human Rights (Hart, 2004); see also Lessig’s ‘architecture’ Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 
2006) 61. 
29 Geoffrey Corn, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing The Inevitability Of 'Taking The Man Out Of The 
Loop', in Nehal Bhuta, et al.(eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016) 233. 
30 Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006) 81-82. 
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consider how the exercise of technical, tactical, and procurement control can apply the relevant law 
to AWS so that their use can be sufficiently regulated by preventing the AWS from being used for 




The first rule of targeting is the distinction principle. This applies in both international armed 
conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and is present in both treaty31 and 
customary international law,32 with the International Court of Justice referring to it as a ‘cardinal’ 
principle of LoAC.33 It is re-stated in Additional Protocol I, as: ‘Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.’34 Combatants 
include all members of armed forces, except medical and religious personnel.35 In both IACs and NIACs, 
civilians are protected from attack ‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’36 
The precise meaning of direct participation has created substantial controversy, and is discussed in 
Section 3.2.37 
 
31 Art.48, API; Art.13(3), APII. 
32 ICRC Study, Rule 1, 6 and 7. 
33 Nuclear Weapons Case (n.8) para.78. 
34 Art.48, API. 
35 Art.43(2), API; ICRC Study, Rules 3, 25-28, 30, on medical transports see rule 29, on humanitarian personnel 
see rules 32 and 33. 
36 Art.51(3), API; Art.13(3), APII. 
37 Compare Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance On The Notion Of Direct Participation In Hostilities Under 
International Law (ICRC, 2009) against Michael Schmitt, 'The Interpretive Guidance On The Notion Of Direct 
Participation In Hostilities: A Critical Analysis' (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal, 5; Kenneth Watkin, 
'Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups And The ICRC "Direct Participation In Hostilities" Interpretive 
Guidance' (2010) 42 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics, 641; Bill Boothby, 'And For Such Time As: 
The Time Dimension To Direct Participation In Hostilities' (2010) 42 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 741. 
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The LoAC distinction rules protecting civilians from attack38 are reinforced by IHRL as any 
killing not in compliance with this principle would be an arbitrary deprivation of life.39 The classification 
of individuals or objects as being targetable must be made with ‘properly verified information.’40 IHRL 
suggests that, if suspected violations of the distinction rule and the attendant IHRL obligations were 
investigated, states may be required to provide evidence of target choices being lawful.41 Mere 
assertion that their actions are lawful would be insufficient.42 Further, in evaluating the target 
verification process, all ‘surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control’ 
of the operation could be examined.43 Consequently, not only are LoAC rules relevant to targeting also 
applicable to weapons developers and military personnel through their actions within the targeting 
process, their actions being within the ‘surrounding circumstances’ means that IHRL rules are also 
applicable to them. 
In order to comply with these rules, an AWS would firstly need to be capable of differentiating 
entities that are lawfully targetable, and those that are not. We saw in the previous Chapter that the 
accuracy of target recognition would be examined during the weapons review process (Chapter 4, 
Section 5.5.1). Recognition of an enemy combatant44 in an IAC is enough for the rule to be complied 
with45 and so an AWS that can recognise their uniform would be legally capable of differentiating 
enemy combatants. The same approach can be taken to recognising members of a uniformed 
paramilitary in an IAC,46 or an organised armed group (OAG)47 in a NIAC.48 Such a method of 
 
38 Art.48, API; Art.13(3), API; ICRC Study, Rule 1. 
39 Murray (n.11) paras.5.22-5.28. 
40 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel and others v The Government of Israel and others, Judgment 
(Case no HCJ 769/02) [2005] Israeli High Court of Justice, para.40; Murray (n.11) para.5.62 
41 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.145; Murray (n.11) para.5.62. 
42 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.145; Murray (n.11) para.5.62. 
43 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.138; Murray (n.11) para.5.62. 
44 Combatants are member of the armed forces (other than medical and religious personnel): Art.43(1), API. 
45 Murray (n.11) para.5.35. 
46 Art.43(3), API. 
47 This is the term of art used to designate an armed non-state actor which engages in a conflict. 
48 Although the international law governing NIAC does not create a combatant status based on group 
membership, the consensus view of states allows for targeting on this basis. See, for example, Gloria Gaggioli, 
'Targeting Individuals Belonging To An Armed Group' (2018) 51 Vanderbilt Journal Of Transnational Law, 901. 
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recognition would be lawful as long as the entry in the AWS database reflects a lawful target.49 The 
ability of the system to recognise targets based upon attire is due to an exercise of technical control, 
but the actual decision to do so would come under tactical control of a commander who decides to 
use the AWS against these targets. The ability of the AWS to lawfully perform these actions would 
need to be demonstrated to a reviewer in order for them to allow it under their guidance. 
However, one only needs to watch news footage of a conflict involving armed non-state actors 
to see that any uniform worn by an OAG is often irregular and changeable.50 This clearly demonstrates 
the need to re-review entries in target databases regularly so that autonomous targeting can take 
place against the most up-to-date targets. 
Yet, combat zones are rarely only populated by uniformed adversaries. Civilians are defined 
in targeting rules as ‘persons who are not members of the armed forces.’51 According to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), this is a customary rule in IAC.52 International law is 
ambiguous as to the status of this rule, mutatis mutandis, in NIAC.53 Yet, those expert manuals that 
elaborate on the definition of civilians in NIAC are clear that ‘civilians are all those who are not 
fighters’54 as such, this means anyone ‘who [is not a] members of the State’s armed forces, dissident 
armed forces, or other organised armed groups.’55 Thus, such persons are civilian and are protected 
from attack unless they directly participate in hostilities.56 
 
49 Marco Sassòli, ‘Can autonomous weapon systems respect the principles of distinction, proportionality and 
precaution?’ in ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal And Humanitarian Aspects 
(ICRC, 2014) 41. 
50 See, for example, Simon Tomlinson, 'From The Afghani Robe To Suicide Bomber, How ISIS Differentiates 
Ranks' (Mail Online, 2015) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20170112025556/http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3253113/From-Afghani-robe-suicide-bomber-s-black-uniform-ISIS-differentiates-ranks-various-outfits.html>. 
51 ICRC Study, Rule 5. 
52 Art.50, API 
53 ICRC Study, Rule 5, Summary. 
54 Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H.B. Garraway and Yoram Dinstein, The Manual On The Law Of Non-
International Armed Conflict With Commentary (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006)(Hereafter: 
NIAC Manual) para.1.1.3. 
55 Tallinn Manual, Commentary to Rule 91, para.4. 
56 Art.51(3), API; Art.13(3), APII; ICRC Study, Rule 6 
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In order for an AWS to comply with this rule, it would need to be able to distinguish civilians 
as those who are not engaged in fighting. As we saw in Chapter 2, autonomous systems are subject to 
the closed-world assumption, the result being that anything not recognised as a target is assumed to 
be a non-target.57 This protects civilians as it would be impossible for an AWS to select them as a 
target. This method should also provide the required special protection to humanitarian aid workers58 
and journalists59 who also have civilian status (also note the discussion in the next sub-Section). As 
such, the ‘door’ to attacking these entities is closed through technological management. A weapons 
reviewer would need to be convinced that this does protect civilians in order to allow an AWS to be 
used in areas of civilian presence. 
 
3.1. Recognition of non-combatants and peacekeepers 
The distinction principle is wider and more complicated than just differentiating between 
enemy uniforms and civilians. Medical and religious military personnel have a neutral status.60 They 
are, therefore, non-combatants and protected from attack61 (unless such persons directly participate 
in hostilities, or if medical personnel engage in self-defence).62 However, as medical and religious 
personnel are usually attached to militaries, they often wear the same, or very similar, uniforms to 
combatants.63 An AWS programmed to attack such uniforms on the presumption that all persons 
 
57 Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour In Autonomous Robots (CRC Press, 2009) 63; Alan Backstrom and 
Ian Henderson, 'New Capabilities In Warfare: An Overview Of Contemporary Technological Developments And 
The Associated Legal And Engineering Issues In Article 36 Weapons Reviews' (2012) 94 International Review of 
the Red Cross, 483, 490. 
58 Art.71(2), API; Art.18(2), APII; ICRC Study, Rule 31. 
59 Art.79, API; ICRC Study, Rule 34. 
60 Ipsen (n.62) para.315(4). 
61 They ‘shall be respected and protected under all circumstances.’ Art.IX, Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (adopted 6 July 1906); Art.15(1), API 
62 Art.13(1) and (2), API; Knut Ipsen, ‘Combatants and Non-Combatants’, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook Of 
International Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2013) para,316(b) and (c). 
63 See, for example, British Army, 'Army Medical Services' (British Army, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190907040550/https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-
regiments-and-units/army-medical-services/>. Also note ‘Chaplains wear the uniforms of the British Army and 
accompany their soldiers wherever they go... They are non-combatants and do not bear arms.’ British Army, 




wearing them are enemy combatants would unlawfully target these non-combatants. Distinguishing 
non-combatant personnel would require an AWS to recognise small changes to their uniform, such as 
altered epaulettes. This would likely be difficult, especially from a distance. 
As such, where intelligence suggests that non-combatant personnel could be present at the 
site of the attack, operators could use the AWS in a semi-autonomous mode where there are 
communication-links (this would also allow lawful targeting where non-combatant personnel directly 
participate in hostilities). Otherwise, a commander could choose not to launch the attack in order to 
facilitate their protection. However, where it is imperative that the attack takes place, a commander 
could proceed with it but incorporate any expected presence of non-combatant personnel into a 
proportionality calculation (see Section 6.5). As non-combatants have a neutral status, any harm 
toward them would not provide military advantage and so this would become incidental harm.64 
Similar steps may be required to protect peacekeepers, who are subject to special protection 
under CIL,65 if they wear a uniform that is similar to adversaries. Yet, if the uniform of the peacekeepers 
is not included in the target database of the AWS, then they should be protected in the same way as 
civilians. Alternatively, the uniform of peacekeepers, along with the Red Cross worn by humanitarian 
aid workers,66 or other symbols designating protected persons could be inputted into a no-strike list 
that could be uploaded to the AWS by a commander. A no-strike list is a database of objects in the 
area of operations that it is prohibited to attack due to legal or policy constraints.67 Whatever method 
is taken, a weapons reviewer would need to be satisfied that these persons could be respected and 
protected by the programming of the AWS developer, and the decisions of a commander, in order to 




64 Literature is scant on how to deal with medical and religious personnel present at the site of attack. See, for 
example, Ipsen (n.62) section III; ICRC Study, Rule 3; Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct Of Hostilities Under The Law 
Of International Armed Conflict (2nd edn, CUP, 2012) 163-165. 
65 ICRC Study, Rule 33. 
66 Art.38, API; Art.12, APII; ICRC Study, Rules 31. 
67 DoD Dictionary, see ‘No-Strike List’. 
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to keep abreast of what specially protected persons are present in the battlespace to ensure that 
adversaries do not abuse these protections by placing protected symbols on their own uniforms to 
avoid being attacked.68 
 
3.2. Civilians directly participating in hostilities 
The threshold at which civilians can be said to be directly participating in hostilities (DPH) and 
therefore subject to attack is a legal grey area. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions refers to 
‘active’ participation, and the Additional Protocols refer to ‘direct’ participation,69 as does the ICRC 
interpretation of CIL.70 The terms are interchangeable.71 International law offers no further 
clarification upon what constitutes such participation. Unlike uniformed adversaries, there may be no 
outward indication that an individual of civilian appearance is actually a fighter. Thus, the analysis in 
this Chapter must turn to the state practices of identifying such participation in order to determine if 
AWS could do so. 
One commonly cited interpretation of DPH is offered by the ICRC. It focuses on the behaviours 
of individuals and their links to the armed conflict.72 Another regularly discussed approach is provided 
by Watkin and focusses upon the roles that civilians DPH would be playing during combat.73 Both of 
these interpretations require a qualitative assessment of what the individuals in question would 
actually be doing. As this thesis has noted previously, it is currently unforeseeable74 that AWS will be 
able to perform qualitative analysis.75 Even if it does become possible for machines to perform 
 
68 Art.85(f), API. 
69 Art.51(3), API; Art.13(3), APII. 
70 ICRC Study, Rule 6. 
71 NIAC Manual, para.1.1.2(2). 
72 Melzer (n.37) 46. 
73 Watkin (n.37) 691. 
74 William Boothby, ‘How Far Will the Law Allow Unmanned Targeting to Go?’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law And The Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 56-57. 
75 Some research suggests that software is capable of some very simple ‘abstract’ thinking, but this is nowhere 
near the level of understanding DPH. See David G.T. Barrett, et al., 'Measuring Abstract Reasoning In Neural 




qualitative analysis,76 there are so many relevant factors that the resultant software may be impossibly 
complex to programme.77 
Yet, under other interpretations, DPH can be assessed by focussing upon the acts carried out 
by such individuals. They include: 
‘attacking the enemy, his materiel or facilities; sabotaging enemy installations; acting as 
members of a gun crew or artillery spotters; delivering ammunition; or gathering military 
intelligence in the area of hostilities.’78 
Comprehending these specific behaviours would require qualitative analysis. However, the 
focus on actions constituting direct participation allows this Chapter, as the previous Chapter 
discussed, to note that some activities do objectively amount to DPH as there is no reason for a civilian 
to perform such an action in the circumstances. For example, handling explosives in a combat zone79 
or planting a roadside bomb.80 If an AWS were equipped with the correct sampling technologies, and 
the correct data entries were present in its memory, a civilian DPH could be lawfully recognised in this 
manner. Whether a commander would be able to use an AWS to distinguish civilians DPH in this way 
would be dependent firstly upon the developers being able to programme this functionality, and the 
reviewer accepting that it can accurately and reliably identify such persons. However, the specific 
behaviours that the AWS uses to recognise civilians DPH would be a decision for the commander as 
the nefarious implication of certain behaviours may only become apparent at the time they occur. For 
example, using the handling of explosives to identify civilians DPH would be impractical in areas near 
a legitimate munitions factory. 
 
76 See Noel E. Sharkey, 'The Evitability Of Autonomous Robot Warfare' (2012) 94 International Review of the 
Red Cross, 787, 789. 
77 Noel Sharkey, 'Why Robots Should Not Be Delegated With The Decision To Kill' (2017) 29 Connection 
Science, 177, 179. 
78 NIAC Manual, para.1.1.2(3). 
79 This could potentially be sampled using nano-robotics; Kevin J. Heller, 'One Hell Of A Killing Machine': 
Signature Strikes And International Law' (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 89, 95-96. 
80 Ford (n.4) 438. 
157 
 
In the earlier discussion of OAG members, it was noted that they often wear irregular and 
changeable uniforms. In a fast-moving armed conflict, OAG members or civilians DPH may temporarily 
adopt identifying insignia. If this is not included in the AWS database, then, if an AWS is built in such a 
way, a commander could, potentially, instruct an AWS to attack persons displaying the insignia or 
other characteristic. In order for this to happen, a reviewer would need to outline in their guidance 
the types of insignia that would be acceptable and how they should be recognised. This would merge 
technical and tactical control in the hands of the commander, such that they are responsible for their 
choice in instructing an AWS to attack a target, but also for their inputting of insignia being accurate. 
In all other ways, this would be the same as autonomous targeting. 
Alternatively, a commander could use an AWS for ad hoc attacks against people in irregular, 
or no, uniform, for example instructing an AWS to attack a particular set of coordinates where they 
know there is a concentration of OAG members or civilians DPH. Where autonomous attack is 
impossible, ad hoc attacks could become a common method for attacking civilians DPH or members 
of an OAG.81 
Ad hoc attacks would need to be based upon sufficient intelligence82 that a commander can 
assess the lawful targetability of a proposed target and employ an AWS. Where intelligence is lacking, 
an assessment of the target in situ would need to be made. This would require the AWS to be used in 
a semi-autonomous mode during targeting. If, however, communications are impossible, then the 
lawfulness of the attack could not be determined, and the attack would need to take place by other 
means, or not at all.83 
 
 
81 Backstrom and Henderson (n.57) 492. 
82 See Ekelhof (n.353) 63. 
83 Note that Boothby makes this same point in relation to the precautionary duties to verify targets and 
choosing means and methods of combat to reduce civilian harm. William H Boothby, Weapons And The Law Of 




There is one method of distinguishing targets that would appear to be definitive in both IACs 
and NIACs for both combatants, members of OAGs, and civilians DPH. People who attack an AWS 
would be distinguishing themselves as carrying out a hostile act, to which the AWS could respond in 
‘self-defence’. Indeed, Arkin notes that an AWS used in this way could function as ‘bait’ to lure out 
attackers.84  
Use of the concept of ‘self-defence’ in armed conflict has generated some significant recent 
debate.85 However, as a legal basis for launching an attack, it relates to acts to defend of oneself (or 
one’s unit) from aggressive acts unconnected to the armed conflict (for example being attacked by an 
angry farmer who is protecting their crops).86 Indeed, LoAC itself only conceptualises ‘attacks’ as 
meaning ’acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.’87 Thus, acts of ‘self-
defence’ during active hostilities are regulated under LoAC targeting law. Unlike self-defence in 
criminal law, LoAC contains no rules that would de-legitimise an act of ‘self-defence’ following an 
intentional provocation of an adversary causing them to launch an initial attack.88 Consequently, it 
would not seem unlawful under targeting law to use an AWS as ‘bait’ in order to identify adversaries.  
For an AWS to be able to respond to an attack, its attackers would need to be accurately 
recognised. Technologies exist whereby the direction of an attacker can be accurately determined.89 
An AWS could use this to lawfully distinguish their attackers. The ability of the AWS to do this would 
 
84 Arkin (n.57) 46, 60.  
85 See, for example, Elvina Pothelet and Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Symposium on Soldier Self-Defense and International 
Law: Highlighting and Framing the Issue’ (Opinio Juris, 2019) Archived: 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191228220402/http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/29/symposium-on-soldier-
self-defense-and-international-law-highlighting-and-framing-the-issue%ef%bb%bf/> 
86 Adil Ahmad Haque, ‘Soldier Self-Defense Symposium: Self-Defense vs. Combatant Immunity’ (Opinio Juris, 
2019) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190504063321/http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/02/soldier-
self-defense-symposium-self-defense-vs-combatant-immunity/> 
87 Art.49(1), API. 
88 Hans F.R. Bodens Hosang, ‘Force protection, unit self-defence and personal self-defence’ in Dieter Fleck and 
Terry D. Gill, The Handbook of International Law of Military Operation (2nd edn., OUP, 2015) para.24.17. 





need to be programmed by the developers and shown to be an accurate and reliable method of 
distinguishing adversaries for a reviewer to authorise such an approach. 
 
3.4. Distinction of objects 
In terms of targeting objects, they must be a military objective in order to be targetable. This 
means the object must, by its  
‘nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.’90  
The four types of military objective are defined as: objects of a military nature are objectives 
at all times, such as warships or military aircraft (unless they are repurposed as medical transport/care 
facilities for example);91 the location of an object can transform it into a military objective if it obstructs  
‘the field of fire for attack on another valid military objective,’92 or it is ‘a site that must 
be seized or because it is important to prevent the enemy from seizing it, or otherwise 
because it is a matter of forcing the enemy to retreat from it’;93 
 in terms of use and purpose, ‘[t]he criterion of 'purpose' is concerned with the intended future 
use of an object, while that of 'use' is concerned with its present function.’94 For example, a civilian 
hotel or factory might be, or about to be, converted into accommodation for troops, or an armament 
 
90 Art.52(2), API; ICRC Study, Rule 8. 
91 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., 'The Principal Of The Military Objective In The Law Of Armed Conflict' (1998) 72 
International Law Studies,197, 208-209; Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), 
Commentary On The Additional Protocols Of 8 June 1977 To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) para.2020. 
92 Robertson (n.91) 208-209; Sandoz et al. (n.91) para.2021. 
93 Sandoz et al. (n.91) para.2021. 
94 Sandoz et a. (n.91) para.2022. 
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factory, respectively.95 As such, their future purpose or present use following conversion may make 
them a military objective.  
Objects of a military nature are always objectives, and so as long as an AWS could accurately 
and reliable recognise them in accordance with a reviewer’s guidance, such use of AWS in targeting 
would comply with this rule. However, making an assessment as to whether an object has become a 
military objective due to its location, use, or purpose requires contemporaneous qualitative 
judgements. This can only be assessed by the commander,96 ‘in the circumstances ruling at the time’. 
Objects that become military objectives due to their location, use, or purpose, are fundamentally 
civilian and may only be attacked ‘for such time as they are military objectives’ according to the 
customary rule suggested by the ICRC for both IACs and NIACs.97 
In the opinion of Jachec-Neale, military advantage with regard to neutralising military 
objectives98 is ‘an expected contribution to the success of military operations.’99 The UK manual also 
stresses that the status of a military objective must be tested by asking the question ‘does it make an 
effective contribution to military action?’100 This decision, and therefore the choice of whether the 
relevant objects become military objectives, is an exercise of tactical control and would need to be 
made during mission planning.101 
The use of an AWS in a semi-autonomous mode would allow such decisions to be made at the 
moment of attack. But, where there are no communication links, and fully-autonomous modes must 
be used, intelligence about the target must be evaluated in advance of the mission. Only where the 
intelligence allows for an object to be categorised as a military objective, the destruction of which 
 
95 Sandoz et al. (n.91) para.2022; Robertson (n.91) 209. 
96 Backstrom and Henderson (n.57) 492 
97 ICRC Study, Rule 10.  
98 Note that this is different to military advantage with regard to proportionality, see Section 6.5. 
99 Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, The Concept Of Military Objectives In International Law And Targeting Practice 
(Routledge, 2015) 116. 
100 UK Manual, para.5.4.5. 
101 Backstrom and Henderson (n.57) 492. 
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offers a military advantage at the time of attack, may it be lawfully attacked. Where this is not possible, 
the attack could not lawfully take place. Such a decision is an exercise of tactical control within the 
guidelines of procurement control. 
As with defining civilians, the definition of civilian objects is also in the negative: ‘civilian 
objects are all those which are not military objectives.’102 This is a customary rule in both IAC and NIAC 
according to the ICRC,103 and is also present in treaty rules for IAC,104 and NIAC.105 Thus, any object not 
defined as a military objective would need to be treated as civilian by the AWS. By not including them 
in the target database of an AWS, they would be protected to the extent possible under technical 
control by closing the ‘door’. By not subjecting them to ad hoc targeting, they would be protected as 
far as possible under tactical control. Both of these guidelines should be included in a reviewer’s 
guidance. 
Such a method of distinguishing civilian objects would also provide the required protection to 
specially protected objects. Such objects are: cultural objects and places of worship; 106 works or 
installations containing dangerous forces;107 objects of a humanitarian nature;108 specially protected 
zones;109 demilitarised zones;110 non-defended localities.111  
 
102 ICRC Study, Rule 9. 
103 ICRC Study, Rule 9, Summary. 
104 Art.52(1), API. 
105 Art.2(7), Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices to, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may 
be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III) (adopted 10 
October 1980 entered into force 2 December 1983) 1342 UNTS 137 (Hereafter: CCW). 
106 Art.53, API; Art.16, APII; Second Protocol to The Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (adopted 26 March 1999, entered into force 9 March 2004) 2253 UNTS 
172 (Hereafter: Cultural Property Convention PII); ICRC Study, Rules 38, 39, 40. 
107 Art.56, API; Art.15, APII; ICRC Study, Rule 42. 
108 Art.70(4), API; Art.18(2), APII; ICRC Study, Rule 32. 
109 Art.23, Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1960) 75 UNTS 31 (Hereafter: GCI); 
Art.14, para.1, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (adopted 12 
August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Hereafter: GC IV); ICRC Study, Rule 35. 
110 Art.85(3)(d), API; ICRC Study, Rule 36. 
111 Arts.59(1) and 85(3)(d), API; Art.3, Update Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (adopted 25 May 1993, updated 7 July 2009) UNSC Res.1877; ICRC Study, Rule 37. 
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We noted above that some objects of a military nature, battleships for instance, may be 
repurposed as medical facilities (i.e. hospital ships). If the shape of an object is programmed as a key 
criterion for target recognition by an AWS, this could result in unlawful targeting as the shape would 
remain the same. To provide the required protection, symbols such as the Red Cross could be 
programmed into a no-strike list and inputted into the AWS as representing a prohibited target by the 
commander or developer.112 Other symbols, such as those denoting religious buildings could be 
similarly programmed. However, as with humanitarian aid workers mentioned above, commanders 
would need to keep updated on what specially protected objects are present in the battlespace to 
ensure that adversaries do not abuse these protections by placing protected symbols on their own 
equipment to avoid being attacked.113 
However, where specially protected objects become military objectives through their use or 
purpose114 at the relevant time,115 they could only be attacked using an AWS through ad hoc targeting 
as they would not be recognisable by an AWS acting autonomously. Any attack against cultural 
property that has become a military objective requires special care,116 and any attack against a work 
or installation containing a dangerous force requires every necessary and due precaution to be 
taken.117 The onus for exercising that care, or taking those precautions, lies with the commander. This 
would include instructing an AWS to engage in attacks despite the presence of a protective symbol – 
the obvious risks that this could pose to other protected objects would require such use of 
autonomous targeting to be very tightly restricted. These requirements should be included in the 
relevant guidance. 
 
112 Art.38, API; Art.12, APII; ICRC Study, Rules 29, 30, 32. 
113 Art.85(f), API. 
114 Art.52(2), API; ICRC Study, Rules 8 and 10; Art.4(2) Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (adopted 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956) 249 UNTS 215; Art.6, 
Cultural Property Convention PII. 
115 ICRC Study, Rule 10. 
116 During hostilities, ‘special protection’ is functionally the same as ‘ordinary protection’. See UK Manual, 
para.5.26.4 fn. 123. 
117 UK Government, 'Statement On Ratification Of Additional Protocol I' (2002) para.(n); French Government, 
'Statement On Ratification Of Additional Protocol I' (2001) para.15; ICRC Study, Rule 42. 
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IHRL reinforces the LoAC rules protecting civilian objects during armed conflict.118 In terms of 
the right to property, any interference with an individual’s enjoyment of this right would need to be 
necessary and proportionate and in pursuit of a legitimate aim.119 The aims of an operation can only 
be assessed at the time, and the responsibility for executing such an assessment resides with the 
commander. As with IHRL rules regulating the targeting of individuals, states would need to evidence 
their target choices as being lawful.120 
 
3.5. The doubt rules 
Attackers must be confident that the targets they have chosen are lawful. The doubt rules are 
found in API, and state that, in relation to targeting persons ‘[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a 
civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian’121 and, in relation to targeting objects ‘[i]n case 
of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, 
a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, 
it shall be presumed not to be so used.’122 IHRL reinforces these provisions by requiring that target 
choices are made upon ‘well based information’.123 
These treaty rules apply in IAC, but there is no similar treaty rule for application in NIAC. This 
is because combatant status only applies in IACs,124 and the rules relating to doubt as to this status; in 
NIACs, civilians DPH are, by definition, civilians and any doubt would relate to whether their activities 
amounted to DPH.125 
 
118 Arts.48 and 52(2), API; Art.13(1), APII; ICRC Study, Rule 7. 
119 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.174; Murray (n.11) para.5.44. 
120 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.145; Murray (n.11) para.5.62. 
121 Art.50, API. 
122 Art.52(3), API. 
123 PCATI v Israel (n.40) para.40; Murray (n.11) para.5.62. 
124 Murray (n.11) para.5.37. 
125 Tallinn Manual, Commentary to Rule 95, para.5. 
164 
 
 With regard to the customary character of these rules, the ICRC suggests that there is a doubt 
rule in relation to targeting persons in IAC, but that there is insufficient state practice to suggest a 
similarly applicable customary rule in NIAC – although they also submit that it would ‘seem justified’ 
to apply the customary IAC rule, mutatis mutandis, in NIACs.126 With regard to targeting objects, The 
ICRC found no customary doubt rules applicable in IAC or NIAC, but note that careful assessments 
must be made and that ‘[i]t cannot be automatically assumed that any object which appears dubious 
may be subject to lawful attack.’127  
The rules of doubt are of particular importance to AWS, as they relate directly to what level 
of mathematical probability is acceptable for a target to be ‘recognised’. When an autonomous system 
recognises an entity from its database, it must compare its sensor readings to the expected target 
characteristics in its memory. Some manufacturers of weapons with autonomy are aiming for 100% 
accuracy in their sensor identification.128 Such a high level of accuracy may not be needed. Reviewers 
and commanders would need to determine a level of probability that reflects the doubt rules, above 
which an entity can be said to have been identified as a target, and below which they would be 
assumed to be a civilian.129 
The precise doubt threshold is undefined in international law. Current conceptions of it are at 
a human standard.130 The UK manual suggests that potential targets should only ‘be given the benefit 
of the doubt and treated as a civilian’ where ‘substantial doubt’ remains following an assessment of 
all information available at the time.131 Further, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia has suggested that the doubt rule from API relating to human targets132 should be assessed 
 
126 ICRC Study, Rules 6 on Situations of doubt as to the character of a person. 
127 ICRC Study, Rules 10 on Situations of doubt as to the character of an object. 
128 Rigby (n.2) According to this lecture, BAE systems are aiming for 100% accuracy in positively identifying 
enemy vehicles within a 10m2 area from 10km away. 
129 Alexander Bolt, ‘The Use of Autonomous Weapons and the Role of the Legal Adviser’ in Dan Saxon (ed.), 
International Humanitarian Law And The Changing Technology Of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 131-133; 
Backstrom and Henderson (n.57) 494-495. 
130 See Sassòli (n.16) 319. 
131 UK Manual, para.5.3.4. 
132 Art.50(1), API. 
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in terms of whether a reasonable person, in the circumstances at the time, ‘could not have believed 
that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant.’133 
However, the doubt threshold could be re-conceptualised for AWS with a minimum level of 
acceptable doubt programmed into the AWS. Kruipy suggests that AWS would need to be able to 
recognise military objectives with 99.9% accuracy.134 Yet, Schmitt and Thurnher,135 along with Ford,136 
have suggested that any algorithmic application of the doubt rule should be set at the level of a 
reasonable human in the same battlespace.137 As such, a reviewer could determine a minimum level 
of acceptable doubt and advise developers to programme this into the system. Further, they could 
provide a commander with a range of circumstances in which the doubt level could be altered above 
this. Ultimately, the decision regarding the level of doubt chosen would fall to the commander. 
 
3.6. Protecting those hors de combat 
A key aspect for complying with the distinction principle is the protection of those hors de 
combat. People with hors de combat status are those who are: in the power of an adverse Party; have 
clearly expressed an intention to surrender; have been rendered unconscious or are otherwise 
incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore are incapable of defending themselves.138 Such 
persons may not be made the object of attack, as LoAC prohibits a denial of quarter.139 IHRL reinforces 
this as any killing not in accordance with LoAC would be an arbitrary deprivation of life.140 
 
133 Prosecutor v Galić (Trial Judgement) Case No: IT-98-29-T [2003] ICTY, para.55. 
134 Tetyana Kruipy, 'Of Souls, Spirits and Ghosts: Transposing The Application Of The Rules Of Targeting To 
Lethal Autonomous Robots' (2015) 16 Melbourne Journal of International Law 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190703191648/https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file
/0011/1586819/16106Krupiy2.pdf>. 
135 Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, '"Out Of The Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems And The Law 
Of Armed Conflict' (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal, 262-265. 
136 Ford (n.4) 442. 
137 Sassòli (n.16) 319. 
138 Art.41(2), API; ICRC Study, Rule 47. 
139 Arts.40, 41(1), API; Art.4, APII; Common Article 3(1) to the GCs; ICRC Study Rules 46 and 47. 
140 Murray (n.11) paras.5.22-5.28, 5.167. 
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However, the protection offered by hors de combat status only exists provided that such 
persons abstain from any hostile act and do not attempt to escape.141 This is a treaty rule in both 
IACs142 and NIACs,143 and, according to the ICRC, is a customary rule in both IACs and NIACs.144 
In terms of those in the power of an adverse party, this is primarily related to those in prisoner 
of war camps or similar installations.145 Although most camps would be outside of combat zones,146 
one cannot predict that fighting will avoid the location of a camp. Still, the location of such objects 
should be communicated to other parties to the conflict,147 and could be added to a no-strike list by a 
commander. Updating an AWS with this database would facilitate compliance with the rule by a 
commander exercising their tactical control. This would be needed where, for example, an adverse 
military installation is converted into a prison camp, as an AWS would still recognise the installation 
as a target. 
With regard to adversaries who express an intention to surrender, developers could play a 
role in protecting these people by inputting notions of capitulation, such as a ‘hands up, don’t shoot’ 
gesture,148 or a white flag as an expression of a desire to communicate.149 Algorithms could then be 
written so that no attack takes place in that location at that time once the relevant observation is 
made.150 In such a situation, adversaries would be surrendering to an AWS. 
 
141 Art.41(2), API; ICRC Study, Rule 47. 
142 Art.41(2), API. 
143 Common Article 3(1) to the GCs; Art.4, APII. 
144 ICRC Study, Rule 47. 
145 Arts.41(2)(a) and 44(1), API. 
146 Art.19, Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (adopted 12 August 1949, 
entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Hereafter: GC III); Art.83, GC IV; ICRC Study, Rule 121. 
147 Art.23, GC III; Art.83, GC IV 
148 This is reportedly possible with the Samsung SGR-A1 sentry gun system John Pike, 'Samsung Techwin SGR-
A1 Sentry Guard Robot' (Global Security, 2011) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190827141904/https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok
/sgr-a1.htm>. 
149 Russell Buchan, ‘The Rule of Surrender in International Humanitarian Law’ (2018) 51(1) Israel Law Review, 
3, 20-21. 
150 Corn suggests that such a capability would be essential in AWS. See Geoffrey Corn, 'Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Managing The Inevitability Of 'Taking The Man Out Of The Loop', in Nehal Bhuta, et al.(eds), 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016) 231. 
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Surrender to an uninhabited system is not entirely unheard of,151 but does create difficulties 
in terms of prisoner arrest and evacuation (unless, of course, AWS hardware and software develops 
to the point of being able to do this). The most obvious solution would be for an AWS to alert 
commanders to the situation who could then deploy ground troops to deal with the prisoners. But, as 
Van Den Boogaard points out, how long would a surrendering adversary need to wait until human 
forces can capture them? Would an AWS resume targeting once the adversary becomes too tired to 
hold their hands aloft?152 In this situation, it would appear that reverting to a semi-autonomous mode 
would be beneficial whilst also notifying surrendered adversaries they are protected from attack 
unless they re-engage in hostile acts or try to escape.153 
The position under LoAC that prisoners must be cared for154 is reinforced by IHRL as the state 
must provide care where they are able to do so.155 Prisoners come under the authority and control of 
a state force and therefore their jurisdiction.156 The position of vulnerability and subordination that 
prisoners are in must be taken into account.157 Whilst applicable rights could be ‘divided and tailored’ 
in this context,158 the capturing state would be responsible for enabling prisoner’s enjoyment of their 
rights to food, water, health, life, and freedom from torture.159 
 
151 During the Gulf War, several Iraqi troops surrendered to a UAV. See Smithsonian, 'Pioneer RQ-2A UAV' 
(National Air and Space Museum, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190721075225/https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-
objects/pioneer-rq-2a-uav>. 
152 Jeroen van den Boogaard, 'Proportionality And Autonomous Weapons Systems' (2016) 2016-17 Amsterdam 
Center for International Law 13. 
153 Art.41(2)(c), API; ICRC Study, Rule 47, ‘Loss of protection’. 
154 Art.41, API. 
155Rouse v Philippines, Comm No. 1089/2002 (HRComm, 25 July 2005) UN Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/1089/2002, 
para.7.8; Keenan (n.157) para.91; General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health Food (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22nd Session) 2000 UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (Hereafter: CESCR GC.14), para. 36; In Osman v United Kingdom, App no:87/1997/871/1083 
(ECtHR, 28 October 1998), para.116, it was held that authorities must do ‘all that could be reasonably expected 
of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life’. 
156 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, App no:55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para.137; Issa and Others v Turkey, App 
no:31821/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004) para.71. 
157 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v Paraguay, Judgment (IACtHR, 2 September 2004) para.152; also see Keenan 
v United Kingdom, App no:27229/95 (ECtHR, 3 April 2001) para.91. 
158 Al-Skeini (n.156) para.137; Murray (n.11) para.5.110. 
159 Arts.11 and 12, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3; Keenan (n.157) paras.89, 111; Murray (n.11) para.5.110. 
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The caring for prisoners who surrender to an AWS may be possible where their surrender 
occurred near to ground forces of the AWS-deploying state. However, as AWS are likely to be 
operating in hostile and communication-denied environments, this presents a parallel with 
commandos operating behind enemy lines who may capture adversaries but are not in a position to 
arrest and evacuate them. API states that in such ‘unusual conditions of combat’, that prisoners ‘shall 
be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety.’160 The UK manual 
suggests that where prisoners are released far from their own lines, they should be left with provisions 
and means to return to safety (map, compass, etc.).161 Thus, where a commander determines that 
such a situation could happen, then an AWS could be equipped with a survival pack that could be left 
with any temporary prisoners.162 Such direct provision would comply with IHRL as the prisoners would 
be provided with the means to realise their rights.163 
Alternatively, the location and condition of those hors de combat through surrender could be 
reported to a third party humanitarian organisation, so that care may be provided or facilitated.164 
Programming this capability would come under technical control but the decision-making to authorise 
such measures would come under tactical control. A reviewer would need to be convinced of the 
ability of an AWS to do all of this before allowing it in their guidance. 
In the case of those incapacitated by wounds or sickness, it would be difficult to programme 
injuries or incapacitation into an AWS database so that they could be recognised, and especially 
difficult for software to recognise that an injury or sickness is incapacitating. As such, unless highly-
 
160 Art.41(3), API. 
161 UK Manual, para.5.8.1. 
162 For example, Google X is developing delivery UAVs for providing emergency medical supplies following 
disasters. See X, 'Wing' (X, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190824034745/https://x.company/projects/wing/>. 
163 General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29th 
Session) 2003 UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Hereafter: CESCR GC.15), para. 25; See also General Comment No. 12: 
The Right to Adequate Food (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20th Session) 1999 UN 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (Hereafter: CESCR GC.12), para. 15; UK Manual, para.5.8.1; Murray (n.11) para.5.111 
164 Murray (n.11) pg.145, fn.214. 
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advanced systems could recognise these characteristics,165 then there does not appear to be a solution 
under technical control. Therefore, where possible, operators could monitor AWS engagements and 
suspend attacks where there is a risk of attacking those incapacitated.166 Thus, responsibility for 
compliance with this rule would come under tactical control. 
Additionally, the protection of those hors de combat extends to those parachuting from 
aircraft in distress,167 but not to paratroopers.168 As such, the ideal solution would seem to be for AWS 
to be programmed not to target parachutists unless authorised by a commander who expects airborne 
troops in the battlespace. Further, the protection of those parachuting in distress is forfeited if they 
engage in hostilities.169 As such, operators could monitor and authorise engagements against such 
persons, where possible. 
Our discussion of those hors de combat so far has only referred to ideal situations where an 
AWS could be used in semi-autonomous modes or prevented from firing due to technological fixes. 
However, where it is not an ideal situation, such persons might be attacked unbeknownst to the AWS 
operators/commanders. Under API this is not always unlawful: ‘A person who is recognized or who, in 
the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.’ 
As such, compliance with this rule is based upon what attackers are capable of recognising in the 
prevailing circumstances at the time. The Air and Missile Warfare Manual recommends a ‘reasonable 
attacker’ standard170 and suggests that unless a person indicates ‘an intention to surrender in a way 
that the [attacker] can perceive and understand,’171 then an ‘attack may lawfully be conducted because 
 
165 Note that medical diagnosis systems are ever advancing. See Nicola Davis, ‘AI equal with human experts in 
medical diagnosis, study finds’ (The Guardian, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20191003063322/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/se
p/24/ai-equal-with-human-experts-in-medical-diagnosis-study-finds>. 
166 AMW Commentary, Rule 15(b), paras.5 and 6. 
167 Art.42, API; ICRC Study, Rule 48. 
168 Art.42(3), API. 
169 UK LoAC Manual (n.9) para.5.7; ICRC Study, Rule 48, Interpretation. 
170 AMW Commentary, Rule 15(b), para.6. 
171 AMW Commentary, Rule 15(b), para.5. 
170 
 
the desire to surrender has not been effectively communicated’.172 This would also apply to those 
suffering from wounds or sickness.173 
In such a situation, deploying an AWS with no ability to recognise any type of person hors de 
combat could technically comply with the rule as there would be no circumstances where the system 
could recognise such persons. However, this would not account for the choice that a commander 
might have over the types (or modes) of systems they could employ.174 For example, if an AWS in a 
semi-autonomous mode could perform the mission and protect those hors de combat, but fully-
autonomous targeting took place and did not protect such persons, then the rule would seem to have 
been broken. However, if an AWS were operating fully-autonomously and no other system could have 
been employed on the mission, or no other system could have recognised those hors de combat, then 
the rule would seem to be complied with. 
Further, it is unclear in law how commanders should deal with attacks which might cause 
incidental harm to those hors de combat. Literature suggests that commanders are under a duty to 
respect and protect such enemy personnel and therefore they should only be subject to unavoidable 
incidental harm.175 With regard to AWS, it would seem appropriate to operationalise this in the same 
way as dealing with other people who may be hors de combat. Due to the necessary contextual 
knowledge required for complying with the hors de combat rules, the guidance of a reviewer would 
only be able to re-state the law and provide options for a commander to carry out as the circumstances 
require. As such, compliance with this rule is very much within the exercise of tactical control. 
 
 
172 AMW Commentary, Rule 15(b), para.5. 
173 AMW Commentary, Rule 15(b), para.6. 
174 See Section 6.4. 




4. Prohibition on indiscriminate attacks 
The prohibition on indiscriminate attacks applies in IACs and NIACs through treaty law176 and 
CIL, according to the ICRC.177 Complying with these prohibitions is an area where technological 
management can have a great impact through making it impossible to perform some aspects of 
indiscriminate attacks. Thus, technical control can play a large role in abiding by these rules, alongside 
tactical control. A reviewer would need to be convinced of such abilities before authorising them, 
however. Each type of indiscriminate attack is now considered in turn. 
Firstly, regarding the prohibition of attacks against objects that are not a specific military 
objective,178 this can be prevented by only programming military objectives as targets into the AWS 
database in the same way that enables compliance with distinction: any object not programmed into 
the memory of an AWS as a target could not be selected as a target (the closed world-assumption).179 
This would protect civilian objects from autonomous attack. However, with ad hoc targeting, 
compliance with this rule would be dependent upon the target being deemed a military objective by 
a commander. Thus, compliance with the rule would also require AWS users to only use this mode of 
functioning against lawful targets. Such a capability would need to be approved by a reviewer. 
In terms of the prohibitions against employing means and methods that cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective, 180 or cannot be limited,181 we saw in Chapter 4 (Section 5.5) that AWS 
in and of themselves would not constitute such weapons and the developers could also prevent some 
inherently indiscriminate munitions being used by an AWS. This is not something that should be 
abused under tactical control as there is no obvious reason to enable a system to be equipped with 
inaccurate or uncontrollable munitions or used in an uncontrollable way. As such, compliance with 
this rule would normally be assured at the manufacturing stage, but commanders would also need to 
 
176 Art.51(4)-(6), API; Art.13(2), APII. 
177 ICRC Study, Rules 11 and 12. 
178 Art.51(4)(a), API; ICRC Study, Rule 12(a). 
179 Arkin (n.57) 63. 
180 Art.51(4)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 12(b). 
181 Art.51(4)(c), API; ICRC Study, Rule 12(c). 
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ensure they only use discriminate munitions with AWS. This would also need to be authorised in a 
reviewer’s guidance. 
Attacks that treat multiple separated objects as a single objective in areas of civilian presence 
are prohibited,182 unless the military objectives are not sufficiently spaced out as to allow individual 
targeting.183 As such, a reviewer could require AWS to be produced in such a way that these attacks 
are prevented through technological management. But, they could give responsibility to a commander 
to turn off this function where the objectives are not sufficiently spaced out in accordance with the 
exception to the rule. 
With regard to the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks due to being disproportionate, once 
a determination is made that an attack would create an excessive level of civilian harm in comparison 
to the expected military advantage184 and the attack is cancelled, the prohibition would be complied 
with. It may be possible for an AWS to perform some of the proportionality calculation, as Section 6.5 
discusses below. Where the system calculates a disproportionate level of incidental harm and is 
programmed to stop attacking, that would seem to comply with the rule. 
Finally, the prohibition on reprisals against civilians and the civilian population would be 
prevented under technical control as such persons would not be inputted to the AWS target 




182 Art.51(5)(a), API; ICRC Study, Rule 13. 
183 ICRC Study, Rule 13, Interpretation. 
184 Art.51(5)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
185 Art.51(6), API; ICRC Study, Rules 145-148. 
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5. Prohibition on environmental harm 
In terms of protecting the environment,186 the last Chapter noted the application of these 
rules with regard to environmentally damaging weapons.187 But, these rules also prohibit conventional 
attacks that cause the same level of prohibited harm.188 Whilst there are treaty provisions for the 
application of this rule in IACs,189 there are no similar provisions for NIACs. Further, according to the 
ICRC, this rule has a customary character in relation to IACs, but there is no fully-formed rule for 
NIACs.190 The United States is seen as a persistent objector to the customary provision, and so this 
customary rule does not apply to them.191 Plus, the UK and France are persistent objectors to the 
customary rule with regard to nuclear weapons.192 
 
5.1. Environmental protection under the ENMOD Treaty 
Conventional attacks that create environmental modification techniques and cause 
‘widespread, longlasting or severe effects’ on the natural environment193 are unlawful. Such 
techniques are those that deliberately manipulate ‘the dynamics, composition or structure of the 
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.’ Attacks against 
environmentally sensitive objects could create such a result. For example, bombing a volcano, or area 
of tectonic activity, and initiating an eruption or earthquake might create the prohibited level of 
environmental harm.194 A reviewer would need to state in their guidance that AWS should not be used 
 
186 Environmental protection has also been referred to, in a wider sense, as being an ‘essential interest’ of 
states by the ICJ. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) Judgement [1997] ICJ Reports, p.7, 
para.53. 
187 Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques 
(adopted 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 October 1978) 1108 UNTS 151 (Hereafter: ENMOD Treaty); 
Arts.35(3) and 55, API; Sandoz et al. (n.91) paras.1443, 1450; US Manual, para.6.17. 
188 Art.1, ENMOD Treaty; Arts.35(3) and 55, API. 
189 Art.1, ENMOD Treaty; Arts.35(3) and 55, API. 
190 ICRC Study, Rule 45. 
191 ICRC Study, Rule 45, Summary. 
192 ICRC Study, Rule 45, Summary. 
193 Art.1, ENMOD Treaty. 
194 ENMOD Treaty Annex, ‘Understanding relating to Article II’; AMW Commentary, Section M. Para.4. 
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for these activities. Such objects should not be included in an AWS database and so could not be 
attacked autonomously. This would be the responsibility of developers. Any use of ad hoc targeting 
for such nefarious purposes would be the responsibility of the commander. 
 
5.2. Environmental protection under Additional Protocol I 
The environmental protection rules in API prohibit attacks creating environmental harm that 
is ‘widespread, long-term and severe’.195 For example, attacks on super-tankers,196 or oil refineries,197 
where the effects would cause ‘such damage as would be likely to prejudice, over a long term, the 
continued survival of the civilian population or would risk causing it major health problems’198 are 
prohibited. Where environmentally sensitive targets are absent from the AWS database, they would 
be protected from autonomous attack via the closed-world assumption. However, attacks near such 
objects might cause unintended consequences. For example, flaming debris from an attack near an oil 
refinery might cause a fire. Commanders should take care to minimise risks toward such objects. 
Abiding by this rule is also relevant to procurement control as a reviewer’s guidance would need to 
outline how a developer or commander can enable compliance with the legal rule. 
With regard to the prohibited level of harm, IHRL can assist in defining this whilst also 
reinforcing the LoAC rules on environmental protection. As Murray suggests,199 actions that would 
affect the enjoyment, by the civilian population, of their rights to food, water,200 and health,201 would 
constitute such a level of unlawful damage. Further, acts that interfere with these rights may also 
 
195 Arts.35(3) and 55, API. 
196 Boothby (n.83) 84. 
197 Murray (n.11) p.150, fn.257. 
198 Report of the Rapporteur, cited in Sandoz et al. (n.91) para.1454; Also note Boothby (n.83) 83. 
199 Murray (n.11) para.5.129. 
200 CESCR GC.15, para. 12(b); CESCR GC.12, para. 8; CESCR GC.14, para. 43. 
201 CESCR GC.14, para. 15. 
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contravene the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, which 
applies in IACs and NIACs under both treaty and customary law.202 
Such objects include ‘foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.’203 However, attacking such 
objects in an IAC is not unlawful if it is the only source of sustenance for, or supports military actions 
of, an adverse party, as long as the civilian population is not left without adequate food and water.204 
Whether such an attack would be lawful requires contemporaneous decision-making by a 
commander, and is therefore within tactical control. The ability of an AWS to be used in such an attack 
would be subject to procurement control. 
 
6. Precautions in attack 
In terms of the targeting rules that constitute precautions in attack, some aspects can be dealt 
with by making certain unlawful behaviours impossible through technological management. Due to 
the complexities of modern battlespaces, however, many aspects also require the simultaneous 
exercise of tactical control. The exercise of both technical and tactical control here would be subject 
to procurement control. 
 
6.1. The level of responsibility 
The precautionary rules contained in API are addressed directly to ‘those who plan or decide 
upon an attack’.205 This could be interpreted as relating purely to commanders, yet, as this thesis has 
argued previously, weapons developers have an enduring impact upon the function of autonomous 
 
202 Art.54, API; Art.14, APII; ICRC Study, Rules 53-55. 
203 Art.54(2), API; Art.14, APII; ICRC Study, Rule 54, Definition of objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population. 
204 Art.54(3), API; ICRC Study, Rule 54, Exceptions – This exception does not likely apply in NIACs. 
205 Art.57(2)(a), API. 
176 
 
systems that they produce. The UK Manual correctly notes that API is silent as to the level of 
responsibility where this duty applies, and so should be applied to all those with ‘discretion in the way 
the attack is carried out.’206 To Boothby, this would include: 
‘[p]lanners of automated or autonomous missions, […] all those involved in the 
preparation of the mission, the programming of the automated or autonomous software, 
the review of available information, the prescribing of the areas that are to be searched 
and of the times when such searches are to take place, the setting of the target 
identification criteria for the weapon control software and so on.’207  
As such, with AWS, the developers, the commanders, the operators, and the commander’s 
staff would all be seen as people who ‘plan or decide upon an attack’. Thus, the precautionary 
decisions cross both technical and tactical control, and also include those who support tactical control. 
Ultimately, however, the decision to launch an attack resides with the commander who would be 
legally responsible for ensuring that precautionary measures taken are appropriate. 
 
6.2. Constant care 
The first rule of the precautionary principle requires that constant care is taken during military 
operations to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. This is a treaty rule applicable 
in IACs,208 and although there is no explicit treaty rule applicable in NIACs, a similar duty is implied in 
Additional Protocol II.209 A customary formulation of the rule is, according to the ICRC, applicable in 
both IACs and NIACs.210 As to what actually constitutes ‘constant care’, the API commentary suggests 
that this supplements the distinction rule,211 and that ‘[i]t is quite clear that by respecting this 
 
206 UK Manual, para.5.32.9. 
207 Boothby (n.83) 254. 
208 Art.57(1), API. 
209 Art.13(1), APII; ICRC Study, Rule 15, Non-international armed conflicts. 
210 ICRC Study, Rule 15. 
211 Art.48, API. 
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obligation the Parties to the conflict will spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.’212 
By using AWS in such a way as to comply with the distinction principle as outlined above, this rule 
would be complied with.213 
The constant care requirement is reinforced when IHRL applies, as such obligations require 
constant battlefield monitoring.214 This is to ensure that only the minimum necessary number of 
attacks take place to sufficiently neutralise a target215 (note also that this is reflective of the humanity 
principle in LoAC).216 For instance, during autonomous targeting, where an enemy tank is damaged to 
the point that an AWS can no longer recognise it as a tank, this would seem to abide by this 
requirement. With regard to semi-autonomous targeting, an operator could cancel any further attacks 
once they judge that the target has been neutralised. Where ad hoc attacks take place in 
communication-denied environments, an operator would have no means to halt AWS attacks, and so 
the AWS might need to be restricted to engaging in single attacks against each target so that an 
unnecessary level of force is avoided. This would also prevent any further attacks against persons who 
are hors de combat through injuries sustained in the opening salvo of the attack.217 
 
6.3. Target verification 
With regard to the treaty218 and customary219 requirement in IACs and NIACs to ‘do everything 
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not 
 
212 Sandoz et al. (n.91) para.2191; Note however, that the AMW manual determines that care is taken once the 
precautionary duties are performed, see AMW Commentary, Rule 32. 
213 Note, however, that some consideration as been given to AWS and constant care with regard to ‘non-
critical functions’ Chris Jenks and Rain Liivoja, 'Machine Autonomy And The Constant Care Obligation' 
(Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190703080751/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2018/12/11/machine-autonomy-constant-care-obligation/>. 
214 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, App nos:57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 
2005) para.194; Murray (n.11) para.5.81 
215 See Isayeva and others (n.214) para.194 
216 UK Manual, para. 2.4-2.4.2. 
217 Art.41(2)(c), API; ICRC Study, Rule 47 (c). 
218 Art.57(2)(a)(i), API; Art.7, Cultural Property Convention PII. 
219 ICRC Study, Rule 16. 
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subject to special protection but are military objectives’,220 this has relevance to both autonomous and 
ad hoc targeting. As such, all those who ‘decide upon an attack’ are required to take feasible measures 
to ensure that the object of attack is a military objective. Feasible measures are those that are 
‘practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including 
humanitarian and military considerations.’221 Thus, the requirement is not absolute, but provides 
flexibility to the situation at hand.222 Such considerations might include assessment of the effects of 
the proposed precautions on: completion of the mission; the risk to one’s own forces; the 
humanitarian situation; costs of time and resources; the foreclosure on alternative courses of 
action.223 Where precautionary measures create operational or tactical risks, or do not provide 
humanitarian benefit, they are not required.224 The effect of considering risk to AWS in terms of one’s 
own forces has a much lower impact as these systems can only be subject to physical risk as equipment 
rather than as a person. 
In terms of using AWS, target verification could constitute ensuring that during autonomous 
targeting, the system contains the expected targets in its database, and its sensors are calibrated 
correctly for recognising them. In terms of ad hoc targeting, this would likely require evaluating the 
most up-to-date intelligence available to ensure that the intended target is indeed a military objective. 
As such, compliance with this rule is dependent upon both technical and tactical control being 
compliant with the legal rules outlined in a reviewer’s guidance. 
IHRL reinforces the requirement to verify targets, by requiring that appropriate care is taken 
to identify them.225 This involves careful consideration of the facts and, where it is necessary and 
 
220 Art.57(2)(a)(i), API. 
221 Art.3(10), Amended Protocol II to the CCW. 
222 This is also reflected in UK Statement On Ratification Of API (n.59) para. (c), and Canadian Government, 
Statement On Ratification Of API (1990) (Standard for decision-making). 
223 US Manual, para.5.3.3.2. 
224 US Manual, para.5.3.3.2. 
225 Kerimova and Others v Russia, App nos:17170/04, 20792/04, 22448/04, 23360/ 04, 5681/05, and 5684/05 




feasible, supplementary investigation to clarify the relevant circumstances.226 Such additional 
measures may include: collecting further information regarding the targetability of the proposed 
target; the prevailing circumstances; the likelihood of an attack; the presence of civilians.227 Equally, 
in situations of targeted killing, it will be important to verify the identity of a specific individual, and 
the activities of the individual(s).228 
Additionally, IHRL requires that the presence of civilians in the battlespace should be 
communicated to all personnel in the vicinity.229 Thus, an AWS should be updated with the number 
and location of civilians prior to missions so that the system can use this information in calculating 
how to perform certain protective measures. For example, intelligence gathered in daytime might 
suggest that a large number of civilians are resident in a particular area, an AWS launched at night 
when these civilians are asleep at home would not be able to recognise these people in their houses 
and protect them. As such, the number and location of civilians could be inputted into the AWS so 
that it engages in operations on the assumption that the previously detected number of civilians are 
already present. Further, where an AWS collects intelligence during a mission, this could be 
communicated to its commander during, or after, the mission, as is practicable, in order that planning 
for other missions can be updated. 
Additional target verification measurers might be needed where the situation at the site of 
attack has changed substantially between intelligence being received and the attack taking place, such 
that the status of the target cannot be assessed. For example, forward-deployed troops might need 
to observe a target to prevent misidentification of civilians.230 Or, an AWS could be used in a semi-
autonomous mode. In communication-denied environments this would not be possible, and so a 
commander would need to rely upon intelligence reports to ensure the correct target is chosen. If 
 
226 Khatsiyeva (n.225) paras.136-137. 
227 Murray (n.11) para.5.60, fn.104. 
228 Murray (n.11) para.5.60, fn.104. 
229 Isayeva (n.12) paras.186-187; Murray (n.11) para.5.61. 
230 Isayeva and others (n.214) paras.188-189; Murray (n.11) para.5.61. 
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these are lacking, and a commander could not be sure that their attack would abide by targeting rules 
then it could not lawfully take place. In summary, whilst developers do play a role in complying with 
the target verification rule for those targets in the AWS database, abiding by it in the actual execution 
of attacks is mostly an exercise of tactical control, in accordance with any additional measures outlined 
in a reviewer’s guidance.  
 
6.4. Precautions in the choice of means and methods 
In terms of taking feasible precautions to choose means and methods of warfare that reduce 
incidental civilian harm, this is a treaty231 and customary obligation in IACs and NIACs.232 Developers 
can play a role in abiding by this rule through building AWS such that they cannot use munitions with 
uncontrollable effects, for example. Yet, compliance with this rule also requires that to use lawful 
means at their disposal in the correct way too. An overview of factors that a commander ought to 
consider should be included in a reviewer’s guidance. 
The choice of means and methods, as limited by the military circumstances, relates to choices 
about what weapons are to be used, and how they should be employed. This is a process sometimes 
called ‘weaponeering’.233 It involves choosing, amongst other factors, the most appropriate: forms of 
weapon guidance or control; timing of attack; method of attack, such as using air or ground systems; 
fusing arrangements.234 These are all germane to targeting using conventional and autonomous 
means. However, the most relevant choices to the autonomous nature of AWS are the restrictions on 
the time, space, and effects within which the system can apply decisions autonomously.235 By deciding 
upon the limits of these dimensions, a commander creates an area within which they delegate the 
 
231 Art.57(2)(a)(ii), API; Art.7, Cultural Property Convention PII. 
232 ICRC Study, Rule 17. 
233 For more on this, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 'No-Strike And The Collateral Damage Estimation 
Methodology (CJCSI 3160.01A)' (US Joint Staffs, 2012) pgs.D-A-20 – D-A-23; Gregory McNeal, 'Targeted Killing 
And Accountability' (2014) 102 The Georgetown Law Journal,681, 748-750. 
234 William H. Boothby, The Law Of Targeting (OUP, 2012) 124. 
235 Note that Ford suggests these three forms of restrictions could constitute a form of control (n.4) 457-458. 
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selection and engagement of targets to the AWS. In military parlance, this is known as a ‘Kill-Box’.236 
This is potentially the most important part of tactical control, as it is only within these restrictions that 
the AWS can function autonomously, and the choices about AWS within each level of control will 
actually manifest. As such, this is the crucial moment where legal targeting rules will either be 
complied with or not, and whether legal responsibility for violating those rules is generated. 
IHRL reinforces this LoAC obligation by requiring that operations be planned ‘so as to 
minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force,’237 and to ‘avoid or minimise, to the 
greatest extent possible, the risk of a loss of life, both for persons at whom the measures were directed 
and for civilians.’238 As such, by choosing a site and time of attack where civilian presence will be 
minimised, and choosing munitions that can achieve the aims of the mission whilst lessening 
unnecessary force, these requirements should be complied with. Such actions would also abide by the 
duty to choose means in light of the potential for incidental damage.239 Decisions on methods to be 
used in a mission should be made contemporaneously, so as to ensure that the most appropriate level 
of autonomy is used, as judged in the circumstances prevailing at the time.240 Further, if munitions are 
to be used within a populated area, the presence of military objectives must be demonstrated.241 As 
we saw in Chapter 3, in order to exert sufficient control over an AWS, commanders could not deploy 
an AWS in a populated area in the hope that the system would find a target but must already know 
their intended target to be present, and that it could be attacked within the time, space, and effects 
restrictions they place upon AWS.242 
 
236 See James W MacGregor, 'Bringing The Box Into Doctrine: Joint Doctrine And The Kill Box' (US Army School 
of Advanced Military Studies, 2004) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20191007163710/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a429320.p
df>. 
237 Isayeva and others (n.214) para.171; Isayeva (n.12) para.175; Murray (n.11) para.5.66. 
238 Kerimova (n.225) para.248; Murray (n.11) para.5.66. 
239 Isayeva (n.12) paras.189; Murray (n.11) para.5.66. 
240 Khamzayev and Others v Russia, App no:1503/02 (ECtHR, 3 May 2011) para.179; Kerimova (n.225) para.247; 
Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.148; Murray (n.11) para.5.66. 
241 Esmukhambetov (n.12) para.148; Murray (n.11) para.5.66. 
242 Ford (n.4) 457-458. 
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When a commander decides how to employ an AWS, they must also consider the potential 
actions of their adversaries.243 For example, knowing that an attack by AWS is incoming, a nefarious 
adversary might position their matériel near to civilian objects, or use human shields, in order to 
prevent attacks. Where this is a possibility, commanders should be sensitive to this risk and instruct 
their AWS to avoid weapons release near concentrations of civilians, unless military necessity makes 
this absolutely unavoidable.244 As such, whilst weapons developers can prevent the use of prohibited 
means of warfare by an AWS, it is the responsibility of the reviewer to outline how an AWS could be 
used in accordance with this rule, and is the responsibility of the commander to actually ensure 
compliance. 
 
6.5. Precautions as to the proportionality of an attack 
As with disproportionate attacks that are prohibited as indiscriminate attacks (Section 4),245 
an AWS would need to be programmed such that when it calculates an attack is disproportionate, it 
could not progress to engage the target. This process would comply with the similar treaty and 
customary precautionary requirements to cancel or suspend an attack where it becomes apparent 
that it would be disproportionate.246 This treaty rule also prohibits attacks where it becomes apparent 
that the target is civilian or is specially protected.247 
In terms of the requirements to refrain from launching attacks that are expected to be 
disproportionate, 248 and the duty to cancel or suspend attacks where it becomes apparent that the 
attack will be disproportionate, 249 these form the basis of the proportionality principle which in its 
 
243 Ergi v Turkey, Judgment (App no:66/1997/850/1057, 28 July 1998) ECtHR, paras.79-80; This extends the 
precaution against the effects of attacks through not placing military objectives within or near densely 
populated areas, Art.58(b), API; Murray (n.11) para.5.66. 
244 On military necessity, see UK Manual, paras.2.2-2.3. 
245 Art.51(5)(b), API. 
246 Art.57(2)(b), API; Art.7, Cultural Property Convention PII; ICRC Study, Rule 19. 
247 Art.57(2)(b). 
248 Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
249 Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
183 
 
treaty form only applies to IAC, but applies to both forms of conflict under CIL250 This is a balancing of 
military advantage expected from the destruction required to achieve military goals against the 
incidental harm caused to civilians, the civilian population, and civilian objects.251 Where this 
incidental harm becomes excessive in comparison to the military advantage that is expected to be 
gained, such attacks become disproportionate. They are, therefore, indiscriminate and prohibited.252 
It is important to note, however, that IHRL has its own understanding of ‘proportionality’ that, 
in relation to lethality, refers to a use of force being proportionate to protect life253 (including the lives 
of targets).254 Yet, this Chapter discusses the conception of proportionality in LoAC. Where IHRL is used 
to inform the understanding of LoAC proportionality, this will allow greater latitude for any victims to 
seek redress, which increases the scrutiny of governmental forces. This is particularly in cases where 
a state may be required evidence decisions255 such as how a target was chosen, the military values 
attributed to military objectives, and any civilian harm that was anticipated.256 
LoAC proportionality should be evaluated in terms of the whole attack.257 So, for example, if 
multiple units assault an enemy command centre, proportionality should be considered in terms of 
the whole attack and not in terms of each unit involved. Or, if one attack is launched in order to divert 
enemy forces from the main attack, this diversion should be considered within the frame of reference 
of the main attack.258 IHRL reinforces this position, as it requires the context of an operation to be 
considered as a whole.259 As such, where an AWS is the sole method of attack, proportionality will be 
 
250 Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
251 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Proportionality In The Conduct Of Hostilities (Chatham House, 2018) para.24. 
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considered in isolation. Where an AWS is just one part of a larger attack, it will be considered on the 
wider level. 
There is some discussion in international law literature as to whether proportionality should 
be evaluated on the tactical, operational, or strategic level, or all three.260 A multi-level decision would 
be beyond the capacity of an AWS, but the data it collects on its missions could inform wider 
considerations of proportionality.261 During situations of combat at superhuman intensity, a constant 
communication link could allow this information to be regularly transmitted and levels of acceptable 
incidental harm could be continually updated.262 However, when an AWS is used in a communication-
denied environment, it would need to be updated with proportionality information as close as 
practicable to the attack beginning. This would be the same situation with beyond-visual-range attacks 
and so would seem a reasonable position for AWS to match. 
LoAC does not define ‘military advantage’ for the purposes of proportionality. According to 
the Air and Missile Warfare Manual, military advantage with regard to proportionality is that which 
‘directly enhances friendly military operations or hinders those of the enemy.’263 This should be 
conceptualised as relating only to military operations in the contemporaneous context of the attack,264 
and not wider political goals.265 The anticipated military advantage must be ‘concrete and direct.’266 
This can be interpreted fairly broadly.267 But, the expected advantages should be ‘substantial and 
 
260 Van Den Boogaard (n.152) pgs.28. 
261 Van Den Boogaard (n.152) 28-30. 
262 Marguiles suggests this as part of his idea of ‘dynamic diligence’. This conceptualizes having many 
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(n.267) 15-20. 
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relatively close, and […] long term [advantages] should be disregarded.’268 Thus, perfect prediction is 
not required, but an assessment should include real and quantifiable anticipated benefits, that are 
likely to occur,269 rather than speculative ones.270  
With regard to incidental harm, the treaty and customary rules state that this includes ‘loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.’271 Experts are 
divided as to whether mental and physical illnesses caused by attacks can be considered as incidental 
harm.272 Further, economic losses can only be seen as supplemental incidental harm.273 In terms of 
viewing civilian displacement as ‘harm’, LoAC is unclear.274 But, IHRL does suggest that displacement 
emanating from the destruction of property should be considered in this half of the proportionality 
calculation.275 As such, civilian displacement would only be relevant to proportionality during a mission 
within the human rights jurisdiction of the attacking state. 
Additional IHRL concerns about property and environmental rights can also be included under 
incidental harm. In terms of civilian property, commanders should consider whether an attack will 
interfere with the right to respect for the home,276 whether an object is essential to the survival of the 
civilian population,277 and whether an object has particular cultural significance.278 With regard to the 
environment, any damage to this should be included in the conception of incidental harm in order to 
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fulfil respect for it.279 IHRL requires that both immediate and long-term environmental damage should 
be considered in terms of incidental harm,280 as should the impact of this damage on civilians.281 
Further, with regard to secondary impacts of an attack and whether they should be considered 
in a proportionality calculation, LoAC targeting rules are silent as to whether ‘long-term’,282 or 
‘reverberating’, effects should be considered.283 Experts agree that they should be included,284 and a 
causal link may be required.285 
LoAC is also silent as to whether ex post facto judging of the proportionality of an attack should 
be based upon the harm that was caused, or what was expected.286 Experts suggest that expectation 
or foreseeability are key to any ex ante assessment of the proportionality decision made by a 
commander.287 
Once military advantage and incidental harm have been assessed, they must then be 
compared.288 It is important to note that targeting rules only prohibit attacks where incidental harm 
is ‘excessive’ in comparison to the expected military advantage.289 This allows for a ‘fairly broad margin 
of judgment’,290 and decisions should be made using common sense and in good faith.291 Although 
many commanders may disagree in close proportionality decisions, they would likely agree to what is 
 
279 Nuclear Weapons Case (n.8) para.30; Also note Murray (n.11) para.5.127-5.139. 
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excessive.292 As such, a ‘reasonable military commander’ standard can be applied.293 This would vary 
depending upon the context of the conflict, and the phase of the conflict that the attack takes place 
in.294 Due to the broad margin of judgement allowed, it can be difficult for a prosecutor to show that 
a commander acted unreasonably.295 Indeed, Sassóli suggests that states should move toward 
determining acceptable levels of incidental harm against internationally agreed objective measures, 
rather than subjective measures.296 Applying an internationally agreed formula would not only make 
targeting prosecutions easier, but would also provide a standard measure against which AWS could 
be programmed. However, states have made no moves in this direction. 
Due to the many subjective and qualitative decisions involved in a proportionality decision, 
no AWS in the near- or medium-term would be able to perform this assessment. As such, the decisions 
would remain with the commander using all available intelligence. A commander would, depending 
upon the sophistication of the AWS available, have three options to ensure a proportionate attack: 
only using the AWS where there is a negligible expected risk to civilians by programming the system 
to cancel any attack where a non-target is present in the expected blast radius; restricting the 
autonomous functions of the AWS very tightly to reduce as far as practicable the risks of civilian harm 
(for example, using small munitions in areas where civilians are expected to be); determining an 
acceptable level of incidental harm that could be inputted into, and applied by, the machine.297 
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It is important to remember that recognition of civilians is in the negative (Section 3), and also 
subject to the doubt rules.298 Thus, where an individual or object cannot be recognised as a lawful 
target, they must be treated as civilian and any harm that comes to them would fall on the incidental 
harm side of the proportionality equation. Requiring an AWS to cease attacks where a non-target is 
identified (option one) should always be proportionate, as no incidental harm should occur. 
The second option would allow an AWS to proceed with an attack even if a small, and 
proportionate, number of civilians or civilian objects are present in the expected blast radius. As long 
as the number of civilians or civilian objects that the commander decides to allow an AWS to include 
in its blast radii are proportionate to the military advantage to be gained, then this option would also 
ensure compliance with the rule. Both first and second options are rather blunt and are comparable 
to beyond-visual-range attacks. 
The third, and potentially sharper, option requires the AWS to perform collateral damage 
estimation (CDE). This is a policy calculation that has been used for many years to determine the level 
of authorisation required for missions that expect civilian casualties.299 It involves consideration of 
various factors, such as:  
‘the precision of a weapon, its blast effect, attack tactics, the probability of civilian 
presence in structures near the target, and the composition of structures to estimate the 
number of civilian casualties likely to be caused during an attack.’300  
Schmitt and Thurnher are confident that this process could be converted into algorithms for 
use by AWS,301 but there is no public evidence available to suggest this has occurred. 
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If it is possible that an AWS could use CDE algorithms to provide an accurate estimation of 
incidental harm at the time of attack, this would go some way to enabling compliance with the rules 
on proportionality.302 The AWS could compare this calculated incidental harm to an acceptable level 
set by the commander, and proceed according to whether the calculated harm is above or below this 
threshold.303 A commander would need to determine the acceptable level of incidental harm, as this 
is inextricably tied to the military advantage to be gained from the attack. This is an abstract value 
that could not be calculated by machine. As long as the threshold of incidental harm determined by 
the commander is not excessive in comparison to the expected military advantage of the attack, in 
the context of the conflict at that time, then the attack should abide by the proportionality principle. 
Consequently, if it is possible to use CDE algorithms with an AWS, then the ability to calculate 
incidental harm would come under the technical control of weapons developers. The estimation of 
military advantage and an acceptable level of collateral damage would remain within the tactical 
control of the commander. Such a method of abiding by the proportionality rule would need to be 
demonstrated to a reviewer who would also need to approve the CDE algorithms for use in AWS, along 
with the process for calculating military advantage. 
Schmitt and Thurnher also note the usefulness of an AWS that could increase its levels of 
acceptable incidental harm where it recognises an attack could provide increased military advantage. 
They provide an example of a concentration of enemy tanks in comparison to a single enemy tank.304 
This is cautioned, however, by the fact that no AWS could be programmed to comprehend military 
advantage for all situations.305 As such, the best option would be for a commander to determine 
alternative thresholds for different expected situations. For example, intelligence may be unclear as 
to the size of an expected enemy unit, or how it may advance. A commander could provide different 
 
302 Arts.51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), API; ICRC Study, Rule 14. 
303 Schmitt and Thurnher (n.135) 256. 
304 Schmitt and Thurnher (n.135) 257. 
305 Schmitt and Thurnher (n.135) 257. 
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estimations of military advantage and accordingly acceptable incidental harm depending upon 
different scenarios that could likely happen according to intelligence reports.  
Where intelligence reports about the civilian presence at the site of attack are very unclear, 
the sophistication of the system is low, or human judgement is required, the only reasonable things 
for a commander to do when using an AWS autonomously would be to input thresholds of incidental 
harm to be very conservative, i.e. following the first or second option. In such situations, instructing 
an AWS that no civilian harm is acceptable may be the preferred method of ensuring that an attack is 
proportionate.306Alternatively, where possible, an AWS could be used in a semi-autonomous mode. 
 
6.6. Warnings 
In the case of the precautionary requirement to give advance warnings to civilians in the area 
of an attack, unless circumstances do not allow, this is a rule under treaty and CIL in both IACs and 
NIACs.307 Commanders would need to make decisions on whether to use warnings, as they can only 
be made in the circumstances at the time of attack. Developers could, however, facilitate compliance 
with this provision. For example, a speaker system or a capability to drop leaflets could be fitted to an 
AWS in order to provide warnings when required. Other techniques, such a ‘roof-knocking’ (where an 
inert or small missile is fired at a civilian building to induce the civilians inside to flee prior to an 
attack)308 could constitute a warning in a very small set of circumstances but should generally be 
avoided due to the ease of them becoming an attack against civilians in and of themselves which would 
be contrary to LoAC.309 Regardless of the technique employed, the decision as to whether to provide 
 
306 Note that, in some situations, rules of engagement may prohibit any incidental harm. See Mandsager (n.2) 
para.6.5(a). 
307 Art.57(2)(c), API; Art.3(11), Amended Protocol II to the CCW; ICRC Study, Rule 20. 





309 Jeroen C. van den Boogaard, 'Knock On The Roof: Legitimate Warning Or Method Of Warfare?' (2017) 19 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 183; Art.48, API. 
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warnings to civilians would reside with the commander under their exercise of tactical control. 
Potential methods of warning would need to be authorised by a reviewer, along with circumstances 
for their use. 
 
6.7. Choosing an attack offering the least civilian harm for a comparable military advantage 
Where there is a choice between targets offering a similar amount of military advantage, 
commanders should choose to attack the target that would cause the least harm to civilians. This is a 
treaty and customary requirement in IAC, and arguably a customary rule in NIAC.310 Due to the 
contextual information needed to make such a choice, it would first seem that only commanders could 
make this decision at the time of attack.  
For an AWS to comply with this rule during autonomous targeting, it would need to recognise 
the military advantage and incidental harm expected from attacking one target and compare it to 
another target, and then choose that with the lesser harm for the same advantage. Such a decision is 
not about the proportionality of an attack per se, but about military advantage and incidental harm of 
one attack in comparison to another. Therefore, it does not require as much qualitative assessment. 
For example, if an AWS mapped the expected blast radius of its munitions onto the target and 
recognised three tanks in the blast radius, this might provide 3X military advantage as opposed to 1X 
with a single tank. If 1γ incidental harm would be created by either attack, then the attack offering 3X 
advantage should be attacked. As such, the AWS would not need to determine the actual level of 
military advantage to be gained from an attack, but just that there is more advantage to be gained 
from one attack in comparison to another where the incidental harm would be similar. Although the 
recognition of all the relevant factors would be difficult to programme, the actual calculation of (3X-
1γ)>(1X-1γ) is relatively simple, and so the rule could be complied with whilst the AWS is functioning 
 
310 Art.57(3), API; Art.7, Cultural Property Convention PII; ICRC Study, Rule 21. 
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autonomously. The ability of an AWS to do this would need to be demonstrated to a reviewer who 
could then authorise it to be used under the discretion of a commander. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This Chapter has argued that, and explained how, the use of AWS could be in accordance with 
targeting rules both in terms of autonomous targeting and ad hoc targeting. This analysis of each 
targeting rule has shown that the use of this legal regime can restrain how AWS are employed so that 
their unlawful use is prevented, and it has also displayed what commanders/operators should do in 
using these machines so that legal thresholds can be met.311 As such, this means that current 
international law rules are capable of regulating the use of AWS at a sufficient level, and it has been 
shown how regulations are applied through layers of control. A secondary effect of this analysis is that 
the role of the human being when using an AWS is far more substantial than it would first seem when 
dealing with an autonomous system.  
This Chapter has shown that human oversight is, in general, a good thing for ensuring 
compliance with targeting rules and should be employed as much as practicable. It has also shown 
what an AWS would need to be capable of doing in order to be used in accordance with the law. 
Where a commander is reasonably certain that an autonomous or ad hoc attack could meet legal 
thresholds, it could lawfully go ahead. However, where this is not so, the attack should take place in a 
semi-autonomous mode, or make use of inhabited means,312 or, potentially, forward-deployed troops 
could be used to confirm the lawfulness of a target to be attacked. Where none of these options are 
possible, a commander should consider as much intelligence about a proposed attack as is possible in 
 
311 Chengeta has suggested that a ‘legally required minimum level of control’ could be the key to closing any 
suggested accountability gaps that exist in relation to the use of AWS. See Thompson Chengeta, 'What Level Of 
Human Control Over Autonomous Weapon Systems Is Required By International Law?' (Ejiltalk.org, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20180825122142/https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-level-of-human-
control-over-autonomous-weapon-systems-is-required-by-international-law/>. 
312 Boothby (n.83) 252-257. 
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the circumstances and make their decision in good faith.313 Where this is the only option, and civilian 
presence at the site of attack cannot be adequately assessed, then a commander should restrict the 
effects of an attack by AWS to be zero civilian harm. Although this may result in no attack, or only a 
limited portion of an attack, occurring, this may be the only method of using an AWS in a fully-
autonomous mode in accordance with targeting rules.  
Overall, this Chapter has suggested that when programming AWS, technical control needs to 
be exercised in two ways. First, the programming of the system and any actions it will be capable of 
taking must reflect legally compliant behaviour; for example, targeting based upon legally-relevant 
target characteristics.  
Second, where the framework for lawful actions described above requires an exercise of 
tactical control, developers must produce an AWS in such a way that it enables a commander to use 
it lawfully. For example, if the model proposed by Schmitt and Thurnher314 to allow AWS to perform 
proportionality calculations can be realised by programmers, then this would enable the autonomous 
use of an AWS to be lawful even where the exact amount of incidental harm that will come from an 
attack is unknown to a commander. 
In terms of the exercise of tactical control, commanders must also make lawful decisions in 
order to use AWS in accordance with targeting rules – the exercise of technical control by 
programmers does not absolve a commander of their responsibilities. A major part of tactical control 
is the decision as to how an AWS should be used, such as what targets it should be employed to attack, 
and what restrictions on the time, space, and effects from its autonomous functions should be. 
It is important to remember that both technical and tactical control are exercised within the 
procurement control exerted by weapons reviewers. As the last Chapter argued, both targeting and 
 
313 UK Statement On Ratification Of API (n.117) para. (c); Canadian Government (n.222)(Standard for decision-
making). 
314 Schmitt and Thurnher (n.135) 256. 
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weapons law regimes should be assessed when reviewing AWS. Consequently, the conclusions of this 
Chapter should be read alongside those of the previous Chapter in order to fully appreciate the novelty 
of AWS and their regulation. All of these conclusions should be incorporated into the guidance of a 
weapon reviewer. The legal rules included in this guidance apply prospectively to outline how AWS 
should be built and used. Violating these legal rules will generate legal responsibility. Where such 




Chapter 6: A responsibility paradigm for AWS 
 
1. Introduction 
Responsibility is a key part of legal systems and is also a major part of the debate surrounding 
autonomous weapon systems (AWS). These machines pose a challenge to traditional notions of 
responsibility. Unlike a human soldier who can be punished following a breach of legal rules, there is 
no way of punishing a machine. Indeed, putting a machine on trial would seem to be as ridiculous as 
historical ‘animal trials’.1 In order for current international law to sufficiently regulate responsibility 
for AWS, it needs to be able to apply the relevant legal rules against states (and potentially non-state 
actors) for their internationally wrongful acts and against individuals for their criminal acts during the 
development or use of AWS. As this Chapter shows, the characterisation of AWS as legal agents of 
those exerting control over them allows for responsibility to be traced back to those persons or 
entities. 
Some argue that if an AWS does something unpredictable then nobody could be sufficiently 
tied to, and held responsible for, those actions. So the argument goes, this creates an accountability 
gap whereby no responsibility can be attributed for the actions of an AWS.2 The argument for the 
existence of an accountability gap is present in both moral and legal discourses.3 
 
1 Sonya Vatomsky, 'When Societies Put Animals On Trial' (JSTOR Daily, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190811093208/https://daily.jstor.org/when-societies-put-animals-
on-trial/>. 
2 Human Rights Watch, 'Mind The Gap' (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
3 HRW (n.2); Robert Sparrow, 'Killer Robots' (2007) 24 Journal of Applied Philosophy, 62; Thompson Chengeta, 
'Accountability Gap, Autonomous Weapon Systems And Modes Of Responsibility In International Law' (2016) 
45 Denver Journal of International Law, 1. 
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As Chapter 2 mentioned, the concept of a moral accountability gap hinges upon whether AWS 
are seen as moral agents.4 As AWS are merely machines,5 they cannot be moral agents and therefore 
human beings controlling them must be held morally accountable for their use. 
The legal argument suggests that because AWS are highly-complex machines there will be 
design flaws, and when these flaws encounter unforeseen events, it could cause such systems to act 
in unanticipated ways; as such, it would be difficult to attribute responsibility.6 Yet, this need not cause 
significant legal issues, because these events are merely accidents. It is inevitable that accidents will 
happen,7 and they may violate legal rules.8 International law makes allowance for this happening and 
does not impose legal penalties for unavoidable accidents. 9 However, no weapon system that has a 
higher-than-acceptable rate of accidents would pass review and be deployed.10 As such, this Chapter 
is primarily interested in determining who is responsible, and how, when AWS have been used 
nefariously, negligently, or recklessly; consequently, it demonstrates that the apparent ‘responsibility 
gap’ is actually quite small. 
This Chapter covers political, procurement, technical, and tactical control from the layers of 
control outlined in Chapter 3. The consequence of control is responsibility, as each controller should 
be held responsible for their exercise of control when things go wrong. In order to demonstrate how 
each controller can be held responsible, the Chapter notes that states are obligated to remedy the 
wrongdoing of AWS before demonstrating the need to take a multi-dimensional approach to 
 
4 Michael Robillard, 'No Such Thing As Killer Robots' (2017) 35 Journal of Applied Philosophy, 705. 
5 See EPSRC, 'Principles Of Robotics' (EPSRC, 2010) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190825042317/https://epsrc.ukri.org/research/ourportfolio/theme
s/engineering/activities/principlesofrobotics/>. 
6 Wendell Wallach, 'Toward A Ban On Lethal Autonomous Weapons' (2017) 60 Communications of the ACM, 
28, 31. 
7 See Paul Scharre, Army Of None (WW Norton & Company, 2018) 150-160 173-179. 
8 Rebecca Crootof, 'War Torts' (2016) 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1347, 1373. 
9 Matthew C Waxman, 'Detention As Targeting: Standards Of Certainty And Detention Of Suspected Terrorists' 
(2008) 108 Columbia Law Review, 1365, 1394. 
10 Such a system would likely breach the rules of precautions in attack. See William H. Boothby, The Law Of 
Targeting (OUP, 2012) 543 548, particularly section 22.5 and accompanying footnotes; Paul Scharre, 
'Autonomous Weapons And Operational Risk' (Center for a New American Security, 2016) 18-23; Michael W. 
Meier, ‘The strategic implications of lethal autonomous weapons’, in Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Research 
Handbook On Remote Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2017) 456-460. 
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responsibility for AWS. It then looks at how the current responsibility paradigm struggles to deal with 
AWS and outlines solutions in the rest of the Chapter for entities exerting political, procurement, 
technical, and tactical control. 
 
2. The applicable law 
Should one of the legal rules (i.e. primary obligations) discussed in the previous two Chapters 
be broken, then this would generate legal responsibility (i.e. secondary obligations). Due to the 
different entities that exert control over AWS, there are several bodies of law that are relevant. 
States are the primary subjects of international law and therefore provide a good starting 
point to discuss those responsible for controlling AWS. International law regulating the responsibility 
of states for internationally wrongful acts is found in customary international law (CIL) and case law, 
and was collated into the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the 
Articles) by the International Law Commission (ILC).11 This is a soft-law instrument and guide to the 
actual legal rules that are used to determine if a state is responsible for breaching its obligations (and 
if there are any circumstances precluding wrongfulness), and how the situation can be dealt with in 
terms of who can respond to a breach and who can seek reparations.  
Most of the discussion of state responsibility here relates to breaches of primary obligations 
under the law of armed conflict (LoAC) and international human rights law (IHRL). Responsibility for 
LoAC violations is mostly concerned with state obligations that are owed to other states and are 
regulated under the rules on state responsibility. IHRL is mostly concerned with state obligations that 
are owed to individuals. Violations for these rules are governed by a self-contained regime within IHRL. 
This is based upon the state responsibly regime, and so the discussion of state responsibility is also 
 
11 International Law Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third 
session’ (2001) UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) p.31 (Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries. Hereafter: ARSIWA). 
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applicable to IHRL (particularly in state-to-state cases).12 Specific IHRL responsibility issues are noted 
in Section 7.4. This Chapter also discusses the potential applicability of the state responsibility and 
IHRL regimes to non-state actors.13 
Some LoAC rules are owed to individuals, the breaching of which generates individual criminal 
responsibility for military personnel who violate them. This is known as the ‘Grave Breaches’ regime.14 
There are commonalities between it and the state responsibility regime.15 As such, both the Grave 
Breaches regime and the IHRL responsibility regime can be thought of as self-contained systems within 
a wider system of ‘general’ international law governing responsibility.16 
The Grave Breaches regime also has significant links to international criminal law (ICL). ICL is 
a body of law that regulates violations of international obligations by individuals. Following the ad hoc 
Nuremberg Trials, and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
other situations, the prosecution of individuals under ICL now has a permanent footing at the 
 
12 See Theodor Meron, 'State Responsibility For Violations Of Human Rights' (1989) 83 Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law, 5-8 April 1989) 372; Art.2(3)(A), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171 (Hereafter: ICCPR); Art.13, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (Hereafter: ECHR); 
Art.7(6), American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 
1144 UNTS 123 (Hereafter: IACHR). 
13 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘State Responsibility and Non-State Actors’ in Math Noortmann, August Reinisch and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds.), Non-State Actors In International Law (Hart Publishing, 2015) 177. 
14 Art.50, Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces 
in the field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1960) 75 UNTS 31 (Hereafter: GC I); 
Art.51, Geneva Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
members of the armed forces at sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 
85 (Hereafter: GC II); Art.131, Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (adopted 
12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Hereafter: GCIII); Art.148, Geneva 
Convention (IV) relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (adopted 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Hereafter: GC IV); Arts.11 and 85, Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (Hereafter: API). 
15 See, for example, Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) Merits [1986] ICJ Reports, p.14, para.115; Art.3, Convention (IV) respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910)(Hereafter: HC IV); Art.91, API; First Protocol to 
The Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict(adopted 
14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956) 249 UNTS 270. 
16 Conclusions 1 and 12, International Law Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission on the 
Work of its Fifty-Eighth session’ (2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2). 
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International Criminal Court (ICC). In terms of ICL, this Chapter focuses on the statutes of these Courts 
and their case law. The ICC is a major focus of this. Despite its troubled existence,17 it is the premier 
body dealing with ICL today and regularly incorporates the case law of bodies that have gone before 
it. Further, the definitions of international crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court rely heavily on accepted historical precedent and CIL18 (although its approach to CIL has been 
criticised),19 and so reflects the most cogent understanding of the legal rules available today. 
Whilst these rules all exist on the international level, the rules of LoAC, IHRL, and ICL also apply 
on the domestic level. Internal rules of states are particularly relevant in this Chapter due to a number 
of potential legal gaps that are present internationally; domestic law can fill those gaps. This is 
particularly so when domestic criminal law has incorporated the Grave Breaches regime and ICL rules. 
As domestic remedies should be exhausted before elevating a case to the international level,20 
domestic courts would be the primary venue for prosecuting individual wrongdoers using AWS. This 
also solves some issues if it would be difficult to prosecute an individual internationally (see Section 
11.1). 
Not only are the LoAC and ICL rules relevant to internationally criminal acts, but so is wider 
domestic criminal law. For example, the nefarious lethal acts of an individual using an AWS could be 
defined as murder domestically, and the fatal actions of a nefarious AWS manufacturer may be 
 
17 See, for example, Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘This is not fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble’ (EJIL: Talk!, 
2019) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190330065740/https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-
fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/>. 
18 Philippe Kirsch, ‘Foreword’ in Knut Dörmann, Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb (eds.), Elements Of War 
Crimes Under The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court (ICRC 2002) pg.xiii. 
19 See, for example, Antonio Cassese, 'The Statute Of The International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections' (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law, 144. 
20 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Judgement, Ser C No4 (IACtHR, 29 July 1988) 61-62; Art.17, Rome Statue 
Of The International Criminal Court 1998 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3 
(Hereafter: ICC Statute). 
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considered corporate manslaughter. Further, domestic service law governing military discipline might 
be relevant to some wrongful uses of AWS.21 
Finally, tort law is relevant. This could be of particular use for holding manufacturers 
responsible through product liability in the domestic sphere. Torts for the use of weapons could not 
be made on the basis of a manufacturer having a duty of care over those their products are used 
against,22 but could be applicable where such companies do not provide required information or 
training for using their products.23  
Crootof argues for the development of a regime of tort in international law to apply to AWS 
called ‘War Torts’.24 Crootof suggests that, where an AWS performs a sub-criminal act, or individual 
criminal responsibility cannot be determined, states should be held strictly liable for these ‘tortuous’ 
acts with their liability attributed using a similar framework to that used for the responsibility of states 
for internationally wrongful acts.25 Whilst this may fill some gaps, it is a significant lex ferenda 
suggestion. This would require a whole new body of international law, and there is no apparent 
interest in doing so from states. It will, therefore, not be considered further in this thesis. 
At this point, it is necessary to differentiate between accountability, responsibility, and 
liability. Although in general parlance they are synonymous, there are differences in legal discourse. 
Accountability is the widest concept, meaning that an offending entity is called to account for their 
 
21 See, for example, Armed Forces Act 2006; UK Ministry of Defence, 'Manual Of Service Law (JSP 830)' (UK 
MoD, 2013); Laura Dickinson, ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Overlooked Importance of 
Administrative Accountability’ in Eric Talbot Jensen and Ronald T. P Alcala (eds.), The Impact Of Emerging 
Technologies On The Law Of Armed Conflict (OUP, 2019); For other forms of administrative accountability, see 
Gregory McNeal, 'Targeted Killing And Accountability' (2014) 102 The Georgetown Law Journal, 681, 758-785. 
22 Swati Malik, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Possibility And Probability Of Accountability' (2018) 35 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 609, 629. 
23 See, for example: Turner et al [Tammy Lou Fontenot] v TASER International, Inc [2012] Western District of 
North Carolina (Charlotte Division), Case no 3:10CV125-RJC-DCK; Heston et al v Taser International and City of 
Salinas et al [2011] US Court of Appeal (Ninth Circuit), Case no 09–15440 DC No 5:05-cv-03658-JW; Rosa v 
Taser International, Inc [2012] US Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit), No 09–17792, 7950. 
24 Crootof (n.8) 1396-1402. 
25 Crootof (n.8) 1386-1402. 
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actions.26 For example, a government minister explaining acts of state to parliament.27 ‘Accountability’ 
is used here to refer to the consequences of moral wrongs. 
 Responsibility is narrower, meaning that an offending entity suffers legal sanction in response 
to their wrongdoing.28 For example, a state accepting their wrongdoing and paying reparations, or an 
individual suffering incarceration. It is used here to refer to the consequences of legal wrongs. 
Liability is the narrowest concept and entails sanction against an entity for particular 
wrongdoing.29 Liability can emerge in various forms. For example, under command responsibility, an 
individual can be held responsible for their command decisions and actions but not for their actions 
outside of this. It is used here refer to the consequences of specific legal wrongdoing. 
 
3. The right to a remedy 
The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (BP&G) are a soft-law guide that simultaneously articulates the right to a remedy 
under IHRL30 and similar duties under LoAC.31 States are obligated to provide a remedy to an 
internationally wrongful act, as stated in the Chorzów Factory cases.32 These cases have been 
influential on the approaches of human rights conventions33 and courts34 in creating and articulating 
 
26 Marc Cornock, 'Legal Definitions Of Responsibility, Accountability And Liability' (2011) 23 Paediatric Nursing, 
25, 25-26. 
27 Katharine Fortin, The Accountability Of Armed Groups Under Human Rights Law (OUP, 2017) 5. 
28 Cornock (n.26) 25. 
29 Cornock (n.26) 25-26; Menno T Kamminga, Inter-State Accountability For Violation Of Human Rights 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). 
30 Art.2(3), ICCPR. 
31 Art.3, HC IV; Arts.49-52, GCI; Arts.50-51, GCII; Arts.129-132, GCIII; Arts. 146-149, GCIV; Arts.11, 85-91, API. 
32 Case Concerning the Factory At Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Germany v Poland) Jurisdiction (1927) PCIJ 
Rep Series A No 9, p.5, 21; Art.3, HC IV; Art.91, API; Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for 
indemnity) (Germany v Poland) Merits (1928) PCIJ Rep Series A No 17, p.10, 47; Art.31, ARSIWA. 
33 Art.2(3)(A), ICCPR; Art.13, ECHR; Art.7(6), IACHR. 




a comprehensive right to a remedy including access to justice,35 and enforcement of remedies,36 
including reparations.37 
The drafters of the BP&G suggest that the document does ’not entail new international or 
domestic legal obligations’.38 Yet, in terms of responsibility and remedies, LoAC obligations are 
presented as being as comprehensive as those in IHRL. LoAC contains treaty and customary39 
obligations to investigate Grave Breaches of its rules,40 and to provide penal sanction to those who 
carry out such acts.41 LoAC also contains an obligation to pay compensation ‘if the case demands’,42 
meaning restitution or restoration would be insufficient to rectify material or personal losses.43 
However, treaties and state practice show mixed approaches as to whether this compensation is for 
individual victims or states.44  
In order to achieve an effective remedy under LoAC, domestic victims of an internal armed 
conflict would need to petition their government for remedy, and foreign victims of extraterritorial 
military operations would need to petition their government to make claims on their behalf using the 
legal fiction of diplomatic protection.45 Therefore, it is conceivable that victims of LoAC breaches by 
an AWS could be provided with compensation.46 But, the convoluted and potentially unfulfilling route 
victims would need to take means that this might not be an effective remedy in reality.47 
 
35 Art.2(3)(b), ICCPR; Art.13, ECHR; Art.7(6), IACHR. 
36 Art.2(3)(c), ICCPR; Art.7(6), IACHR. 
37 Art.41, ECHR; Ananyev and Others v. Russia, App nos:42525/07 and 60800/08 (ECtHR, 10 April 2012) 
paras.210-231 
38 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (60th session, 21 
March 2006) UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, 3. 
39 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP, 2005) 
(Hereafter: ICRC Study), Rule 158. 
40 Art.49, GCI; Art.50, GCII; Art.129, GCIII; Art.146, GCIV; Art.86(1), API 
41 Art.49, GCI; Art.50, GCII; Art.129, GCIII; Art.146, GCIV 
42 Art.3, HC IV; Art.91, API 
43 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary On The Additional Protocols 
Of 8 June 1977 To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) para.3655. 
44 Dinah Shelton, Remedies In International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2015) 81-83. 
45 Sandoz et al. (n.43) para.3657; Shelton (n.44) 83. 
46 Boothby (n.10) 544. 
47 McFarlane v. Ireland, App no:31333/06 (ECtHR, 10 September 2010) para.114. 
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There may be an option, however, whereby foreign victims could argue that their right to a 
remedy under IHRL should include effective investigations of LoAC violations independent of their 
right to a remedy for violations of substantive rights. This independence would be required as an 
investigation into a potential violation of the right to life, for example, may not necessarily overlap 
with the key aspects of a potential breach of the LoAC rules.48 This situation would be further 
complicated by the question of how IHRL applies during armed conflict, if derogations have taken 
place, and if rights have been ‘divided and tailored’49 (See Chapter 3). The situation is complicated, at 
best. But, it is the same for all potential violations, and not just those carried out by AWS. Still, fulfilling 
the right to a remedy, in both IHRL and LoAC terms, requires a sufficient responsibility regime that can 
identify and punish wrongdoers.50 In order to meet these obligation, this Chapter demonstrates how 
the different entities controlling AWS can be held responsible under current international law. 
  
4. Focussing on state, non-state actor, and individual responsibility in international law 
Some authors have suggested that state responsibility alone would be sufficient to provide a 
responsibility regime for AWS.51 However, the present Chapter argues against this view. Firstly, such 
a position would provide impunity to individual wrongdoers, and so is morally unacceptable.52 Further, 
where a state is held responsible for the actions of its agents, that should not, and does not, 53 prevent 
 
48 This would be a similar situation to where, for example, a domestic remedy was insufficient. See The Nature 
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Human Rights Committee, 80th 
session) 2004 UN Doc. GC.31 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, para.16; James A. Sweeney, ‘Law and policy on post-
conflict restitution’ in Matthew Saul and James A Sweeney (eds.), International Law And Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Policy (Routledge, 2015) 278. 
49 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, App no:55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para.137. 
50 Art.49, GCI; Art.50, GCII; Art.129, GCIII; Art.146, GCIV; Art.86(1), API; Art.2, ICCPR. 
51 Jeffrey Thurnher, 'No One At The Controls: The Legal Implications Of Fully Autonomous Targeting' (2012) 67 
Joint Force Quarterly, 77, 82; Daniel N. Hammond, 'Autonomous Weapons And The Problem Of State 
Accountability' (2015) 15 Chicago Journal of International Law, 652, 662-671. 
52 Sparrow (n.3) 71. 
53 Art.25 (4), ICC Statute; Art.58, ARSIWA. 
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individuals being held responsible as well.54 Although the simultaneous pursuit of individual and state 
responsibility might create tensions, this is not necessarily problematic.55  
Second, whilst the responsibility of states and individuals could be generated by the same act, 
the violated substantive rules might not be identical for each entity and so an act that breaches one 
set of rules may not necessarily breach the other. For example, a state agent committing an individual 
war crime would not garner state responsibility unless it was part of a wider systematic pattern of 
wrongdoing.56 Consequently, if only state responsibility were considered to deal with the use of AWS, 
then this could create a responsibility gap in international law. In response to this, the different legal 
regimes under which legal responsibility can be generated should be thought of as complementing 
each other, rather than as alternatives.57  
Third, armed non-state actors (ANSAs) are expected to possess AWS in the near future.58 But, 
the state responsibility regime has a limited application to non-state actors and it is difficult to 
articulate their responsibility within this regime (see Section 8). Thus, restricting the notion of 
responsibility for AWS to state responsibility would remove the possibility of holding ANSA members 
individually responsible in place of holding the ANSA responsible as a group. As such, the development 
of a responsibility regime for AWS needs to include states, non-state actors, and individuals. 
 
 
54 P.3 of commentary to Art.58, ARSIWA. 
55 Antonio Cassese, ‘Fundamentals of International Criminal Law’ in Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta (eds.), 
Cassese's International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2013) 7-8; Beatrice I. Bonafè, The Relationship Between 
State And Individual Responsibility For International Crimes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 24-25. 
56 Paola Gaeta, 'On What Conditions Can A State Be Held Responsible For Genocide?' (2007) 18 European 
Journal of International Law, 631, 641. 
57 Bonafè (n.55) 24-25; Chengeta (n.3) 3. 
58 Dyani Sabin, 'ISIS Will Use Killer Robots One Day, Says A.I. Expert' (Inverse, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190725103910/https://www.inverse.com/article/32929-isis-killer-
robots>; A rudimentary AWS could be built in a weekend if legal rules were ignored. Andrew Fursman, 'Private 
Sector Perspectives On The Development Of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems' 2016 Group of 
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Side Event (Geneva, 15 April 2016). 
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5. The problematic nature of the current responsibility paradigm 
The current responsibility paradigm for the development and use of weapons under 
international law was intended to cover situations where humans are in direct control of their 
weapons.59 For example, where an individual fires a missile to commit a war crime, they can be held 
individually responsible, and where an internationally wrongful act occurs, the state they represent 
can be held responsible.60 This is possible as there is a clear chain of responsibility back to the human 
being (state agent). An example of this is found in UK doctrine, but similar positions are found in US61 
and Chinese doctrine62: ‘[l]egal responsibility for any military activity remains with the last person to 
issue the command authorising a specific activity.’63 
However, with autonomous systems, holding a commander responsible for all the actions of 
an AWS ignores the impact of the deploying political entity, weapons reviewer, and weapons 
developers, who, as we have seen, exert control over AWS. Considering the substantial impact that 
each entity can have over AWS, it would seem plainly inappropriate to ignore their legal responsibility. 
Imagine that an AWS developer mis-programmed something deep within the code of an AWS 
which meant that in some situations, civilian vehicles are misidentified as armoured personnel 
carriers, and this is not picked up by a weapons reviewer. Upon deployment, the commander uses this 
system against tanks and artillery where it works perfectly well, but, during a later mission, the system 
ultimately misidentifies a civilian vehicle and attacks it. Holding the AWS commander responsible 
 
59 P.W. Singer, Wired For War (Penguin Press, 2009) 74. 
60 Art.1, ARSIWA; William J. Fenrick, ‘Prosecution of International Crimes’ in Terry D Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds.), 
The Handbook Of The International Law Of Military Operations (OUP, 2011) para.29.05; Moses Case, General 
Claims Commission (Mexico and United States), in John Bassett Moore, History And Digest Of The International 
Arbitrations To Which The United States Has Been A Party (Vol.III) (Government Printing Office, 1898) 3127, at 
3129; Art.4, ARSIWA. 
61 See HRW (n.2) 31-32. 
62 Qiang Li and Dan Xie, 'Legal Regulation Of AI Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law: A Chinese 
Perspective' (Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2019) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190924150139/https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/05/02/ai-weapon-ihl-legal-regulation-chinese-perspective/>. 
63 Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 'The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems' (UK 
Ministry of Defence, 2011) para.510; see also Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 'Joint Doctrine 
Publication 0-30.2 Unmanned Aircraft Systems' (UK Ministry of Defence, 2017) para.4.19 stating that 
governments and the chain of command also have responsibility for their activities. 
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would seem to go against the idea that people should be held responsible for their own actions. The 
current situation would hold commanders responsible for other’s mistakes just because they 
happened to be the last person commanding the system at the time the fault manifested itself.64 Such 
a responsibility regime is insufficient as it does not ensure the responsibility of each person exercising 
control over AWS. 
Despite the insufficiency of the current paradigm, it is intended to be used for attributing 
responsibility for AWS. The UK has rearticulated its position for weapons with autonomy: 
‘[o]nce deployed, accountability is vested in the trained operators who employ the system, 
and in the decisions taken by commanders at every level who have operational or tactical 
responsibility for the conduct of a campaign and the specialists who advise them.’65 
This re-articulation of the current paradigm now considers operators, commanders, and 
specialist advisers. But, it still does not go far enough as to include the responsibility of manufacturers 
for their technical control over AWS,66 nor those who exert political control. The unwillingness to 
extend the chains of responsibility to manufacturers is due to another policy decision. Under UK 
doctrine, when equipment is delivered and accepted by the military, manufacturer responsibility is 
discharged.67 By incorporating this policy decision into a responsibility regime for AWS, the 
insufficiency is maintained. 
 
64 Note the similarly problematic development of command responsibility in the case of General Yamashita, 
who was held responsible for the unlawful actions of his troops despite not being in a position to know about 
what his troops were doing. Whilst the principles of command responsibility were rightly affirmed in this case, 
repeating the mistake of holding a commander responsible for something they could not control would be 
undesirable. Indeed, modern command responsibility does not hold commanders responsible unforeseeable 
activities. See the dissenting opinions of Judges Rutledge and Murphy in re Yamashita, 327 US 1 [1946] US 
Supreme Court; Laurel Baig, ‘Omission Liability and Superior Responsibility’ in Antonio Cassese and Paola 
Gaeta (eds.), Cassese's International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2013) 183-187; Art.28, ICC Statute. 
65 UK UNOG Delegation, 'Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s Perspective On Human Control 
Over Weapon Development And Targeting Cycles’ 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (Geneva, 8 August 2018) UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, para.19 
66 See UK UNOG delegation (n.65) 5, fig.3 and Annex 1, 6-12. 
67 UK Approach (n.63) para.510. 
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The inappropriateness of the current paradigm can be clearly seen with the similar technology 
of self-driving cars. Automated cars provide an advanced form of cruise control that can keep a vehicle 
at an appropriate speed, in a motorway lane, and automatically brake.68 The human ‘driver’ must 
remain able to take back driving at any point, i.e. they are ‘on-the-loop’ and are responsible for 
ensuring the safe functioning of the vehicle at all times.69 This, therefore, provides an obvious person 
to be held responsible when things go wrong and would work well with semi-autonomous targeting, 
or where fully-autonomous targeting is overseen by humans who can intervene when necessary. 
Yet, with an autonomous vehicle that could take you from A to B without human intervention, 
people will merely provide a destination.70 This is a parallel to the tactical control an operator has over 
AWS: humans instruct the system to perform particular tasks but do not otherwise intervene. 
Manufacturers retain technical control in relation to both technologies and should have responsibility 
resulting from that control. Indeed, some self-driving car manufacturers have accepted tortuous 
liability for the actions of their products in advance of their production and sale.71 
Thus, we can see that the current responsibility paradigm for AWS is aligned with automated 
vehicles, despite the functionality of AWS being more like autonomous vehicles. The responsibility 
paradigm for AWS should follow this example of expanding responsible entities to those exerting 
control over the system, rather than the commander only. 
 
 




69 Ralf Herrtwich, 'The Difference Between Autonomous And Driverless Cars' (360Here, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20180625001253/https://360.here.com/2017/02/06/difference-
autonomous-driverless-cars/>. 
70 Justin Hughes, 'Car Autonomy Levels Explained' (The Drive, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190611203522/https://www.thedrive.com/sheetmetal/15724/wha
t-are-these-levels-of-autonomy-anyway>. 





6. Approaches to multi-party responsibility 
We noted in Chapter 3 that some authors have suggested providing AWS with legal 
personality so that a responsibility regime can be easily constructed to include each entity that exerts 
control over AWS.72 Other authors have suggested similar approaches of sharing responsibility for 
AWS between controlling entities.73 These approaches are legally problematic, as holding a collective 
responsible would shield individual wrongdoers74 and goes against the tenant of international criminal 
law that each individual should be responsible for their own actions.75 Further, it is also a form of 
collective punishment, which are prohibited.76 
As such, this reinforces the decision in Chapter 3 that AWS should be viewed as legal agents 
of those controlling them, rather than legal persons.77 As holding the controlling entities responsible 
together is so problematic, the responsibility of entities individually must be considered in order to 
sufficiently regulate AWS. This Chapter now looks at the responsibility of those exerting political 
control, beginning with states, and then considers non-state actors, before going on to consider 
individual responsibility of those exerting procurement, technical, and tactical control.  
 
72 Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders, 'On The Morality Of Artificial Agents' (2004) 14 Minds and Machines, 349; 
EU Committee on Legal Affairs, 'Draft Report With Recommendations To The Commission On Civil Law Rules 
On Robotics (2015/2103(INL))' (2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190803144706/http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/
JURI-PR-582443_EN.pdf?redirect>, para.31(f). 
73 Report Of The Special Rapporteur On Extrajudicial, Summary Or Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns (Human 
Rights Council, 23rd session) 2013 UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para.81; Chengeta (n.3) 34-36; Tetyana Kruipy, 
‘Regulating a Game Changer: Using a Distributed Approach to Develop an Accountability Framework for Lethal 
Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2018) 50 Georgetown Journal of International Law, 45. 
74 Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis and Thomas D. Grant, 'Of, For, And By The People: The Legal Lacuna 
Of Synthetic Persons' (2017) 25 Artificial Intelligence and Law, 173, 287; International Tin Council Case, JH 
Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry [1989] 3 WLR 969, 986-987. 
75 Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgement) Case No: IT-94-1-A [1999] ICTY, para.186. 
76 Art.50, Annex, HC IV; Art.87, GC III; Art.33, GC IV; Art.75(2)(d), API; Art.4(2)(b), Protocol Additional To The 
Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, And Relating To The Protection Of Victims Of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (Hereafter: APII); 
Art.4, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994, updated 31 
January 2010) UNSC Res.1901 (Hereafter: ICTR Statute); Art.3(b), Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(adopted 16 January 2002) UNSC Res.1315 (Hereafter: SCSL Statute); Prosecutor v. Priebke and Haas, (1998) 
Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, cited in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion To International 
Criminal Justice (OUP, 2010) 879; ICRC Study, Rule 103. 
77 Ugo Pagallo, The Laws Of Robots (Springer Netherlands, 2013) 40-43; Ugo Pagallo, 'Vital, Sophia, And Co.—




7. The responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts 
In terms of states breaching their international obligations, the following discussion is 
primarily concerned with violations of those customary and treaty rules discussed in the previous two 
Chapters. A breach of LoAC78 or IHRL79 obligations using AWS would generate state responsibility 
(unless there is an appropriate ‘defence’, see below Section 7.2). To whom a state may be responsible 
depends upon whom the obligation is owed to. A state may be obligated towards another state, or 
group of states (bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties), 80 all states (jus cogens norms, or obligations erga 
omnes), or individuals.81 Where these obligations are breached, a subsequent obligation to make 
reparation is created.82 
With regard to obligations owed to individuals, we have already seen the difficulties of 
asserting one's rights in terms of a right to a remedy (Section 3). Indeed, the traditional international 
law view suggests that individuals have no direct recourse against foreign states apart from the legal 
fiction of diplomatic protection.83 However, that discussion did note that there are some, albeit 
difficult, routes through which an individual may able to enforce their rights against a foreign state. 
In terms of claiming that a state is responsible for violations of their obligation, the onus of 
establishing responsibility lies with the claimant. Where a state seeks to preclude its responsibility by 
relying upon the circumstances, the onus lies with that state to justify or excuse its conduct.84 
 
78 Art.51, GCI; Art.52, GCII; Art.131, GCIII; Art.148, GCIV. 
79 Rights conferred by treaty cannot be waived by individuals. See, Arts.1(2), 7, 8(3), 14(3)(g), 23(3), ICCPR; P.10 
Commentary to Art.20, ARSIWA; The Naulilaa Case (Portugal vs Germany) [1928] Vol.II UNRIAA, 1011, 1026; 
Art.1(2), ICESCR; p.6-7 commentary to Art.51, ARSIWA. 
80 Phosphates in Morocco (Judgement) (Italy v France) (1938) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No74, p28. 
81 Human Rights Committee (n.48) para.10. 
82 Chorzów Jurisdiction (n.32); Chorzów Merits (n.32); Art.31, ARSIWA. 
83 see Chorzów Merits (n.32) 27-28; Also see Art.5(8), Agreement on cessation of hostilities between the 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea 
(adopted 18 June 2000, entered into force 18 June 2000) 2138 UNTS 85. 
84 P.8 introductory commentary to Chapter V, ARSIWA, pg.72. 
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Any ‘gross or systematic’85 violations of CIL norms that are jus cogens endangers the ‘survival 
of states and their peoples and the most basic human values’,86 and so would generate so-called 
‘aggravated state responsibility’. Jus cogens norms relevant to AWS include: the prohibition on 
aggression;87 the prohibition on genocide;88 the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment;89 the ‘basic rules’90 of LoAC (the Hague and Geneva Conventions);91 some 
IHRL obligations (rights to life and humane treatment, amongst others).92  
This Chapter now discusses the general approach to consider how the actions of an AWS in 
breach of an obligation of its deploying state could be attributable to that state. It then considers some 
specific issues related to state responsibility for violations of human rights obligations (Section 7.4), 
and the responsibility of non-state actors (Section 8). 
 
7.1. Actions of state organs giving rise to the responsibility of states 
Where there is a breach of an international obligation whether by action or omission, that is 
attributable to a state, there is an internationally wrongful act.93 States are responsible for every 
wrongful act of state that takes place.94 
 
85 Art.40(2), ARSIWA. 
86 P.3 commentary to Art.40, ARSIWA. 
87 International Law Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission on the Work of its seventeenth 
and eighteenth sessions’ (1966) UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1, 247-249; Nicaragua case (n.15) para.190; 
P.4 commentary to Art.40, ARSIWA; See also numerous national statements denouncing aggression, fn.644, 
ARSIWA. 
88 P.4 commentary to Art.40, ARSIWA; see also ILC (n.87) 261. 
89 Art.1, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85; P.5 commentary to Art.40, 
ARSIWA. 
90 P.5 commentary to Art.40, ARSIWA. 
91 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Reports, p.226, para.79; 
Prosecutor v Kupreškić and others (Trial Judgement) Case No IT-95-16 [2000] ICTY, para.520. 
92 See Francisco Forrest Matin, et al., International Human Rights And Humanitarian Law : Treaties, Cases And 
Analysis (CUP, 2006). 
93 The Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) Judgement [1949] ICJ Reports, p.4, 22-23; Case Concerning United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) Judgement (1980) ICJ Reports, p.3, 
paras.63-67; Art.2, ARSIWA. 
94 Phosphates in Morocco (n.80) 28; Art.1, ARSIWA. 
211 
 
This responsibility covers all state organs and agents when performing acts of state.95 As we 
have seen, AWS should be thought of as the legal agents of the humans who exert control over them. 
Where that person is a state agent, for example, military personnel, using an AWS to breach a state 
obligation within or beyond their authority,96 those acts should be thought of as being the 
responsibility of the state they represent. 
The rules on state responsibility make allowance for the actions of legal agents to be seen as 
those of the principal state agent.97 In the ILC Articles, this rule is specifically formulated to apply only 
to people acting as legal agents.98 There are two solutions to this issue. Either an AWS is seen as 
equivalent to any other weapon, such as a rifle, and using it is seen as the action of the state agent 
controlling the system. Alternatively, the rule can be interpreted in a broad manner to include a non-
human AWS as a legal agent. Either way, the actions of an AWS under the control of a state agent are 
attributable to a state. Therefore, in terms of responsibility, it is the behaviours of the state agent 
acting through an AWS that are crucial. 
Consequently, where an AWS malfunctions and an internationally wrongful act is performed 
by accident, it is difficult to attribute responsibility for the AWS to the state because it would not be 
part of the ‘conduct’ of the operator/commander.99 The state using the AWS could voluntarily adopt 
its malfunctioning behaviour as its own, but would be under no obligation to do so.100 
 
95 Moses Case (n.60) 3127, at 3129; Art.4, ARSIWA; On state organs beyond the legislative, executive, or 
judicial, see, for example, GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309 (adopted 4 May 1988) 
BISD 35S/116. 
96Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (France v United Mexican States) [1929] Vol.V UNRIAA,516; See The Panama 
Star and Herald case in, John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Vol.VI) (Government Printing 
Office, 1906) 775, at 779-780; Art.7, ARSIWA. 
97 D Earnshaw and Others (Great Britain v United States) (Zafiro case) [1925] Vol.VI. UNRIAA, 160, 160-165; 
Charles S Stephens and Bowman Stephens (USA v United Mexican States [1927] Vol.IV UNRIAA, 265, 265-268; 
Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited, and Various 
Underwriters (Sabotage Cases: 'Black Tom' case and 'Kingsland' case) (United States v Germany) [1930] Vol.VIII 
UNRIAA, 84, 84-101; Art.8, ARSIWA. 
98 Art.8 ARSIWA. 
99 Art.4(1), ARSIWA. 
100 Diplomatic and Consular Staff (n.93) para.74; Art.11, ARSIWA; for an example of this, see Israel adopting the 
behaviour of a ‘volunteer group’ who captured Adolf Eichmann as its own, Official Records Of The Security 




7.2. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
It is important to note that where a ‘wrongful’ act may happen, some circumstances may 
preclude that wrongfulness. They are: consent;101 self-defence;102 countermeasures;103 necessity;104 
force majeure;105 distress.106 However, none of these circumstances can be used to shield a state from 
the responsibility of performing an act prohibited by jus cogens norms.107 Issues of consent, self-
defence, and countermeasures do not raise specific issues with regard to AWS and so will not be 
discussed here. 
Force majeure can preclude the wrongfulness of breaching an obligation if the breach occurs 
due to the irresistible force of unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the state, which make 
the obligation materially impossible to comply with.108 As has been discussed, states are obligated to 
review new weapons to ensure they abide by LoAC109 and major errors in programming should be 
identified during testing, not doing so would breach this obligation. However, suppose an ostensibly 
minor coding error in an AWS was missed during review and this error ultimately resulted in the AWS 
misidentifying a civilian object as a military objective, thereby violating the review obligation. Such a 
 
101 The Savarkar Case (Great Britain, France) [1911] Vol.XI UNRIAA, 243, 254; Art.54(b), Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTC 331; Art.22(1), 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964) 500 
UNTS 95 (Hereafter: VCLT); Art.20, ARSIWA. 
102 Nuclear Weapons (n.91) paras.25, 30, 79, 89; Art.51, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, 
entered into force 24 October 1945)(Hereafter: UN Charter); Art.21, ARSIWA. 
103 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) Judgement [1997] ICJ Reports, p.7, para.83; Art.22, 
ARSIWA. 
104 R.Y. Jennings, 'The Caroline And Maclood Cases' (1938) 32 American Journal of International Law, 82, 85, 
note the ‘necessity of self-defence’; Art.25, ARSIWA. 
105 Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issues in France (France v Serbia) (1929) PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 20/21, p.6, 39-40; Art.23, ARSIWA. 
106 International Law Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth 
session’ (1978) UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (Part 1), 125; Art.24, ARSIWA. 
107 Arts.53 and 64, VCLT; Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Counter-claims [1997] ICJ Reports, 
p.243, para.35; Art.26, ARSIWA. 
108 P.2 commentary to Art.23, ARSIWA. 
109 There would be a failure to ‘determine’ if the new weapon violates legal rules: Art.36, API; also note the 
implied duties in CIL to test weapons discussed in Chapter 4 Section 4.1. 
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situation would necessarily be unforeseen, as it was not identified during testing. It would also be an 
irresistible force, as the AWS would have no ability to divert from its programming. Therefore, where 
a state could not prevent such wrongful acts occurring, this could be seen as a situation of force 
majeure absolving the state of responsibility.  
In terms of distress, this generally applies to situations where a state agent is in personal peril, 
or those under their protection are in peril.110 As AWS are machines, they cannot experience personal 
peril. However, the wrongfulness of its actions could be precluded if people under its protection were 
in peril. For example, a large AWS may be capable of casualty evacuation and programmed to take the 
quickest route to the nearest medical facility, potentially traversing the territory of another state. In 
such a case, the wrongfulness of unlawfully crossing an international border could be precluded.111 
A defence of necessity is intended to preclude the wrongfulness of an action taken where non-
performance of an obligation112 is the only means to avert a grave and imminent peril that would 
damage an essential interest of a state,113 and it does not also impair an essential interest of other 
states or the international community as a whole.114 It has been suggested that where cyber-attacks 
are harmful to another state but do not rise to the level of an armed attack, the victim state could 
respond on grounds of necessity as there would be no lawful response available under the Jus ad 
Bellum.115 Similarly, using grounds of necessity could be used by states when responding to uses of 
AWS by non-state or terrorist adversaries. As we saw in Chapter 3, where a fleet of AWS are 
commanded by a single private person, their acts could not be characterised as being within a non-
international armed conflict as the ‘organisation’ prong of the Tadić test would not be fulfilled.116 A 
 
110 P.1 commentary to Art.24, ARSIWA. 
111 US Department of State, 'Bulletin: Vol.XV, No.376' (US Government Printing Office, 1946) 501-505. 
112 This distinguishes the ground of necessity from force majeure. In the latter case, the circumstances make 
performance of the obligation impossible. See Michael N Schmitt and Liis Vihul, Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The 
International Law Applicable To Cyber Operations (2nd edn, CUP 2017) (Hereafter: Tallinn Manual), Rule 26, 
Commentary para.12. 
113 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (n.103) paras.51-52; Art.25(1)(a), ARSIWA. 
114 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (n.103) para.58; Art.25(1)(b), ARSIWA. 
115 Tallinn Manual, Rule 26, commentary para.18. 
116 Prosecutor v Tadić (Interlocutory Appeal) Case No: IT-94-1-A [1995] ICTY, para.70. 
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victim state could respond through non-performance of the obligations not to use force in other states 
if the adversaries are in in another territory,117 or the obligation not to apply LoAC rules to what would 
be ‘internal disturbances’ if the adversaries are within the state's territory.118 As such, this would allow 
a level of force normally associated with armed conflict to be used outside of an armed conflict 
without generating state responsibility. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the Martens Clause acts as a 
reminder that customary rules and principles of international law continue to apply even in situations 
without specific regulation.119 A state acting in such a situation would have their actions, and 
responsibility for them, regulated under customary rules. The responsibility of states for breaching 
these rules would be attributed and dealt with in the normal way. Thus, it can be said that even in this 
extreme situation, the use and responsibility for AWS could be sufficiently regulated. However, it is 
important to note that the ability to use grounds of necessity to preclude the wrongfulness of an act 
more akin to self-defence is not settled.120 
 
7.3. The use of AWS by armed non-state actors giving rise to state responsibility 
Armed non-state actors are expected to acquire AWS in the near future.121 Where a state 
effectively controls an ANSA using AWS, the group would become an organ of the state; the state 
would be responsible for the actions of that group in the same way as a group using conventional 
arms.122 An ANSA using an AWS in the absence of state authority when state authority should have 
been present would be the responsibility of the state123 (unless the state could do nothing to prevent 
 
117 Art.2(4), UN Charter. 
118 Art.1(2), APII. 
119 Art.1(2), API; Preamble, APII. 
120 Brownlie considers that acts of necessity would only be an appropriate in situations of intervening because 
of a natural catastrophe. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP, 1963), 432. 
121 Sabin (n.58). 
122 Nicaragua case (n.15) paras.109-115; Art.8, ARSIWA. 
123 Art.9, ARSIWA. 
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unlawful actions by the ANSA).124 The use of AWS by an insurrectional movement that then goes on 
to become the state would be the responsibility of the ‘new’ state.125 Finally, a state could voluntarily 
adopt the actions of an ANSA using AWS and accept responsibly for their actions; whilst this may be 
unlikely, states have done this in the past.126 
 
7.4. The responsibility of states under human rights regimes 
The Articles are intended to apply across all fields of international law, including to human 
rights regimes,127 and are focussed upon state-to-state interaction. States have the right to hold other 
states responsible under IHRL as they are obligations erga omnes,128 but this is rare due to the political 
and economic costs and the lack of direct ‘injury’ to the state claiming wrongfulness.129 Further, 
despite intended cross-international law application of the Articles, this does not prevent IHRL being 
lex specialis with regard to responsibility,130 particularly where the use of AWS violates substantive 
IHRL obligations, or an inadequate investigation into the use of AWS violated procedural obligations 
under the right to life.  
In the IHRL responsibility regime, domestic enforcement of rights is the primary avenue for 
remedy that must be exhausted before individuals may petition a regional human rights body.131 As 
with general state responsibility, non-repetition of violations, redress to victims, and condemnation 
 
124 Sambiaggio Case (of a general nature) (Italy-Venezuela) [1904] Vol.X UNRIAA, 499, 513; International Law 
Commission, ' Report of The International Law Commission on the Work of its twenty-fourth session’ (1972) 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1, 135-136; Art.9, ARSIWA. 
125 Bolívar Railway Case (Great Britain v Venezuela) [1903] Vol.IX UNRIAA, 445, 453; Moore (n.96) 956; Art.10, 
ARSIWA. 
126 Diplomatic and Consular Staff (n.93) para.74; Art.11, ARSIWA; Golda Meir (n.100). 
127 Art.1, ARSIWA. 
128 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) New Application: 
1962, Second Phase [1970] ICJ Reports, p.3, para.33-34. 
129 Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (OUP, 2013) 99; Dinah Shelton, Remedies In 
International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP, 2005) 99. 
130 Alston and Godman (n.129) 99. 
131 Velásquez Rodríguez (n.20) 61-62. 
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of wrongdoers are key to sufficient remedies under the IHRL-specific system.132 Thus, if a judicial body 
were to rule that AWS had been used in the violation of human rights by a state, condemning the 
perpetrators and requiring guarantees of non-repetition along with some form of redress of victims 
would be required. 
 
8. The international legal responsibility of non-state actors 
When referring to armed non-state actors, one normally thinks of ‘insurgents, rebels, 
terrorists, militias, criminal cartels, or gangs.’133 But, international organisations that use military 
forces, such as NATO operations or UN Peacekeeping are also ANSAs. There is a responsibility regime 
for their actions,134 but the regulation of AWS under this regime does not pose novel issues. As such, 
the following discussion focusses on the common conception of ANSAs. 
 
8.1. The responsibilities of armed non-state actors under international law 
The proliferation of AWS to ANSAs is not expected to be limited to those groups who receive 
state backing.135 Therefore, the responsibility of such groups for using these systems qua groups must 
be considered. ANSAs may or may not hold territory and may operate beyond their territory. They 
may act at, above, or below, the threshold of armed conflict.136 Here though, the discussion is focussed 
on those party to an armed conflict. 
Whilst international law is primarily focussed on states, some international obligations have 
been directed towards ANSAs. For example, if an ANSA engages in a successful rebellion, the rebellious 
 
132 Dinah Shelton, ‘Enforcement and remedies’, in Scott Sheeran and Nigel S. Rodley (eds.), Routledge 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge, 2013) 678. 
133 Report Of The Special Rapporteur On Extrajudicial, Summary Or Arbitrary Executions On Armed Non-State 
Actors: The Protection Of The Right To Life, Agnes Callamard (Human Rights Council, 38th Session) 2018 UN 
Doc A/HRC/38/44, para.4. 
134 Responsibility of international organizations (66th session, 27 February 2012) UN Doc. A/RES/66/100. 
135 Sabin (n.58). 
136 Callamard (n.133) para.4. 
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actions become the responsibility of the ‘new’ state.137 In armed conflicts, ANSAs are governed by 
CIL,138 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol II where the ANSA holds 
territory.139 Thus, if ANSAs used AWS to breach customary or treaty obligations, they should, logically, 
be held responsible. However, very few ANSAs have ever attempted to provide reparation for LoAC 
failures they are responsible for in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC).140 Thus, even if an ANSA 
took responsibility for the wrongful use of AWS, little would come of this. 
In terms of IHRL applicable to ANSAs, we saw in Chapter 3 that human rights obligations have 
been placed upon some NSAs who hold territory.141 This is despite the reticence of IHRL Courts to 
accept NSAs as being capable of filling a legal vacuum142 and guaranteeing human rights.143 
The ability for such groups to provide a remedy for their violation of any obligations is limited. 
Truth, peace and reconciliation commissions, compensation commissions, or symbolic reparations 
may be appropriate in the absence of judicial bodies.144 If the perspective of ANSAs as guarantors of 
IHRL is rejected, then the human rights jurisdiction of the territorial state is maintained and they would 
be responsible for such obligations on its territory, whether or not they have de facto control. Still, as 
we shall see in Section 11.4, members of ANSAs could still be held individually criminally responsible 
for their actions using AWS. 
 
137 Bolívar Railway (n.125) 453; Moore (n.96) 956; Art.10, ARSIWA. 
138 See ICRC Study, note discussion on its worth in Chapter 3, Section 3.2; also see Andrew Clapham ‘Focussing 
on armed Non-State Actors’ in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook Of International 
Law In Armed Conflict (OUP 2014) 779-782. 
139 See Art.1, APII. 
140 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, 'Reparation For Violations Of International Humanitarian Law' (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross, 529, 534-535. 
141 See Jessica Burniske, Naz Modirzadeh and Dustin Lewis, 'Armed Non-State Actors And International Human 
Rights Law: An Analysis Of The Practice Of The U.N. Security Council And The U.N. General Assembly' (Harvard 
Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, 2017); Callamard (n.133) paras.10-18. 
142 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Reports, p.16, para.125; 
Callamard (n.133) para.47. 
143 Sargsyan v Azerbijan, App no:40167/06 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) paras.146-150; Isayeva v Russia, Judgment, 
App no:57950/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) para.178. 
144 Callamard (n.133) paras.84-94. 
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There are further issues of ANSAs being held responsible for their actions as a group under 
LoAC and IHRL: NIAC responsibility mechanisms have been poor; state parties to NIAC are bound by 
IHRL treaties whereas ANSAs are subject to a limited range of obligations (if any), thus creating an 
inequality between parties; application of NIAC rules requires a ‘nexus’ to the conflict,145 and so 
civilians beyond areas of armed conflict or in/near situations of combat not rising to an armed conflict 
may not have any entity responsible for their protection.146 The limited scope for ANSAs to be held 
responsible as a group for their use of AWS is, arguably, insufficient. However, this is the same as any 
ANSA actions, and so AWS are not subject to a specifically insufficient regime. Further, ICL can fill this 
gap by holding the members of an ANSA individually criminally responsible. 
 
8.2. State responsibilities and duties in relation to business and human rights 
The relationship between businesses and human rights is a developing area of international 
law.147 It is, somewhat, regulated under the standard rules of state responsibly. Where businesses, 
such as AWS manufacturers, are sufficiently tied to the state that it acts like a state organ, it can be 
treated as one.148 A state would need to exert ‘meaningful control’149 for this to happen.150 Holding 
special voting rights151 or even state-ownership,152 would not meet the threshold unless they are 
accompanied by meaningful control.153 Although state responsibility for AWS would primarily be 
rooted in the exercise of tactical control by commanders/operators, it could also exist through the 
 
145 Arts.2,5, and 6, APII and Art.75, API; also see Fortin (n.27) 47-51. 
146 See Callamard (n.133) para.28. 
147 See, for example, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (Human Rights Council, 26th session) 2014 UN 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, para.1. 
148 WTO, United States – Definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties on certain products from China (11 
March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, para.318. 
149 Note that this phrase does not have the same meaning as that in ‘meaningful human control’. 
150 US-China Anti-dumping (n.148) paras.318-320. 
151 Christina Balis, 'State Ownership In The European Defence Industry: Change Or Continuity?' (Avascent 2013) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20181003142224/https://www.avascent.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Avascent-State-Ownership.pdf> 6. 
152 Aude Fleurant, et al., 'The SPIRI Top 100 Arms-Producing And Military Service Companies, 2017' (SPIRI, 
2018) note the state ownership of arms manufacturers by China (pg.2) and India (pg.7). 
153 US-China Anti-dumping (n.148) paras.318-320. 
219 
 
technical control of their manufacturers if they are considered as a state organ. Even if an AWS 
manufacturer is not a state organ, a state could voluntarily adopt the relevant behaviour as its own 
but would not be obliged to.154 So, for example, if a state-controlled business provided AWS for the 
specific purpose of carrying out a genocide, then such arbitrary deprivations of life would seem to be 
attributable to the state.155 
A specific soft-law regime for business and human rights has also been developed. The Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights develop a ‘protect, respect, remedy’ framework.156 Duties 
towards protecting human rights, and remedying their breaches, are placed upon states, whilst the 
responsibility to respect human rights is placed upon businesses.157 
Under IHRL, states have indirect responsibilities to ensure that businesses within their 
jurisdiction, and those companies that they do business with, respect human rights. As most of the 
businesses involved in developing potential AWS technologies are private companies (e.g. BAE 
Systems,158 Northrop Grumman,159 Samsung160), states have an indirect responsibility to ensure that 
these companies respect human rights when they purchase such technologies. This applies whether 
the producer is within161 or outside of their territory.162 Thus, states would be obligated to ensure that 
 
154 Diplomatic and Consular Staff (n.93) para.74; Art.11, ARSIWA; Golda Meir (n.100). 
155 For specific examples of businesses assisting in atrocities, see Section 11.1. 
156 Annex, Art.1, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (Human 
Rights Council, 17th session) 2011 UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Hereafter: B&HR Guiding Principles). 
157 Note that ‘responsibility’ is used rather than ‘duty’ as businesses are not yet bound by human rights. See 
John Ruggie, 'The UN "Protect, Respect And Remedy" Framework For Business And Human Rights Outline' 
(Business & Human Rights, 2010) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20170904203338/https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf>, 2. 
158 BAE Systems, 'Taranis' (BAE Systems, 2016) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190812060713/https://www.baesystems.com/en-
uk/product/taranis1>. 
159 Northrop Grumman, 'X-47B UCAS Makes Aviation History…Again!' (Northrop Grumman, 2017) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190912001747/https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/x
47bucas/Pages/default.aspx>. 
160 John Pike, 'Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot' (Global Security, 2011) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190827141904/https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok
/sgr-a1.htm>. 
161 Commentary to Principle 2, B&HR Guiding Principles. 
162 Principles 5 and 6, B&HR Guiding Principles. 
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AWS manufacturing processes are IHRL compliant, and the resultant product could be used in 
compliance with IHRL. This reinforces the requirement to perform weapons reviews from an IHRL 
perspective.  
States should retain all documents related to the procurement of AWS from a private 
company. If the development or use of AWS were subject to an investigation by an IHRL tribunal, the 
tribunal would only have the power to compel the state to produce documents. The AWS 
manufacturer would be beyond their jurisdiction. As such, the state would be the only source of the 
relevant documents. 
Specific concern in the Guiding Principles is given to business and human rights in conflict 
zones.163 Although arms manufacturers are generally not present in conflict zones, their products are. 
As such, states should take civil, administrative, or criminal legal steps against companies within their 
jurisdiction that commit, or contribute to, human rights abuses.164 Further, the use of private military 
contractors (PMCs) by states is ever increasing.165 Should a state employ a PMC that uses AWS, then 
the state would be obligated to ensure that the PMC’s use of such systems is in accordance with IHRL. 
Within this regime, states are also under a duty to remedy human rights abuses through the 
creation of grievance mechanisms.166 Thus, where an AWS manufacturer is complicit in human rights 
abuses, states must enable the bringing of claims by creating mechanisms for remedy in order that 
their responsibility for AWS can be sufficiently regulated.  
 
 
163 Principle 7, B&HR Guiding Principles. 
164 Commentary to Principle 7, B&HR Guiding Principles. 
165 For example, BBC, 'What Are Private Security Companies Doing In Afghanistan?' (BBC News, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190530193957/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-46400647>. 
166 See Principles 25-31, B&HR Guiding Principles. 
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9. International criminal law 
This Chapter now turns to the applicability of international criminal law to the people involved 
in developing and using AWS. The following sections demonstrate how an AWS could perform the 
actus reus of several international crimes. Then, this thesis argues that those who exert control over 
AWS could be held responsible for acting through AWS to commit these crimes when they also possess 
the mens rea elements of the crimes, such that the use of AWS in contravention of ICL can be 
sufficiently regulated. This includes arguments for abandoning national policies that shield 
manufacturers from responsibility for their actions.167 In presenting an argument for a new paradigm 
of individual responsibility better suited to AWS, this Section also demonstrates how ICL could be 
applied to the senior management of AWS manufacturers, and the developers and users of AWS using 
existing legal precedents. Finally, the present Chapter looks at different modes of liability of command 
responsibility and the lex ferenda ‘procurement responsibility’ emanating from the exercise of 
procurement control.168 
ICL may have evolved by the time AWS are in common usage, or there may be some 
international instrument dealing with AWS. But, this should not create retroactive jurisdiction over 
the development and use of weapons with autonomy prior to that prohibition. To do so would go 
against the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which is ‘solidly embedded in ICL.’169 
The International Criminal Court may exercise its jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression,170 where the crimes occurred on the territory of a state 
party171 or the person accused of a crime is a national of a state party.172 In such cases, a state party 
 
167 See Section 5. 
168 Geoffrey Corn, 'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing The Inevitability Of 'Taking The Man Out Of The 
Loop', in Nehal Bhuta, et al.(eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems (CUP, 2016) 228-238. 
169 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Principle of Legality’ in Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta (eds.), Cassese's 
International Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2013) 30. 
170 Art.5, ICC Statute. 
171 Art.12(2)(a), ICC Statute. 
172 Art.12(2)(b), ICC Statute. 
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may refer itself to the ICC,173 the Prosecutor may initiate their own investigation,174 or the UN Security 
Council may refer a situation to the prosecutor.175 
The crime of aggression has been activated under ICC jurisdiction, and an AWS could be used 
in the acts constituting this crime. But, this offence is concerned with the choice to initiate an 
aggressive war,176 which is unlikely to be delegated to an AWS.177 Thus, it is the actions of these leaders 
that would be subject to a responsibility regime, and not those of the AWS. As such, the use of AWS 
under political control in a crime of aggression can be sufficiently regulated through subjecting these 
leaders to an individual responsibility regime. 
Yet, there are a number of states who are developing AWS and are not party to the ICC, 
namely China, India, Israel, Russia, and the US.178 Unless nationals from these states acted in a 
situation where the ICC has jurisdiction,179 the application of ICL in these states would generally be 
done through their domestic law. With regard to Grave Breaches of LoAC, all states are obligated to 
investigate and provide penal sanctions for such acts180 as the Geneva Conventions have become 
customary international law.181 However, other international crimes would be defined domestically; 
such definitions are broadly similar to those found in the statutes of international tribunals such as 
the ICC.182 Thus, many of the conclusions regarding unlawful behaviours by AWS from this Chapter 
could be applied in domestic courts. Yet, the self-contained responsibly mechanism in LoAC would be 
 
173 Art.13(a), ICC Statute. 
174 Art.13(c), ICC Statute. 
175 Art.13(b), ICC Statute; Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 
24 October 1945). 
176 Art.8 bis element 2, ICC, Elements Of Crimes (International Criminal Court 2011) (Hereafter: Elements of the 
Crimes). 
177 For discussion of AI systems in strategic decision-making, see Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell and Darragh 
Murray, 'Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, And The Use Of Force By States' 10 Journal of National 
Security Law & Policy, 1. 
178 See Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, ‘Mapping The Development Of Autonomy In Weapon 
Systems’ (SIPRI, 2017) 125-129. 
179 Note the inclusion of US nationals in the Prosecutors preliminary investigation into Afghanistan. See 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Pre-Trial Chamber II) Case No.ICC-02/17 [2019] ICC, 17-20. 
180 Art.49, GCI; Art.50, GCII; Art.129, GCIII; Art.146, GCIV; Art.86(1), API. 
181 Nuclear Weapons (n.91) para.79; Kupreškić (n.91) para.520. 
182 See, for example 18 U.S. Code § 1091 – Genocide; US Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2010. 
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useful domestically if there is no realistic method of prosecuting a wrongdoer under ICL rules where 
the ICC and its jurisprudence are unpopular.183 
Investigating unlawful acts performed by AWS could be made relatively simple in comparison 
to human beings as one would expect that all AWS actions and processes could be logged and 
examined ex post facto. This is of particular relevance where the substantive rules of targeting are 
‘purposely loose’,184 which can lead to difficulty in determining whether a proportionality decision is 
lawful when it is a ‘close call’,185 for example. It can be exceedingly difficult to prosecute someone 
whose behaviour falls within this grey area.186 Thus, where investigators can reconstruct the 
programming of an AWS and the instructions it was given, it may be possible to separate out the 
shades of grey into distinct lawful or unlawful choices. However, if the algorithms used to make 
decisions are highly-complex, this could hamper investigations.187 Perhaps, therefore, this creates 
another requirement that only ‘explainable’ algorithms should be used so that investigators could 
actually understand what happened.188 
 
10. The core crimes as they relate to AWS 
The following discussion of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes focusses upon 
their definitions under the Rome Statute, as this generally reflects CIL.189 However, this consideration 
 
183 See, for example, BBC, 'US Issues Threat To War Crimes Court' (BBC News, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190823073608/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
45474864>. 
184 Antonio Cassese, ‘War Crimes’ in Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta (eds.), Cassese's International Criminal 
Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2013)(Hereafter: Cassese WC) 74. 
185 Experts have noted that it is difficult to determine what qualifies as excessive in relation to a violation of the 
proportionality rule; see Laurent Gisel (ed.), The Principle Of Proportionality In The Rules Governing The 
Conduct Of Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC, 2018) 62-65. 
186 Note, for example, the Prosecutor abandoning a charge including the causing of disproportionate harm, 
Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević (Trial Judgement) Case No: IT-98-29/1-T [2007] ICTY, para.308. 
187 See Joshua G. Hughes, 'The Law Of Armed Conflict Issues Created By Programming Automatic Target 
Recognition System Using Deep Learning Methods' (2018) 21 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 99. 
188 See Wojciech Samek, Thomas Wiegand and Klaus-Robert Muller, 'Explainable Artificial Intelligence: 
Understanding, Visualising And Interpreting Deep Learning Models' [2017] arXiv 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190924160742/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.08296.pdf>. 
189 Kirsch (n.18) pg.xiii. 
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of the crimes is limited to what an AWS could perform. Thus, it is focussed upon those crimes related 
to killing, harm to persons, and destruction of property, although others are considered. Following the 
explanation of the core crimes in relation to AWS, the Chapter then discusses how individuals could 
be held responsible for their actions controlling these systems. 
 
10.1. Genocide 
 The aspects of the crime of genocide related to the following discussion are defined as:  
‘any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;’190 
An AWS could, by firing munitions, perform attacks that kill or cause serious bodily harm, 
thereby fulfilling the actus reus part of the offence. In order to fulfil the mental elements, an individual 
with either technical or tactical control would need to possess the requisite intent to engage in the 
unlawful conduct, or have knowledge that the unlawful acts will occur as a consequence of their 
actions,191 with the special intent to destroy the relevant group in whole or in part.192  
Further, as the Elements of the Crimes document that accompanies the ICC Statute suggests, 
rape and sexual violence could constitute ‘serious bodily or mental harm’193 and therefore an actus 
reus of genocide (rape is also an actus reus of crimes against humanity and war crimes). Although 
‘robots don’t rape’194 is a common argument for the moral superiority of using AWS, feminist analysis 
 
190 Art.6, ICC Statute. 
191 Art.30, ICC Statute. 
192 See Arts.6(a)(3) and (b)(3), Elements of the Crimes. 
193 Art.6(b) fn.3, Elements of the Crimes.  





of this position shows that in the same way that human soldiers can be ordered to ‘weaponise’ rape 
and sexual violence, developers could be ordered to programme an AWS to commit such acts.195 
There have been problematic definitions of rape in ICL196 and many definitions of rape require 
penetration by male genitalia.197 However, rape according to the ICC Statue can be performed ‘with 
any object’198 and requires the ‘[invasion] of the body of the victim…however slight.’ 199 Thus, it is 
possible for an AWS, as an object, to perform the act of rape as an international crime. In terms of 
AWS and other acts of sexual violence constituting ‘serious bodily or mental harm’,200 this requires 
that the perpetrator committed against a person, or caused a person to engage in, an ‘act of a sexual 
nature by force’ of a comparable gravity to other pre-defined crimes against humanity and war crimes 
of a sexual nature.201 As such, it is possible that an AWS could perform the required acts of a sexual 
nature for the purposes of causing serious bodily or mental harm as a crime of genocide. 
In order for the offences to be completed, the conduct required for the genocidal acts must 
be able to effect the destruction of the group in whole or in part, and be part of a manifest pattern to 
do so.202 As such, even a single instance of genocidal violence would be enough for the offence to be 
completed if it is part of such a pattern.203 However, the offender must genuinely intend to destroy 
the group,204 and this intent cannot be based on delusions that single acts of violence would affect the 
 




196 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement) Case No: ICTR-96-4-T [1998] ICTR, para.597; Prosecutor v 
Delalić and others (Trial Judgement) Case No: IT-96-21-T [1998] ICTY, para.479; Antonio Cassese, ‘Crimes 
Against Humanity’ in Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta (eds.), Cassese's International Criminal Law (3rd edn, 
OUP, 2013)(Hereafter: Cassese CAH) 96-97. 
197 See, for example, s.1, Sexual Offences Act 2003 UK; Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgement) Case No: IT-
95-17/1 [1998] ICTY, para.185. 
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entire group.205 For example, programming an AWS to kill all members of a particular group in a 
location where they are not present would not complete the offence. 
 
10.2. Crimes against humanity 
The aspects of crimes against humanity related to this discussion are defined as: 
‘any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) 
Extermination; … (g) Rape, … any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; … 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.’206 
In terms of murder, the victim must die as a result of the conduct.207 However, the perpetrator 
need not intend to kill the victim but could have intended to inflict grievous bodily harm, knowing that 
such harm would likely kill the victim, and be reckless as to that harm.208 More generally, a perpetrator 
need not anticipate the specific consequences of their conduct, but must be aware of the risk that 
their actions might bring about to the victim.209 For example, programming an AWS without adequate 
restrictions on its autonomous targeting, or tampering with such restrictions, might cause substantial 
harm that could not be anticipated. In regards to extermination, a particular population needs to be 
targeted in a way to ‘bring about the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population.’210 
This Chapter has already discussed the crimes of rape and sexual violence above, and that an AWS 
could commit the relevant acts for the offences. For those offences that entail killing or forms of sexual 
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violence other than rape, more than one person must be affected (only one person within the 
widespread or systematic attack need be affected for rape to be a crime against humanity).211 
Regarding ‘other inhumane acts’, this is a residual clause,212 which could allow for other 
serious physical and mental harms caused by AWS to be considered within the meaning of crimes 
against humanity.213 For example, it is claimed that the use of uninhabited aircraft vehicles (or 
‘drones’) has created psychological issues for those living under their zones of operation,214 this could 
potentially also be applied to AWS. As such, we can see that AWS could be used to perform the 
required behaviours constituting each crime noted above. 
 For the offences to be completed, the perpetrator must have the requisite intent. First, the 
perpetrator needs to intend to engage in the conduct, and mean to cause the relevant consequence, 
or know that it will happen in the ordinary course of events,215 and then have the additional knowledge 
of the context which the crimes take place in.216 
For the offences to become crimes against humanity, they must be part of an ‘attack directed 
at any civilian population’.217 This requires that there is a ‘course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of [the] acts.’218 Although the perpetrator need not know everything about the attack,219 
they must know that there is an attack against the civilian population and that their acts comprise part 
of it,220 or at least be aware that there is a risk of their behaviour being part of the attack.221 If the 
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attack is in an emergent stage, the intent to further it satisfies this mental element.222 Where this 
special intent exists alongside the intent to bring about the result of the individual offence and one of 
the offences have been committed, a crime against humanity exists. Should an individual with control 
over an AWS have the required intent, and an AWS performs the relevant acts due to that control, a 
crime against humanity would have been fulfilled. 
 
10.3. War crimes 
The war crimes related to this discussion are: wilful killing;223 inhumane treatment;224 wilfully 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;225 extensive destruction of property not 
demanded by military necessity;226 intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population;227 
intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects;228 intentionally directing attacks against 
personnel or objects of a humanitarian or peacekeeping character;229 intentionally launching an attack 
in the knowledge that it would be disproportionate in terms of civilian losses or environmental 
harm;230 attacking undefended places of residence which are not military objectives;231 killing or 
wounding a combatant who is hors de combat;232 making improper use of a flag of truce, of enemy 
insignia/uniforms, or protected insignia;233 intentionally directing attacks against buildings which are 
specially protected;234 treacherously killing or wounding adversaries;235 declaring that no quarter will 
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be given;236 committing rape, or any other form of sexual violence;237 violence to life and person, in 
particular murder against civilians and those hors de combat.238 
It is important to note that the ICC statute includes several crimes related to the use of 
prohibited weapons in an IAC.239 However, as we saw in Chapter 4 (Section 5.1), decisions to use such 
weaponry would be made by those using AWS and are not related to the autonomous nature of AWS 
attacks. Therefore, they are not further discussed here, save to say that the person deciding to use 
and employ such weapons on an AWS could be held responsible for their actions.  
The mental element of war crimes must involve intent and knowledge, meaning that the 
perpetrator means to engage in the conduct and means to cause the consequence or knows that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events.240 Whilst the ICC could have jurisdiction over individual 
instances of war crimes, the Court is more focussed upon when such crimes are ‘committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission.’241 Thus, an individual instance of using an AWS 
to perform a war crime is more likely to be prosecuted in domestic courts, but could be conducted at 
the ICC. 242 
 
10.3.1. The context of armed conflict 
Having shown that AWS could commit acts prohibited under ICL, this thesis now demonstrates 
how people exerting control over such acts can be responsible for them. The commission of war crimes 
requires that the unlawful conduct take place in the context of, and be associated with, an armed 
conflict, and the perpetrator be aware of the existence of that (international or non-international) 
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armed conflict.243 Consequently, the manufacturing of AWS, or other weapons, in advance of an 
armed conflict is difficult to reconcile with this provision. As McFarland and McCormack note, whilst 
it could be shown that weapons development in preparation for a conflict was ‘associated with’ it, a 
prosecutor could not show it to be ‘in the context of’ the conflict.244 This is because weapons 
manufacturing prior to a conflict would precede the context of the armed conflict. 
The concept of criminal conduct ‘closely related to hostilities’ has been considered by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in terms of acts committed at geographic distance, rather than temporal 
distance from the conflict.245 However, the ICTY and the Special Court for Sienna Leone (SCSL) have 
accepted the notion that aiding and abetting such crimes could be performed in advance of the armed 
conflict.246 Despite this case law, Article 22(2) of the ICC statute states that definitions shall be strictly 
construed and not extended by analogy. Thus, such precedents cannot be applied to ICC deliberations. 
This arguably creates a responsibility gap whereby AWS weapons manufacturers could programme a 
system to conduct acts constituting a war crime but could not be held responsible as war criminals 
because their behaviour takes place in advance of the armed conflict. Similar behaviour that 
constituted acts of genocide or crimes against humanity would not be immune from prosecution as 
no armed conflict is required for such crimes. Further, domestic courts might not require this context 
for a war crimes prosecution, or may apply ICTY and SCSL case law to expand their understanding. 
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Still, where the manufacturing of weapons takes place at the same time as the conflict, this 
could fall within the ‘context of’ the conflict. As such, AWS developers could come under ICC 
jurisdiction should they use, through their technical control, an AWS to perform a war crime during a 
conflict that is contemporary with manufacture. 
The fact that AWS manufacturers and their employees are likely to be civilian is irrelevant for 
the purposes of war crimes, as there is no requirement that the perpetrators be combatants in an IAC 
or NIAC, or directly participating in hostilities in a NIAC.247 Civilians may commit war crimes against 
other civilians or combatants in IAC, and against other civilians in a NIAC whether or not the victims 
are directly participating in hostilities. For an ordinary crime to become a war crime, there needs to 
be a link to the armed conflict that ‘played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit’ 
the offence.248 
 
11. Identifying types of potential offender 
This Chapter now moves to discuss the international criminal responsibilities of those involved 
in manufacturing AWS, and then moves to those who use, oversee, and review them. Their 
responsibility in terms of intent, negligence, and recklessness is discussed where relevant. 
 
11.1. International criminal responsibilities of AWS manufacturing companies and their 
senior management 
ICL has almost exclusively dealt with individuals. However, in the I.G. Farben case, a post-WWII 
US military tribunal partly dealt with the company who manufactured chemical gas used in Nazi 
extermination camps as a legal person. The company was seized, its war-making facilities dissolved,249 
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and a committee also took control of its research.250 As we have seen, the use of legal personhood to 
attribute responsibility is not ideal as it shields individual wrongdoers. However, if it is impossible to 
determine which individuals are responsible for unlawfully programming an AWS, then taking legal 
action against their company would be better than nothing. 
Dealing with a company as a legal person is unlikely to happen on the international level. First, 
because ICC jurisdiction only covers ‘natural persons’,251 and so the ICC could not prosecute a 
company. Second, international law has completely failed to hold companies responsible for their 
criminality in recent years.252 As such, taking this approach in the absence of individual criminal 
responsibility for employees of AWS manufacturers would need to be done on the domestic level. 
It is important to note that whilst this thesis has focussed on the developers who actually build 
and programme AWS, senior managers of their companies can also be held individual criminally 
responsible on the international level for their unlawful failures. For example, several ‘Nazi 
Industrialists’ were prosecuted under US jurisdiction following the Nuremberg Trials.253 Thus, there is 
no bar to holding senior management of an AWS manufacturer legally responsible under ICL if they 
were to play a willing role in international crimes as an accessory.254  
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11.2. ‘Acting through’ AWS and the ‘control of the crime’ approach 
In terms of AWS developers and commanders/operators, both exert control over the system 
and how it will function on operations (technical and tactical control, respectively) within the guidance 
of a weapons reviewer (procurement control). If they instructed an AWS to perform an international 
crime, they would plainly have the necessary mens rea. We saw in Chapter 3 that AWS can be 
understood as being the legal agents of those controlling them, and so the acts of the AWS can be 
seen as the acts of the controller. ICL has dealt specifically with the performance of the actus reus of 
a crime by a legal agent. 
In ICL, this concept is known as ‘acting through’ another (or the ‘control of crime’ approach, 
or ‘control theory’) it was brought into ICL as a method of holding the Nazi regime responsible as an 
internationally criminal organisation.255 It developed from German law where a direct perpetrator 
(Vordermann) is controlled by an indirect perpetrator (Hintermann).256 For example, an individual who 
uses their superior position to control and coerce, or exploit, an innocent child to perform a criminal 
act on their behalf.257 In such situations, the controlling indirect perpetrator can be held responsible 
for the acts of the innocent direct perpetrator. It has been incorporated into the ICC statute in terms 
of controlling entities acting through other people.258 
ICC case law has, so far, only considered control theory in relation to military commanders 
acting through their subordinates in a hierarchical structure.259 Judges Fullford and Van der Wyngart 
have criticised this approach and suggested that Article 25(3)(a), which allows for individual criminal 
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responsibility when acting through another, should be understood to focus on cases of co-
perpetration.260 The Article, however, clearly allows for cases of acting through another: 
 ‘a person shall be criminally responsible […] if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, 
whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of 
whether that other person is criminally responsible.’  
Despite the criticism, the Court has taken the correct approach and has interpreted ‘acting 
through’ to include relationships based upon control.261 
In terms of AWS, the language used by the judges in the Katanga and Chui pre-trial decision 
suggests that the ‘automatic’ following of orders by subordinates and the ‘mechanised’ way in which 
the organisation worked may enable parallels to be drawn to the actual use of machines.262 This would 
not be prohibited under Article 22(2) of the ICC statute which prevents extending the definition of 
crimes, but not an expansion of the understanding of perpetration. 
We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that the parallels between soldiers and machines are useful to 
show their common position in subordination to their commanders,263 and that the subordinate 
position of an AWS is subject to far greater control as human soldiers can choose to disobey unlawful 
orders264 whereas a machine cannot.265 Thus the manifestation of a commander’s (or operator’s) 
actions is much more clearly shown through an AWS than it would with be through soldiers. As such, 
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AWS should be seen as following programming/instructions in an ‘automatic’ and ‘mechanised’ 
manner, such that their controllers can be seen as acting through them for the purposes of individual 
criminal responsibly when an unlawful act is committed. This Chapter now discusses the particular 
issues of generating individual criminal responsibility for the exercise of technical, tactical, and 
procurement control, having already noted the responsibilities of states and non-state actors, and 
political leaders, for their political control. 
 
11.3. International criminal responsibility of AWS developers 
In terms of technical control, this Section considers three scenarios where AWS developers 
act unlawfully and could be held responsible. First, where a developer programmes an AWS to perform 
a criminal act. Second, where an individual unlawfully alters an AWS to assist, aid, or abet the 
commission of international crimes by others. Third, where the developers were reckless or negligent 
as to the programming of the system such that civilians are not protected. As the present Chapter 
noted above, developers could not be held responsible for the commission of war crimes that were 
not ‘in the context of […] an [armed conflict]’.266 
Where a developer intentionally programmes an AWS to perform unlawful acts by altering 
the algorithmic understanding of a target to include civilians or enabling an algorithmic bias against a 
particular type of person,267 for example, they would clearly have created a situation whereby they 
knew the unlawful acts would happen. Their intent and knowledge would fulfil the general mental 
elements for international crimes.268 The presence of any necessary special intent would fulfil the 
mental requirements for genocide and certain crimes against humanity.269 Should the AWS go on to 
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perform an international crime, the developer would be acting through the AWS and would fulfil the 
actus reus element. This completes the individual criminal responsibility that could be ascribed to a 
developer under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC statute. 
McCormack and McFarland argue that, in order for a developer to clearly be responsible, they 
may need to have programmed an AWS in such a way that the operator cannot intervene in their 
plan.270 This would seem to be correct. Should a developer, for example, programme civilian objects 
into the target database of an AWS, then their direct responsibility for the unlawful act would seem 
to be in question if an operator knew this information and deployed the system anyway. In such a 
situation, the role of the developer would seem to be accessorial. 
The second scenario of a developer altering AWS programming to assist, aid, or abet unlawful 
uses of AWS may seem outlandish but people have willingly assisted international crimes in similar 
circumstances.271 It is possible to imagine an AWS developer who becomes aware of some AWS 
operators using their products with a desire to commit international crimes and alters the controlling 
architecture to ‘unlock the door’ and enable these crimes to occur.  
The aiding and abetting of an international crime requires that such conduct is ‘for the purpose 
of facilitating the commission of such a crime.’272 Thus, a developer would need to be acting with the 
specific intention of facilitating the criminality, with knowledge that the ultimate perpetrator intended 
to do so, and that their actions would contribute to the unlawful activity.273 However, the ultimate 
perpetrator (the AWS operator) need not know that there has been any assisting, aiding, or abetting 
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to their crimes,274 nor need there be a common plan between them.275 Indeed, the aider or abettor 
need not be present with the ultimate perpetrator during the crime.276 
As ICL Courts have considered aiding and abetting behaviour for international crimes to exist 
before, during, and after the principal acts,277 the actions of an AWS developed prior to the acts of the 
ultimate perpetrator should still be seen as criminal. Yet, ICL case law has not yet needed to consider 
accessorial acts taking place at advanced temporal distance from the principal acts, such as that 
between weapons manufacture in peacetime and criminal acts years later,278 and so jurisprudence 
displays no indication as to a limit of acceptable advanced temporal distance for aiding and abetting 
in terms of genocide or crimes against humanity. As such, a court may decide that long time gaps 
between AWS manufacture and their unlawful use may be too far removed to be included. Yet, where 
the intent of the ultimate perpetrator and the developer’s accessorial intent exist at the same time 
during the manufacture of the AWS, this would seem to meet the threshold. Here, the developer 
would not necessarily be unlawfully acting through the AWS but using their technical control to enable 
the operator to act unlawfully through the AWS. They, would, therefore, be an accessory to the crimes. 
Should the relationship between nefarious developers and operators become so close that 
they are “acting pursuant to a common design, [and] possess the same criminal intent’,279 it may be 
possible to characterise their behaviour as a joint criminal enterprise. The ICC Statute allows for this,280 
and the use of AWS does not cause novel problems. 
In the third scenario, developers could programme an AWS so poorly that civilians are not 
protected, and they are reckless or negligent as to the harm that would come to the civilians. ICL case 
law has differing practice on whether these mental states are sufficient for mens rea. It has accepted 
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both recklessness,281 meaning that the offender knows it is probable that their acts will cause unlawful 
harm,282 and gross negligence,283 meaning that a person does not act to avert a risk of harm they know 
will come about due to their conduct being blatantly at odds with the required standard,284 as 
sufficient for fulfilling the mens rea element of international crimes. Yet, neither of these mental states 
are included in the ICC Statute, which requires intent and knowledge to fulfil mens rea ‘[u]nless 
otherwise provided’.285 As such, the Statute allows for negligence and recklessness to fulfil the mens 
rea elements where a ‘should have known’ threshold is used (conscripting children286 and command 
responsibility).287 As this threshold is not applicable to the circumstances of weapons developers, they 
are unlikely to be held responsible at the ICC for acts of recklessness or negligence. However, domestic 
jurisdictions commonly apply both standards to mens rea; where ICL is incorporated into domestic 
law, developers could be held responsible for their unlawfully reckless or negligent acts. 
 
11.4. International criminal responsibility of AWS users 
This Section considers the responsibility for AWS where they are firmly under the tactical 
control of operators. Where an operator specifically instructs an AWS to perform an internationally 
criminal act, they would commit the actus reus elements by acting through the AWS. They would 
possess the mens rea elements by intentionally instructing an AWS to perform the unlawful act and 
knowing that it would occur as a consequence of those instructions.288 For genocide and certain crimes 
against humanity, this would also need additional special intent.289 
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For example, an operator could use an AWS for ad hoc targeting against a field hospital.290 Or, 
they could inflate the acceptable level of incidental harm during an autonomous mission such that the 
same medical personnel and hospital would be incidentally damaged.291 The effect of each nefarious 
act would be the same: protected persons would be unlawfully harmed. The operator could be held 
responsible in either case, as they would display both intent and knowledge that their actions would 
result in unlawful conduct. 
In terms of aiding and abetting, it is not inconceivable that an operator might allow an AWS 
that they know has been unlawfully programmed by a developer to be used for missions. The 
responsibility framework would be the same as outlined in the previous Section. But, as the operator 
would need to be directly involved with the developer’s plan, the relationship between a nefarious 
developer and a nefarious operator would need to be quite close. This could, therefore go beyond a 
mere accessorial relationship and into a joint criminal enterprise quite easily. 
In terms of recklessness and negligence, we have already seen that these standards are not 
always applicable at the ICC, despite precedents for their use in ICL. Such claims could be heard in 
domestic courts applying ICL rules, however. Negligence is particularly relevant to the use of highly 
complex machines. These systems could be so complex that they are beyond human understanding.292 
This raises the issue of how a threshold of negligence can be decided when it may be impossible to 
fully comprehend the workings of these systems. Sassóli articulates that operators need not 
comprehend the complex mechanisms of AWS, but must understand the capabilities of the system.293 
In much the same way, all people who drive cars understand the capabilities of the vehicle to move 
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/your-turn-doctor/>. 
291 See Carrie McDougall, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and Accountability: Putting the Cart Before the 
Horse’ (2019) 20 Melbourne Journal of International Law 58, 69. 
292 See Hughes (n.187). 
293 Marco Sassóli, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions And Legal Issues To Be Clarified' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 307, 324. 
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but many do not understand the precise nature of an internal combustion engine. Thus, adequate 
training would need to bring operators up to an appropriate level of understanding.294 Consequently, 
any claim of negligence against an operator could only be levelled on the basis that they did not give 
adequate thought to the capabilities of the system. A negligence claim could not be made because the 
operator did not consider the complex technical workings of the robot. Following the same logic in 
terms of claiming recklessness, an operator could not be thought of as reckless if an unlawful act 
occurred and an advanced level of understanding, beyond that which would be reasonable for an 
operator to have, was required to foresee that the acts would probably happen. 
 
11.5. Superior orders that are (not) manifestly unlawful 
The notion of leaders, or commanders, ordering subordinates to use an AWS for criminal acts 
is something we saw earlier in relation to policies of using sexual violence as a ‘weapon’. Should a 
superior order a subordinate to commit a crime using an AWS, they themselves would be individually 
criminally responsible under Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC statute. 
In normal circumstances, an operator being ordered to use an AWS for criminality would not 
prevent their individual responsibility. However, Article 33 of the ICC statute provides that the defence 
of superior orders can be activated where a criminal act has occurred and a subordinate is under a 
legal duty to follow orders, the subordinate did not know the order was unlawful, and the order was 
not manifestly unlawful.295 For an order to be manifestly unlawful, it must be obviously illegal to a 
reasonable combatant (orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are always manifestly 
unlawful).296  
 
294 Training operators to an appropriate level of understanding is already US policy, see US UNOG delegation, 
cited in Chengeta (n.3) 24. 
295 Art.33(2), ICC Statute. 
296 Mark W.S. Hobel, '"So Vast An Area Of Legal Responsibility"? The Superior Orders Defense And Good Faith 
Reliance On Advice Of Counsel' (2011) 111 Colombia Law Review, 574, 587-590. 
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It is possible to imagine a situation where a commander orders an AWS operator to use the 
system in an attack that does not seem manifestly unlawful. As this thesis has discussed at length, 
target identification by AWS is based on recognising characteristics associated with adversaries. The 
legality of an attack, therefore, can hinge upon whether the characteristic is lawful in terms of 
distinguishing a target. There are many motifs displayed by those actively fighting for a cause, and 
some are shared with those peacefully supporting such a cause.297 An order to target individuals based 
upon them displaying such a motif would only be manifestly unlawful if the operator is aware that the 
symbol was displayed by both legitimate targets and civilians. Where an operator is unaware of such 
facts, they could rely upon a defence of superior orders and the commander issuing an unlawful 
command would be held responsible. 
It is problematic that this defence only applies to cases of war crimes with superior orders not 
being a defence to genocide and crimes against humanity. Still, other defences may be available, and 
superior orders could potentially be extended to genocide and crimes against humanity under Article 
31(3) which allows grounds for excluding criminal responsibility other than those specifically listed 
under Article 31(1) to be considered (mental disease, intoxication, self-defence, duress). 
 
11.6. Modes of liability: command responsibility 
Having discussed AWS operators, the Chapter now moves to consider their commanders who 
will oversee AWS operations. The standard for command responsibility in the ICC Statute states that 
a commander shall be held responsible for the crimes of their subordinates under their effective 
control where they knew or, owing to the circumstances, should have known that their forces were 
 
297 See, for example, the Easter Lily motif, a symbol of Irish republicanism displayed both by peaceful and 
violent organisations, see Ireland Calling, 'Easter Lily - Irish Symbol Of Peace' (Ireland Calling, 2018) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20180626105121/http://ireland-calling.com/easter-lily/>. This is 
provided only as an example and is not meant to suggest that ‘The Troubles’ were legally an armed conflict. 
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committing (or were about to commit) international crimes, and failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent or punish such criminality.298  
Where the commander is a civilian superior (a political leader, for example), the standard is 
altered such that they must consciously disregard information clearly indicating that their 
subordinates were committing or were about to commit international crimes, rather than that they 
should have known; the crimes concerned must also be under the effective control and authority of 
the civilian commander.299  
The superior-subordinate relationship may be de jure, or de facto.300 The ICC Trial Chamber in 
Bemba elucidated various factors that may indicate the existence of command authority and effective 
control in a military context,301 and the SCSL Trial Chamber did so in relation to the ANSA context.302 
A similar degree of control is required in civilian superior-subordinate relationships for the purposes 
of command responsibility.303 Essentially, anybody with the ability to order a subordinate operator to 
use an AWS to act in a particular way would have the required level of control over the subordinate 
and the system to establish command responsibility, whatever their position in the command 
hierarchy.304  
The ICC requires an element of causation to confirm the applicability of command 
responsibility, unlike the ICTY and ICTR.305 Whilst command failures need not have enabled the 
commission of the crimes, the crimes (or an increased risk of the crimes occurring)306 must have 
occurred as a result of the superior’s failure to exercise control over their subordinates at the relevant 
 
298 Art.28(a), ICC Statute; note that this is a less strict interpretation than in Yamashita (n.64). 
299 Art.28(b), ICC Statute. 
300 Delalić and others (Trial)(n.196) para.370. 
301 Bemba (n.306) para.417. 
302 Prosecutor v Brima and Others (Trial Judgement) Case No: SCSL-04-16-T [2007] SCSL, para.788. 
303 Prosecutor v Nahimara and others (Appeal Judgement) Case No: ICTR-99-52-A [2007] ICTR, paras.606-609. 
304 Blaškić (Trial)(n.221) para.301. 
305 Baig (n.64) 187. 
306 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Pre-Trial Chamber II) Case No: ICC-01/05-01/08-424 [2009] ICC, para.425. 
243 
 
time.307 This need not entail knowledge of a specific unlawful plan by subordinates but may be general 
information to make the commander aware that unlawful acts could occur. The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
suggests knowledge that subordinates are violent, unstable, or inebriated, would be enough general 
information to put the commander on notice that unlawful acts might be committed by their 
subordinates.308 Thus, where an AWS commander is aware that their subordinates operating AWS 
present a risk of unlawful conduct, they are under a duty to prevent such offences. Where a 
commander should have known of such happenings, they could also be held responsible as a form of 
negligence.309 It also seems possible to extend command responsibility to the AWS as a subordinate. 
So, as with violent, unstable, or inebriated human subordinates, a commander would also be on notice 
of the potential for unlawful acts if they knew that the ability of an AWS under their command to be 
used in compliance with the law could not be assured.310 
Preventing subordinate criminality must entail the superior taking all necessary measurers 
within their material ability,311 which may potentially go beyond their formal powers.312 The ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber took both ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence to create a non-exhaustive list as to what would 
constitute discharging the duty to prevent:  
‘(i) to ensure that superior's forces are adequately trained in [LoAC]; (ii) to secure reports 
that military actions were carried out in accordance with international law; (iii) to issue 
orders aiming at bringing the relevant practices into accord with the rules of war; (iv) to 
take disciplinary measures to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under 
the superior's command.’313 
 
307 Bemba (n.306) para.418. 
308 Prosecutor v Delalić and others (Appeal Judgement) Case No: IT-96-21-A [2001] ICTY, para.238. 
309 Bemba (n.306) para.429. 
310 Christopher M. Ford, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Law' (2017) 69 South Carolina Law Review, 
413, 474. 
311 Blaškić (Appeal)(n.246) para.438 
312 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Appeal Judgement) Case No: ICTR-95-1-A [2001] ICTR, para.302; 
Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Appeal Judgement) Case No:IT-00-39-A [2009] ICTY, para.193-194. 
313 Bemba (n.306) para.438 
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In terms of AWS, a commander may be required to ensure that in addition to their human 
forces being adequately trained under part (i), that their robotic forces are adequately capable of 
performing the tasks asked of them in accordance with international law.314 However, whilst a 
commander should have the same degree of knowledge as a reasonable commander at a comparable 
level of command and in a comparable operational context,315 this does not require deep technical 
knowledge of the AWS nor each operation. Nor does this justify a wilful or negligent lack of knowledge 
about either the technical aspects of the system or operations. Thus, if a commander were to fail to 
ensure that AWS under their command were programmed to enable lawful use, that would seem to 
constitute a failure of command responsibly (part (i)).316 Another failure might be not ensuring that 
AWS are used in such a way as to be legally compliant (part (iii)), for example, not monitoring that 
AWS operators were taking adequate care of civilians or placing sufficient restrictions on autonomous 
functioning. 
In terms of the duty to repress, and punish, subordinate criminality, the ICC Statute only 
extends to knowledge about acts that subordinates are ‘committing or [are] about to commit’.317 This 
implies that the duty to punish subordinates does not extend to commanders who are informed about 
such criminality ex post facto.318 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber has extended the meaning of this 
duty to include both ongoing crimes, and that which have occurred.319 Thus, where an AWS 
commander becomes aware that these systems are being used for criminality, whether it is happening 
at the time, or has already finished, they would be legally required to punish the operators who 
engaged in unlawful acts. This may be fulfilled using disciplinary measures immediately available to 
the commander, or through enabling investigation by competent authorities.320 Of course, an AWS 
 
314 Ford, (n.310) 474. 
315 Tallinn Manual, Rule 85 commentary para.10. 
316 See Section 12 for more on issues created by highly complex systems. 
317 Art.28, ICC Statute. 
318 Baig (n.64) 187. 
319 Bemba (n.306) para.439. 
320 Blaškić (Appeal)(n.246) para.68. 
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commander could not punish an AWS when it is used in a criminal act and so the duty to repress could 
only apply to human subordinates. 
 
11.7. Modes of liability: procurement responsibility  
Corn suggests a new mode of liability for persons involved in the testing and procurement of 
AWS which shares a conceptual basis with command responsibility. This is a lex ferenda suggestion. 
But, unlike others, such as Crootof’s War Torts concept,321 it a comparatively modest proposal to 
recognise that both commanders and procurers exert control over AWS and apply similar rules to that 
command, rather than creating a whole new body of law. As we saw in Chapter 3, procurement 
responsibility is the basis of the conception of procurement control used in this thesis.322 The weapons 
testing process (Chapter 4) is a key moment for exercising such control. It is also a significant 
opportunity to correct, or cancel, the development of an AWS that is unlikely to produce a lawful 
system. Further, the guidance resulting from a review can shape the use of AWS as discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
As Corn suggests, the current conception of command responsibility is not flexible enough to 
accommodate a shift of focus to procurement responsibility.323 But, Corn’s concept is based upon the 
same foundation as command responsibility (accomplice liability and negligence).324 Considering the 
similar conceptual basis, and the importance of weapons reviewers in terms of AWS being used in 
compliance with international law, it is worth considering procurement responsibility. Following Corn, 
it is possible to reconceptualise and then apply command responsibility as procurement 
responsibility.325 So the argument goes, where weapons reviewers knew of issues with AWS and did 
 
321 Crootof (n.8). 
322 Art.28, ICC Statute. 
323 Corn (n.168) 232. 
324 Corn (n.168) 233. 
325 Corn (n.168) 232. 
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nothing, or should have known about issues and did nothing, they would be held responsible for those 
issues.326  
 As we have already seen, if this type of control is exercised properly, it makes wrongful actions 
unforeseeable.327 Indeed, where an AWS creates a violation of international law, and the reason for 
this is found to be an inadequate procurement process, then the official who carried out the relevant 
parts of the procurement process should be held responsible.328 
Applying the standard of ignoring known issues to weapons testers and reviewers is not overly 
problematic. However, applying a ‘should-have-known’ standard does create an issue. With human 
soldiers, a commander is responsible for their training, and would, therefore, be aware of any gaps, 
or personal issues, that may become problematic during combat.329 Yet, weapons reviewers are not 
directly involved in the programming of AWS. Thus, even if they have a considerable technical 
understanding of the system through testing,330 that would not necessarily allow them to understand 
the nuances of how the system will work in all contexts. Where such a level of technical knowledge is 
reasonable, a should-have-known standard could be implemented and persons who are not aware of 
required information could be held responsible if the system acts unlawfully and this is avoidable. 
Yet, where knowledge of the reviewer is at a reasonable level, and that is still insufficient, for 
example, if the AWS was very highly complex, a should-have-known standard should not be used 
because the level of knowledge required is unreasonable to expect. As such, this reinforces the 
argument that despite the complexity of these systems, they need to be understandable by humans 
in order for many legal and policy duties to be performed.331 
 
326 Art.28, ICC Statute. 
327 Corn (n.168) 233. 
328 Corn (n.168) 235. 
329 Corn (n.168) 234. 
330 Corn (n.168) 228-238. 
331 See Samek, Wiegand and Muller (n.188); Hughes (n.187). 
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In summary, Corn’s argument for a new mode of liability is convincing in relation to weapons 
reviewers who know of issues and disregard them, and in relation to issues that they reasonably 
should-have-known about. But, it comes unstuck where the complexity of a system is beyond 
reasonably expected knowledge. Thus, in addition to having a mode of liability dependent upon the 
complexity of the system, a more preferable solution would be to ensure that all systems are 
manufactured in such a way that they are understandable to human beings of reasonable experience 
and knowledge. 
Still, as the concept of procurement responsibility is still only a suggestion, it is more likely 
that any failure to adequately review a weapon would be dealt with under service law, or with 
administrative means in the domestic setting.332 For such failures to become unlawful on the 
international level, some changes would be needed. 
 
12. Remaining issues 
Having started this Chapter by discussing the possibility that a responsibility gap might exist 
in relation to AWS, it is clear from the foregoing discussion that there are several entities that can be 
held responsible for the internationally wrongful, or criminal, acts of an AWS. However, the present 
Chapter has also noted areas where these gaps are not completely closed, and issues remain. 
Responsibility gaps still exist in relation to: AWS developers who fulfil the actus reus and mens 
rea of war crimes during peace-time manufacturing, and yet because of the temporal distance from 
an armed conflict cannot be held to have committed a war crime under international law; AWS 
manufacturing companies cannot be held responsible on the international level due to not having 
 
332 For example, see Armed Forces Act 2006; Dickinson (n.21); UK MoD (n.21); McNeal (n.21). 
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legal personality under ICL;333 the multi-national nature of modern weapon production334 may create 
issues for any victims of manufacturer wrongdoing as a multi-jurisdictional investigation may simply 
be too difficult to create (note that multi-agency investigations across jurisdictions can fulfil the duty 
to investigate under IHRL). 335  
As we saw in Section 2, domestic law may be capable of filling some gaps where individuals 
and manufacturers involved in developing and using AWS have committed acts that are unlawful 
under domestic criminal law. Further, tort law could allow for AWS manufacturers to be held 
responsible under a product liability regime, or where a company fails to provide required information 
or training for their products,336 for example. 
The closure of several responsibility gaps is dependent upon certain premises. This first 
requires states to change their policies to accept that arms manufacturers can be responsible for their 
products following delivery. Second is to understand that those exercising control over AWS act 
through them such that the actions of an AWS are the manifestation of their control. Where these 
arguments are not accepted, responsibility gaps would exist as the most obvious fall-back position 
would be the current paradigm that has been shown to be insufficient.  
The complexity of AWS can cause problems for investigators of wrongdoing. Much like with 
operators,337 commanders,338 and reviewers,339 the performance of investigative duties require such 
 
333 Note this jurisdiction in other areas of international law: Barcelona Traction (n.128) para.56; Case 
Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) Preliminary 
Objections [2007] ICJ Reports, p.582, para.61; Ralph G. Steinhardt, ‘Responsibilities of Multinational 
Corporations’ in Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed.), Weapons Under International Human Rights Law (CUP, 2015). 
334 See the large number of contributing companies from different countries: BAE Systems, 'Taranis' (BAE 
Systems, 2016) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190812060713/https://www.baesystems.com/en-
uk/product/taranis1>; Dassault, 'Neuron, The European Combat Drone Demonstrator: Introduction' (Dassault 
Aviation, 2018) Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190727165638/https://www.dassault-
aviation.com/en/defense/neuron/introduction/>. 
335 Pearson v United Kingdom, App no:40957/07 (ECtHR, 13 December 2011) para.71; Maktouf and 
Damjanović, App nos: 2312/08 and 34179/08 (ECtHR, 18 July 2013) para.82. 
336 See: Turner et al.; Heston et al.; Rosa (n.23). 
337 Sassóli (n.293) 324. 
338 Tallinn Manual, Rule 85 commentary para.10. 
339 Hughes (n.187). 
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persons to understand the system they are examining. Where a system is complex, this may require a 
technical expert to be available where necessary to carry out these duties. This is not a significant leap 
beyond current doctrine, which already allows for advisers across the development and use of 
weapons,340 and is encouraged in relation to cyber-operations.341 A similar solution could be employed 
with AWS. 
Yet, some cutting-edge algorithms are so complex as to be beyond the understanding of 
experts.342 The use of explainable algorithms, which provide evidence for their decisions, might be the 
only way for humans to understand these systems at the necessary level. As such, they may be legally 
required in order to fulfil the obligations of operators, commanders, procurers, and investigators.343 
 
13. Conclusion 
Having considered many aspects of accountability, responsibly, and liability as they relate to 
AWS and the different entities that control them, this Chapter has sketched out a new paradigm of 
responsibility for AWS. It argues that those who control the unlawful actions of the system should be 
held responsible, no matter their position. This argument has been reinforced by applying current 
international law rules and precedents from ICL trials. Thus, this Chapter has demonstrated how a 
sufficient responsibility paradigm could be applied to the use of AWS and over all entities exercising 
political, procurement, technical, or tactical control. Thus, the exercising of control has clear links to 
being held responsible for wrongdoing that results from such control. In conformity with the layers of 
control outlined in Chapter 3, the holding of each entity responsible for their controlling acts can be 
 
340 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution (3rd edn, UK Ministry of 
Defence 2009), 1-9; UK Ministry of Defence, 'Legal Review Of Newly Acquired Or Developed Weapons Or 
Associated Equipment (2009DIN04-217)' (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2009) para.11. 
341 Tallinn Manual, Rule 114 commentary para.6. 
342 Boulanin and Verbruggen (n.178) 17. 
343 Hughes (n.187). 
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seen in parallel; if multiple controlling entities have engaged in wrongdoing, then each wrongdoer 
should be held responsible separately.  
This Chapter also noted that in order for sufficient investigations, reviews, the exercise of 
command responsibility, and the fulfilment of operator duties to be enabled, that explainable 
algorithms be used in AWS or technical experts be present during AWS use. Essentially, this also adds 
additional regulation to the use of AWS. 
The highly technical nature of AWS does not, therefore, create a responsibility gap so large 
that AWS should never be lawfully used as some have claimed.344 But, all persons involved in the 
production and use of AWS can be held responsible in some way. This should be based on the level of 
control that an entity has over an AWS, which should be reflected in the applicable responsibility 
paradigm. Still, the proposed paradigm hinges upon its main points being accepted. Where they are 
not accepted, wide responsibility gaps could be created, and this could hamper the fulfilment of any 
victim's right to a remedy. However, the proposed paradigm does not solve all issues and some small 
responsibility gaps may not be possible to fill in international law but could be filled under domestic 
law. Consequently, it can be said that, in terms of responsibility, international law is capable of 
sufficiently regulating AWS in most cases. But, there some instances where domestic law must fill 
gaps. 
 
344 HRW (n.2); Chengeta (n.3); Sparrow (n.3). 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
1. Layers of control and technological management 
Considering autonomous weapon systems (AWS) from the layers of control approach has 
allowed us to see that, on the whole, current international law can sufficiently regulate AWS. We have 
observed through each substantive Chapter that legal duties are placed upon the human beings who 
exercise political, procurement, technical, and tactical control over AWS, and they must ensure that 
the deployment, development, manufacture, and use of AWS are in conformity with the law, 
respectively, as AWS are their legal agents. Consequently, failures in their exercise of control also 
entail their responsibility if legal obligations are violated by AWS. Taking this view of AWS was 
necessary as they are subject to the control over their programming and instructions by their very 
nature. Each entity exercises their control in parallel; as such, there is no competition between entities 
which means that responsibility can be attributed discretely to multiple parties if necessary. 
The use of technological management has also been discussed as a method by which some 
breaches of legal rules can be made impossible. There are moral issues raised by this,1 but the 
continual narrowing of possible behaviours that an AWS could perform into only allowing those that 
are desirable would seem to be a positive outcome in legal terms. However, as we saw through 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the actual lawful use of these systems is fundamentally dependent upon 
developers building, and commanders using, these systems in lawful ways, as authorised by reviewers. 
As such, whilst a nefarious AWS user could choose to use a system unlawfully, as with other weapons, 




1 Roger Brownsword, 'Technological Management And The Rule Of Law' (2016) 8 Law, Innovation and 
Technology, 100, 129-131. 
252 
 
2. Is current law sufficient to regulate AWS? 
This thesis suggested that the ideal solution for how international law should deal with AWS 
would be a comprehensive regulatory treaty covering their development, manufacture, use, 
proliferation, and responsibility.2 However, as we have seen, there is little likelihood that any 
international instrument can be agreed to deal with AWS, whether regulatory or prohibitive. As such, 
this thesis is left to examine present-day international law and its ability to deal with AWS. It has shown 
that the best way to understand the lawfully compliant use of AWS is through layers of control. This 
returns the discussion to the research question of the thesis: Can international law as it currently 
stands sufficiently regulate autonomous weapon systems, or is new law required? 
We have seen over three analytical chapters, that, broadly, international law does have the 
tools to deal with AWS, although some specific areas where the law is, at best, sub-optimal have been 
noted. It has also been shown how legal rules are applied through exercises of control. For example, 
in the discussion of weapons law, we saw that, in order to effectively deal with the autonomous nature 
of these systems, reviewers, when exercising procurement control, need to consider the ability of an 
AWS to recognise potential targets as distinct from non-targets, and that this is different from the 
normal consideration of accuracy when evaluating whether a weapon is inherently indiscriminate. 
A reviewer’s ability to consider this is due to the inherent flexibility of the legal framework of 
weapons reviews. Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which creates the treaty obligation to carry out 
weapons reviews, and the customary rules which create implied duties to evaluate weapons,3 do not 
state how a weapons review should be carried out. As such, this allows them to be used flexibly so as 
to be comprehensive enough to sufficiently regulate AWS and their novelty as weapons. Decisions to 
use this flexibility would also form part of procurement control. 
 
2 Rebecca Crootof, 'The Killer Robots Are Here: Legality And Policy Implications' (2015) 36 Cardozo Law Review, 
1837, 1897; Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner and Mathew Waxman, 'Adapting The Law Of Armed Conflict To 
Autonomous Weapon Systems' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 335, 406-408. 
3 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: 
Rules (CUP, 2005), Rule 71. 
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Technical control is also key here as it is the ability of weapons developers to produce a system 
that can be used in compliance with the law is also crucial. This thesis has shown that technical control 
does not just revolve around creating AWS so as to be lawfully usable by commanders/operators, but 
also that the programming of AWS for use in combat results in them partaking in the targeting cycle.4 
Thus, their control over AWS, and their responsibility for how AWS work, extends into deployment of 
these system more significantly than for any other weapon system. It was important for this thesis to 
evaluate the enduing influence of AWS developers in order to determine how legal rules apply to them 
so as to be able to show that current legal regimes can sufficiently regulate their actions in relation to 
AWS. 
The application of targeting law is like weapons law in that it does not prescribe how particular 
tasks should take place. On a basic level, if the required tasks are performed, the law is complied with. 
As we saw throughout the thesis, autonomous systems using artificial intelligence are incapable of 
assessing qualitative values. Thus, they cannot be used for those legally required tasks that need 
innate qualitative judgement. This is not necessarily fatal to the lawfulness of using AWS, it merely 
means that humans must perform these tasks and have an ongoing engagement with each mission 
AWS are used for. However, autonomous systems can assess quantitative data and so could lawfully 
perform tasks involving quantitative analysis. Therefore, through dividing these tasks between human 
and machine, compliance with the law whilst using these systems can be enabled. Consequently, it 
can be said that the targeting law regime can regulate AWS sufficiently. 
The human engagement, and the key decisions it involves, across this human-machine division 
of labour is the crux of tactical control as commanders are determining how attacks using AWS should 
take place. This includes not only the targets, time and location of attack, and weapons to be used (or 
effects to be caused), but also how targets and civilians should be recognised and how the AWS should 
 
4 US Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms (US DOD, 2018)(Hereafter: DoD 
Dictionary) see ‘Targeting’. 
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deal with this information, and all of this in terms of whether targeting by the AWS will take place in 
a fully-autonomous, semi-autonomous, or remote-controlled mode. 
Regarding responsibility, we saw in the previous Chapter that international law, and 
international criminal law in particular, does have the tools to deal with the use of AWS in most cases. 
However, making use of these tools would require a paradigm shift to reflect an understanding of the 
different controlling relationships the thesis has explained: to change national policies so that 
manufacturers can be seen as responsible for their products after delivery; to change the view of 
control theory such that it includes perpetrators ‘acting through’ an AWS as an innocent agent.  
However, the biggest gap in this responsibility paradigm is that related to weapons developers 
who make an AWS in peacetime that goes on to perform a war crime, as such crimes under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court require the actus reus to take place ‘in the context of’ an 
armed conflict.5 Whilst the definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute are strictly construed,6 other courts 
could follow precedents that include an understanding that some war crimes begin before an armed 
conflict breaks out.7  
Closing such gaps would enable those who exert control over AWS to be responsible for their 
actions in exerting that control, whichever layer their control comes from. In most cases, this should 
allow international legal rules on responsibility to be applied to each controlling entity as necessary. 
By following the approach that the exercise of control leads to responsibility for that control, we can 
see that current international legal rules are generally capable of regulating responsibility for AWS at 
a sufficient level in theory. 
 
5 See the last two requirements for each crime under Art.8, International Criminal Court, Elements Of Crimes 
(International Criminal Court, 2011). 
6 Art.22(2), Rome Statue Of The International Criminal Court 1998 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3. 
7 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Appeal Judgment) Case No: IT-95-14-A [2004] ICTY, para.48; Prosecutor v Taylor (Trial 
Judgement) Case No: SCSL-03-01-T [2012] SCSL, para.484. 
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In considering these legal areas together, we can see that, overall, AWS can be sufficiently 
regulated by current international law. But, in order to appropriately reflect the layers of control 
approach that this thesis has shown to be optimal for understanding AWS,  sufficient regulation 
requires legal rules to be used flexibly in terms of weapons law, to be applied across a human-machine 
division of labour with regard to targeting law, and used with an altered perspective when dealing 
with responsibility. As such, the legal framework that has been outlined through the thesis stretches 
current interpretations of international law, as it applies to AWS, further than ever before. Yet, the 
efficacy of this framework is dependent upon it being accepted. This is not guaranteed. Rejection 
would lead to inadequate regulation of AWS.  
 
3. Further issues to discuss 
The most obvious issue that needs further discussion is how to ensure that legal frameworks 
that do sufficiently regulate AWS are assured and implemented. Considering that the process of 
developing a specific international instrument to regulate AWS is unlikely to succeed, soft law can be 
considered. Creation of soft law regulation to cement this framework, and the layers of control 
approach, in a way that appeals to many states, with the hope that it would become part of customary 
international law and national military manuals, seems to be the best way forward.8 
Another issue that requires further discussion is the use of highly complex programming in 
systems such as AWS. The last Chapter noted that if people reviewing,9 using, 10 or investigating11 AWS 
 
8 Note that part of the forthcoming Oslo Manual considers AWS. 
9 Joshua G. Hughes, 'The Law Of Armed Conflict Issues Created By Programming Automatic Target Recognition 
System Using Deep Learning Methods' (2018) 21 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 99. 
10 Marco Sassóli, 'Autonomous Weapons And International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions And Legal Issues To Be Clarified' (2014) 90 International Law Studies, 308, 324; Michael N Schmitt 
and Liis Vihul, Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The International Law Applicable To Cyber Operations (2nd edn, CUP, 
2017), Rule 86 commentary para.6. 
11 Art.91, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 
UNTS 3 (Hereafter: API); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law (60th session, 21 March 2006) UN Doc. A/RES/60/147. 
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cannot understand how they work, then this impairs their ability to fulfil their legal obligations. 
Solutions to this are either to provide technical advice to these decision-makers or develop explainable 
algorithms.12 In order that the law is complied with, it is imperative that the practicalities of how these 
solutions could be implemented are worked out. It has a particular impact upon whether the 
complexity of these systems could impair the understanding of AWS to such a degree that it becomes 
impossible to fulfil these duties. Consequently, whilst we have seen in the previous chapters that AWS 
are not unlawful, and can be regulated, if some AWS in the future are so complicated that obligations 
cannot be fulfilled, then those particular systems could not be said to be sufficiently regulated and 
could, therefore, be thought of as unlawful. Thus, enabling these obligations to be complied with is 
essential to the lawful use and regulation of AWS in the future. 
 
4. Continuing moral issues 
Returning to the discussion from Chapter 2 on distance and technology being driving trends 
behind the development of AWS, we can see that these systems are pushing both concepts further 
than ever before. Although this thesis has noted the significant layers of control that humans will 
retain over these systems, a lack of direct human control is still unnerving. Indeed, this would seem to 
be the basis of concerns about the use of these systems. The discussion in Chapter 2 noted that many 
of the moral arguments made about AWS do not seem to stand up to close scrutiny. To this author, 
the intrinsic revulsion that many people have at the idea of AWS operating without direct human 
control does not fit neatly into common understandings of morality. Considering many bases for 
ethical frameworks were developed in the ancient world, the difficulties of applying moral standards 
to modern machines is not surprising. Still, using the best moral and ethical analysis available, Chapter 
 
12 DARPA, 'Explainable Artificial Intelligence' (Darpa.mil, n.d.) 
Archived:<https://web.archive.org/web/20190813202802/https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-
artificial-intelligence>; Wojciech Samek, Thomas Wiegand and Klaus-Robert Muller, 'Explainable Artificial 




2 managed to build a moral framework that would allow AWS to be used in extremis where they 
reduce risks in comparison to other systems, or they are needed to avoid defeat.13  
However, this also requires humans to make decisions about how the system will be used.14 
As such, human beings must take a role in closely controlling AWS in order for their use to be morally 
compliant. This is similar to the legal framework that this thesis has discussed in detail. The difference 
between these two frameworks is that if, one day, an AWS capable of qualitative analysis could be 
developed to a legally compliant standard, the human role could lawfully become more distant. 
Morally, however, the position would not change. Humans must always take a close role to AWS in 




13 Alex Leveringhaus, Ethics And Autonomous Weapons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 82-86. 
14 This is because the machines cannot make decisions ‘for the right reasons’, see Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins 
and Bradley J. Strawser, 'Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, And Acting For The Right Reasons' (2015) 18 
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